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Abstract 
 
Democracy in the face of disagreement: Environmentalist 
opposition to Escarpment Mine on the Denniston Plateau 
 
Despite New Zealand’s Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) being lauded as 
offering democratic decision-making processes, those in opposition to consent 
applications often feel their input has minimal influence on the decisions made. 
This research explores how democracy is actualised or constrained through 
environmentalist opposition to decisions made about coal-mining on conservation 
land, including both informal and formal participation.  
 
Escarpment Mine is a proposal for an open cast coal mine on the Denniston Plateau 
on the West Coast of New Zealand. The mine was granted resource consents in 
2011 by the two local councils. Environmental activists engaged with these 
decisions through the formal council led submission process, a requirement under 
the RMA, and informally through activism, protest and campaigning. Their 
opposition was founded on concerns about the mine’s effects on conservation and 
climate change.  
 
Drawing on theories of deliberative democracy and radical democracy, I create a 
framework for democracy that includes agonism and antagonism, situated within 
the overarching democratic principles of equality, justice and the rule of the 
people. Through interviewing environmentalists opposed to Escarpment Mine and 
the council officials involved, my research discusses the way environmentalists 
were constrained from participating meaningfully in the formal process due to 
perceived bias and the privileging of neoliberal discourses. I suggest that this case 
reflects a lack of agonism in most areas, and a delegitimising of antagonistic 
activism despite such activism working towards equality and justice. Thus, the case 
does not fulfil the democratic ideals of working with disagreement. 
 
Key words: environmental management, environmentalism, Resource Management Act 1991, 
activism, agonistic planning, radical democracy, communicative planning, deliberative democracy 
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Chapter one:  
Introducing opposition to 
Escarpment Mine and issues with 
democratic decision-making 
 
 
 
 
Coal mining on conservation land is a convergence of multiple environmental and 
democratic concerns. Climate change is primarily caused by human-induced 
greenhouse gas emissions, and thus, the use of coal and consequent release of 
carbon dioxide contributes to climate change. Additionally, a mine that is proposed 
on conservation land risks damage to flora and fauna. Yet those most concerned 
about these environmental issues are not being heard by decision-makers. 
Dominant discourses of neoliberalism and economic gain that drive extractive 
industries often prevail over environmentalists’ concerns. This raises questions 
about justice, equality and democracy. The overarching research objective of this 
thesis is to understand how democracy is actualised or constrained through 
environmentalists’ actions about decisions made for coal-mining on conservation 
land. This is explored through environmentalist opposition to Escarpment Mine on 
the West Coast of the South Island, in both informal participation in democracy 
through activism, and formal participation as prescribed by legislation. 
1.1 Democracy 
Democracy is a contested concept, an ideal under which society has aspired to 
govern itself and be governed. Democratic decision-making is also a generally 
accepted criteria for good environmental governance and management. People 
affected by a decision have a right to have a say in that decision.  This broad 
principle is underpinned by concepts such as equality, justice and rule of the 
people as the founding tenets of democracy. Theories of democracy are broad and 
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dissatisfaction with liberal democracy and representative democracy has led to 
alternative theories emerging that are more participatory and just. In particular, 
deliberative democracy (with the planning equivalent communicative planning) 
and radical democracy (with agonistic planning) propose alternative ways in 
which to conceptualise and work with disagreement in democracy. Deliberative 
democracy focuses on rational deliberation and debate, guiding decisions towards 
consensus (Bond, 2011a; Munton, 2003; Pugh, 2005). Similarly, communicative 
planning is a planning practice that encourages participation in the form of 
deliberation, steering towards consensus in decisions (Bäcklund & Mäntysalo, 
2010; Pugh, 2005). Radical democracy, conversely, suggests that some differences 
in society are irreconcilable, making the aim for consensus unfeasible (Little, 
2002). The concept of agonism is central to radical democracy and agonistic 
planning, whereby disagreement is seen as necessary, not detrimental, for 
democracy to function (McClymont, 2011).   
 
It is important to explore how such theories are reflected in practice, if we are to 
advance democracy in cases where there are strong opposing views about 
decisions affecting the environment and society. This is especially within 
democratic decision-making and participation processes such as in the Resource 
Management Act 1991 (RMA). In particular, such research is critical at a time when 
decision-making about environmentally degrading activities that contribute to 
climate change continue to be made, despite a broad scientific agreement on the 
severity of the consequences that will result from increasing greenhouse gas 
emissions to the atmosphere (IPCC, 2007; Oreskes, 2004).  These issues are both 
pressing and highly contested.  
 
Furthermore, activism and environmentalist action outside the formal processes 
are part of the functioning of democracy, and worthy of research. Young (2001), a 
theorist of deliberative democracy, suggests that theories of democracy rarely 
discuss the role of activism or participation in democracy outside formal 
processes. This thesis, which includes how environmentalists’ activism influenced 
the decisions made about Escarpment Mine, contributes to such theories of 
activism in democracy. Additionally, Bäcklund and Mäntysalo (2010) argue that 
more research is needed in linking theory to practice in agonistic planning theory, 
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further connecting democracy and planning. This is an area which this thesis also 
addresses.  
1.2 Escarpment Mine and environmentalist opposition 
Despite the RMA being lauded as offering democratic decision-making processes, 
environmentalist opposition to large projects is often not heard in favour of 
economic development. Moreover, many groups participate in both activist actions 
outside of the formal decision-making process as well as participating in the formal 
process. In light of the understanding of democracy stated above, I ask how do 
these various activities influence decisions taken on large contested projects with 
significant environmental effects?  Escarpment Mine presents a unique 
opportunity to explore these questions and is the case study used in this research.  
It is a proposal for an open cast coal mine on the Denniston Plateau on the West 
Coast of New Zealand, which was granted various resource consents under the 
RMA in 2011 by the two local councils (Archer, McGarry, & Heal, 2011). 
Environmental activists engaged with the council decisions through the public 
submission process in 2010 and 2011 (Ridge & Inwood, 2011). The council 
decisions were appealed to the Environment Court by two environmental groups, 
with the decision to be announced early 20131 (The Environment Court of New 
Zealand, 2012). Additionally, environmentalists have undertaken extensive 
campaigning and activism in opposition to the proposal2. While campaigning 
appears to have had no direct effect on the formal decision-making process, it has 
prompted public discussion about the environmental effects of such a project 
through mainstream media channels3.  
 
Two factors are of central concern to the environmentalists involved in opposition 
to this mine; conservation and climate change. First, the biodiversity of the 
Denniston Plateau is at threat from habitat destruction caused by Escarpment 
Mine (Forest and Bird, 2012a). The plateau is seen to be a unique ecological 
environment, with some arguing it should be protected from any mining (Forest 
                                                        
1 The hearings were held in late 2012 and at the time of writing, the decision by the Environment 
Court had not been announced. 
2 See Forest and Bird (2012b) and Coal Action Network (2012) for example. 
3 Examples of this case in the media include Berry (2012), Rutherford (2012), TVNZ (2012) and 
Young (2012). 
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and Bird, 2012a; West Coast Environment Network, 2011a). Second, the end-use of 
Escarpment Mine’s coal will release greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. 
Climate change is primarily caused by high levels of greenhouse gases emitted by 
human activity (IPCC, 2007). Despite this, the government continues to support 
exploration for oil and gas, and increased coal mining and production (Ministry of 
Economic Development, 2011). Opening yet another coal mine4 will increase New 
Zealand’s contribution to climate change with irreversible global impacts. 
Regardless of these issues, most environmentalists felt that their concerns about 
biodiversity and climate change were not awarded the attention they deserved in 
the formal participation process under the RMA.  
 
In contrast, the decision-makers at the council-led hearing granted the consents for 
Escarpment Mine based on the economic benefits to the region (Archer et al., 
2011).  Bathurst5, the project developer and consent applicant, argued that the 
mine will bring hundreds of millions of dollars into the Buller district and create 
hundreds of jobs (Archer et al., 2011). The tension between environmental issues 
and economic interests is nothing new, especially in regions dependent on 
extractive industries for economic growth. Dominant discourses that adhere to 
neoliberal ideologies and economic growth prevail, and drive the expansion of 
extractive industries.  
 
Through interviews with environmentalists opposed to Escarpment Mine and 
council officials involved in the decision-making process, this thesis explores the 
way in which democracy is actualised or constrained when environmentalists are 
opposed to such extractive and environmentally degrading activities and where 
there are tensions between the dominant drive for economic growth, and 
environmental protection. Understanding the nexus between formal and informal 
                                                        
4 There are approximately 22 coal mines currently operating in New Zealand (Ministry of Economic 
Development, 2013). 
5 The company with the mining rights that are associated with the Escarpment Mine proposal has 
changed name and ownership. Initially L&M Coal, a local company, applied for consents in 2010, 
but then was acquired by Buller Coal Limited later in 2010 (Bohannan, 2011). Buller Coal Limited is 
a subsidiary of Bathurst Resources Limited (Bohannan, 2011). Throughout this thesis, I have 
referred to the company as Bathurst to avoid confusion, as the company’s ownership is not a critical 
part of this research. 
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participation in democracy is critical to gaining clear insights on how democracy is 
actualised by environmentalist action.  
 
Little has been written about New Zealand’s environmentalism in academic 
literature, and especially not in the area of environmentalists’ influence in formal 
participation processes led by councils or government. Other research on formal 
participation processes has analysed stakeholder involvement in planning 
processes, but little has been undertaken specifically on environmentalist 
participation. This research focuses on environmentalists’ influence in both the 
formal participation process and in activism, contributing to literature on 
environmentalism in New Zealand. 
1.3 Research objective and thesis overview 
In light of the discussion above, the overarching research objective of this thesis is 
to understand how democracy is actualised or constrained through 
environmentalist actions about decisions made on coal-mining in conservation 
land, in both informal participation in democracy through activism, and formal 
participation as prescribed by legislation. 
 
More specifically, my research questions are as follows: 
1. How do theories of democracy, participation and activism address 
disagreement in decisions about the environment?  
2. How have environmentalists’ actions outside of formal processes influenced 
resource consent decisions about coal mining on conservation land?  
3. How has environmentalists’ participation in formal processes influenced 
resource consent decisions about coal mining on conservation land?  
4. How does environmentalist action, both through formal processes and through 
other actions, reflect democratic principles? 
 
Table 1.1 illustrates how the objectives are to be fulfilled, and where in the thesis 
they are discussed. In particular, Chapter two discusses the methodology used in 
this research, with constructivism and post-structuralism as the basis for the 
methods applied. The primary research, consisting of 15 interviews with 
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environmentalists and council officials, is also detailed in Chapter two. Chapter 
three provides context to the case and to environmental politics and activism in 
New Zealand. This includes the influence that environmentalists have had in three 
previous cases of environmentalism in New Zealand, both through formal 
participation processes and outside of these formal processes. In the case of ‘2 
precious 2 mine’, protests around the country and numerous formal submissions 
spurred the government to retract a proposal to remove protection from mining 
for some areas of conservation land. Conversely, the direct action of the Save 
Happy Valley Coalition was unsuccessful in halting the expansion of the Stockton 
Mine. In the Mokihinui case, environmentalists’ efforts in campaigning in 
combination with their participation in the formal participation process under the 
RMA may have contributed to the proposed hydro dam being withdrawn. This 
chapter includes a review of literature and media and publicity from 
environmentalist groups, illustrating the nexus of formal participation processes 
and informal participation through activism, and the influence of both combined.  
 
Table 1.1: How the objective of this thesis will be fulfilled 
Research 
question 
Method of fulfilling research question Chapter  
1 Literature review 4 
2 Interviews with environmentalists and council officials 5 
3 Interviews with environmentalists and council officials 5 
4 Interviews with environmentalists and council officials, 
analysed in relation to literature from Objective 1/Chapter 
four and Chapter three 
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Research question one is discussed through a literature review that is found in 
Chapter four. The ethos of democracy and the theories of deliberative democracy 
and radical democracy are discussed and critiqued, from which I create a 
framework to analyse my case study. Research questions two, three and four have 
been explored through primary research with the chosen case study, 
environmentalist opposition to Escarpment Mine. The interviews with 
environmentalists about the influence of their actions within formal processes and 
outside of these processes, as well as council officers involved, is discussed in 
Chapter five. In Chapter six, I present the analysis of the interviews and the case in 
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relation to theories of democracy and disagreement, using the framework devised 
from the literature that incorporates elements of both deliberative democracy and 
radical democracy. Chapter seven concludes this thesis, as well as making 
recommendations for further research and for planning practice.  
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Chapter two: 
Methodology 
 
 
 
 
The primary research for this thesis is a qualitative study with people involved in a 
consent process for a coal mine in New Zealand. The chosen case study is the 
council planning process and subsequent decisions made about Escarpment Mine, 
the proposed open cast coal mine on the Denniston Plateau on the West Coast of 
the South Island (detailed in Chapter four). The epistemological framework is 
constructivism with a post-structural methodological approach. My primary 
research comprises semi-structured interviews with environmentalists involved in 
the submission process and protest against Escarpment Mine, as well as council 
officers involved in the decision-making processes for the various resource 
consents. A Foucauldian discourse analysis was used to analyse the data. This 
chapter outlines this approach and associated methods in more detail. 
2.1 Constructivist epistemology 
Constructivism6  is an epistemology that perceives reality and knowledge as being 
socially constructed and subjective, whereby an absolute truth is neither possible 
nor desirable (Baxter & Jack, 2008; Costantino, 2008; Creswell, 2003; Kobayashi, 
2001). The meanings that individuals seek and create of the world “are varied and 
multiple, leading the researcher to look for the complexity of views rather than 
narrowing meanings into a few categories or ideas” (Creswell, 2003, p. 8). Thus, 
the purpose of research is to explore participants’ perspectives of the situation 
under study (Creswell, 2003). Holstein and Gubrium (2011) suggest that “the hows 
and whats of the social construction process echo Karl Marx’s (1956) maxim that 
people actively construct their worlds but not completely on, or in, their own 
                                                        
6 While there are subtle differences in the history of constructivism and social constructionism, 
they are often used interchangeably (Costantino, 2008). In this thesis, particularly in Section 2.1, I 
employ the term constructivism to refer to the commonalities between both constructivism and 
social constructionism.  
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terms” (p. 342, emphasis in original). Social, historical and political contexts shape 
peoples’ meanings and perceptions of the world around them. Constructivism 
lends itself to a post-structuralist methodology, as well as a critical understanding 
of discourse and power.  
2.1.1 Post-structuralism 
Post-structuralism is my methodological approach because I interpret the 
knowledge created in this research to be situated in participants’ understandings 
and subjective experiences, as well as ways of telling and re-telling such 
understandings. Post-structuralist approaches reject and deconstruct the idea of 
overarching structural powers, in favour of an understanding of subjective 
meaning and power that is social and relational (Davies & Gannon, 2005; Fawcett, 
2008; Limb & Dwyer, 2001). This reinforces the epistemology of constructivism. 
The fluidity and dynamic nature of meanings is emphasised (Fawcett, 2008; Limb 
& Dwyer, 2001), while “meaning can be produced and temporarily fixed only in 
specific contexts” (Fawcett, 2008, p. 667). Post-structural qualitative research 
analysis emphasises the diversity of roles that people have, and how people’s 
descriptions of events are essentially their own construction and interpretation of 
what has occurred (Fawcett, 2008). Thus, I understand knowledge to be held by 
the ‘knower’, meaning that the telling of knowledge is also interpreted through the 
listeners’ knowledge.  
 
A post-structural analysis requires the researcher to take “apart the endless layers 
that are seen to constitute social reality” (Fawcett, 2008, p. 668), particularly 
through looking for recurring themes, patterns, contradictions and variation 
within research participants’ accounts (Fawcett, 2008). This understanding of 
knowledge makes the interpretation of language key to the analysis of the data. A 
post-structural approach lends itself to discourse analysis (discussed below), and 
an acknowledgement of the researcher’s positioning in the world (see 2.1.3).  
2.1.2 Power and discourse 
Under a constructivist approach, knowledge is not in the mind of an individual, but 
is created socially (Gergen & Gergen, 2008). Holstein and Gubrium (2011) state 
that Foucault recognised how historical and cultural contexts shape people, their 
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knowledge and their meanings of the world. Discourse can be considered as 
socially constructed bodies of language with certain associations and meaning 
(Cook, 2008). Followers of Foucault emphasise that discourses “are not merely 
bodies of ideas, ideologies, or other symbolic formulations, but are also working 
attitudes, modes of address, terms of reference, and courses of action suffused into 
social practices” (Holstein & Gubrium, 2011, p. 344). From a Foucauldian 
perspective, different socially constructed knowledges and groupings of language 
interact, demonstrating relationships of power (Cook, 2008; Kobayashi, 2001). 
This perspective argues that language and the way language is used is critical to 
understanding how society functions and the various dimensions of power in 
social relations (Robbins, 2012).  
 
When there are dominant discourses, or when knowledges are assumed to be 
universal or absolute, other knowledges, understandings or assumptions are 
undermined and considered outside the realm of possibility (Gergen & Gergen, 
2008; Holstein & Gubrium, 2011). Foucault’s theories suggest that “some logics 
come to pervade a network of power relations so that people, groups, and 
institutions within that web come to naturalize and accept these logics as their 
own” (Robbins, 2011, p. 75). Fawcett (2008) suggests, of Foucault’s work, that 
while it may appear that some people stand a lot to gain from a dominant 
discourse, these people “are voluntarily more constrained by regulatory aspects 
than others occupying less privileged positions” (p. 667). Hence, prevailing 
discourses involve power and the governing of individuals’ actions for all those 
involved, regardless of their positioning.  
 
Kobayashi (2001) suggests that social science research aims to “understand the 
conditions under which human actions have more or less efficacy, more or less 
power to affect others and to effect change” (p. 67). Robbins (2012) proposes that 
researchers investigate how people create their environmentalist identities in 
asking “what systems of control do such subjects make social and political sense?” 
(p. 76). Studying the efficacy of actions and the relationships of power between 
various knowledges is fundamental to my research on how environmentalist 
action is able to have influence in planning decisions about coal-mining on 
conservation land, particularly when there are certain discourses that dominate in 
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the decision-making process.  It is important to reveal how power is actuated in 
such a way as to deny meaningful participation in a so-called democratic decision-
making process.  
2.1.3 My positionality  
With discourse as “the nexus between power and knowledge” (Cheek, 2008, p. 
355), all language is laden with value and there will be unstated meanings 
associated with language used between researcher and research participants 
(Cheek, 2008). Creswell (2003) states “the researcher filters the data through a 
personal lens that is situated in a specific socio-political and historical moment” (p. 
182). The researcher’s awareness of their positioning in relation to those under 
study, as well as self-reflection about the research process, is part of a post-
structuralist approach (Davies & Gannon, 2005; Fawcett, 2008) and qualitative 
approaches (Limb & Dwyer, 2001; Mason, 2002). In using a discourse analysis 
approach to interpreting data, the researcher must acknowledge that they will be 
associating their own meanings with language used by research participants, and 
therefore transparency in their positionality is critical for sound research (Cheek, 
2008; Waitt, 2010).  
 
As a researcher I am aware of my own positionality, and the way that this 
influences how I interpret and analyse information offered to me. Here I briefly 
discuss things in my life that influence my positionality. I am a member of Forest 
and Bird and several other environmentalist groups. Prior to this research I 
received information about the case studied here and followed it with interest, 
along with other information on issues to do with conservation and climate 
change. I also sometimes participate in petitions or protests, although I have not 
been involved in coordinating such actions. I have experienced working as a 
council officer between 2008 and 2011. This helped me understand the neutral, so-
called objective stance that council officers tend to present when talking about 
council processes and decisions, out of a perceived necessity to promote fairness. 
In this sense, there is the potential for my research to be interpreted through the 
knowledge I have constructed in myself with experience of both environmentalism 
and work as a council officer. Being aware of the potential for my bias creates a 
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transparency in the research process, aiding me to conduct fair and thorough 
research.  
 
Kobayashi (2001) discusses the challenges of remaining neutral during interviews. 
She argues that while not revealing her opinion on the issues discussed during the 
interviews and ensuring that questions gave opportunities for a wide scope of 
answers, neutrality is simply not possible. There is always naturally more rapport 
with some interviewees compared to others (Kobayashi, 2001). Furthermore, 
there are often “a few hostile to our stated intentions” (Kobayashi, 2001, p. 64). 
While I did not experience hostility from any research participants, I sensed that 
my positionality and the personalities of those I interviewed shaped the way 
participants communicated with me in interviews. Clearly some people chose their 
words very carefully (in particular one of the council officers), while others were 
very open with what they disclosed. Many participants welcomed me into their 
homes, with one offering for me to stay in their spare room and others inviting me 
for meals. Mostly I declined such offers due to time restrictions, but I accepted 
where it felt fitting. There were also moments where environmentalists expressed 
such depth of emotion about issues that I, too, have views about. I expressed 
empathy in such situations, particularly when interviewees noted very personal 
concerns, such as threats to personal safety or health. 
 
In her research about racism in Canada, Kobayashi (2001) also discusses the 
ethical obligation to present subjects fairly, while also contributing to research and 
understanding about oppressive relations. At times during interviews, participants 
responded to my interview questions in ways I could not have anticipated. I have 
sought to represent their opinions in a way that is fair and can contribute to 
understandings about such perspectives. I respected each individual’s views and 
knowledge as equally valuable to the research, while also considering views in the 
context of all the data collected.  Although during interviews I was not explicit 
about my opinions on new coal mines, in some cases it may have been apparent 
where my position lay. However, my opinions about coal mining did not change the 
nature of the questions I asked (research questions and objectives, as well as 
interview questions), which focus on democracy, disagreement, and meaningful 
participation in decision-making.   
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While I am aware of my positionality and how it may shape the interview process 
and subsequent analysis of my interviews, I have aimed to conduct fair and just 
research that provides a thorough analysis of the situation by acknowledging 
various points of view and the complexity of the decisions made.  
2.2 Research methods  
In this research I conducted fifteen semi-structured interviews with people in a 
single case study. I used a Foucauldian discourse analysis to explore the data, with 
particular attention to diverse knowledges and power relations between 
discourses. Qualitative methodologies acknowledge the dynamic and subjective 
nature of reality and experience (Limb & Dwyer, 2001), fitting with a constructivist 
post-structuralist approach. Under qualitative approaches, data cannot be 
statistically measured and the idea of ‘truth’ is negated, in favour of lived 
experience and shared meanings (Limb & Dwyer, 2001). 
2.2.1 Case study 
I have chosen a single case study as a focus for my research. This case study is 
discussed in depth in the next chapter. The Escarpment Mine fulfils a number of 
characteristics that are particularly relevant to gaps in the literature about 
environmentalist participation in planning decision-making processes, the role of 
activism in democracy, and environmentalism in New Zealand. Stark and Torrance 
(2005) suggest that case studies in social science research seek “to engage with 
and report the complexity of social activity in order to represent the meanings that 
individual social actors bring to those settings and manufacture in them” (p. 33). 
This aligns with constructivist and post-structural approaches which emphasise 
subjectivity and the context specific nature of peoples’ experiences and meanings. 
This assists in answering the research questions by exploring how 
environmentalists, through their experiences, were able to influence the decisions 
made about Escarpment Mine. 
 
Yin (2009) suggests that case study research is appropriate when the context is 
particularly relevant to the focus of the study, and also for in-depth studies 
focusing on answering ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions about a particular situation.  The 
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context of my chosen case study is critical to exploring how the context of 
dominant discourses has influenced environmentalists’ ability to affect the 
planning consent decision. The previous cases of environmentalism in New 
Zealand and legislation which frames the formal participation processes, as 
discussed in Chapter three, illustrate the privileging of economic development and 
the way in which activism outside the formal process in combination with formal 
participation can effect the most change in environmental decision-making.  
 
Baxter (2010) suggests that case studies can either test theory or generate theory, 
and in some occasions do both. There are varying opinions as to whether single 
case studies are able to create generalizable theory. Stark and Torrence (2005) 
state that case study research “privileges in-depth inquiry over coverage: 
understanding ‘the case’ rather than generalizing to a population at large” (p. 33). 
Flyvbjerg (2006) suggests that depending on the case chosen and the way in which 
it is chosen, singular case study research can provide valuable generalisations. On 
the other hand, George and Bennett (2005) suggest that “for most qualitative 
researchers, the development of a coherent theory itself is of primary concern, not 
necessarily whether the findings challenge hegemonic wisdom or whether findings 
adhere in all or even most cases at the time they are studied” (cited in Baxter, 
2010, p. 95, emphasis in original). This argument is consistent with 
constructivism’s approach to knowledge, in which there is no absolute truth to be 
sought after, and that knowledge is subjective, suggesting that multiple case 
studies are not directly comparable due to the varying context of specific 
situations. Thus, the choice of a single case study for this research is consistent 
with a constructivist approach, whereby the complexity of social, historical and 
political contexts are the basis for individuals’ way-of-knowing and understanding 
the case.  
  
Baxter (2010) and Yin (2009) each suggest that the value of case study research 
lies in the revealing of in-depth understandings about the causes of various social 
phenomena while integrating the various contextual factors that may be critical to 
understanding the circumstances. While the case of Escarpment Mine is specific in 
some respects (coal mining on conservation land), others are likely to contribute to 
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generalizable theories about democratic processes in planning consent decisions 
and the role of activism in democracy.  
2.2.2 Literature review methods 
While my chosen case study and parallel cases have been important in New 
Zealand’s history of environmental activism, there is very little written about them 
in academic literature. Hence, many references in Chapter three and throughout 
this thesis are from websites, newsletters and newspaper articles. When indicated, 
I have also drawn on material from interviews with participants who have been 
involved in various other cases.  
 
The literature review in Chapter four fulfils my first research question, to explore 
how theories of democracy, participation and activism address disagreement in 
decisions about the environment. First, I sought literature about environmentalism 
and environmental activism, in order to demonstrate how environmentalism 
connects to literature about activism in democracy. Second, theories of democracy 
were reviewed to provide a framework with which I could analyse my case study. I 
focussed on literature that was based on the role of activism and disagreement in 
theories of deliberative democracy and radical democracy. Consequently, I created 
the framework for democratic decision-making from these various theories as 
explored in academic literature. 
2.2.3 Interview methods 
Constructivism lends itself to qualitative research through semi-structured 
interviews, as this type of research allows the researcher to foster in-depth 
understanding of the participants’ perspectives and meanings (Creswell, 2003; 
Mason, 2002). There are many benefits to conducting interviews as a form of 
qualitative data collection. Interviews allow the researcher to gain profound 
understanding of people’s subjective perspectives (Dunn, 2010; Peräkylä & 
Ruusuvuori, 2011), as well as allowing for an analysis of situations in the past (as 
in this case study) or at a physical distance (Peräkylä & Ruusuvuori, 2011). Semi-
structured interviews allow the researcher to progress with the aims of a 
constructivist approach and qualitative methodology: to enrich understandings of 
the contextual causes of a situation (Rubin & Rubin, 1995). 
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My primary research methods consisted of fifteen individual semi-structured 
interviews. Participants were chosen through their involvement in decisions made 
about the Escarpment Mine. Participants mainly fell into two groups: 
environmentalists from groups who participated in formal consultation processes 
as well as environmentalist action, and council officials who were involved in 
processing the decision.  I travelled to Nelson, Westport and Greymouth in 
June/July 2012 to complete nine interviews with environmentalists and council 
officials. All interviews were individual, bar one interview that involved two 
people. These interviews were held either in people’s offices, homes, or cafes and 
other public places. Between June and August, four further interviews were held in 
Wellington and Palmerston North, and two via Skype, depending on the location of 
and convenience for the interviewees.  
 
I targeted environmentalists from four environmental groups: one established 
conservation organisation, a more recent network of climate justice campaigners7, 
and two local environmental groups in opposition to the mine. I also met with 
individuals who opposed the mine on environmental grounds who were not 
currently affiliated with the various groups. Environmental activists who were 
associated with these groups were chosen (rather than individuals opposed) as 
their involvement in these groups indicates their broader and on-going 
commitment to environmentalism. These environmentalists enabled me to identify 
significant elements of the democratic nature of the decision-making process, and 
the effect of oppositional action (in this case, environmentalist action), both within 
and outside the formal consultation process. I made contact with 
environmentalists through identifying key actors in the media, and press releases, 
newsletters and websites from various environmental organisations. My personal 
networks also assisted in contacting certain environmentalists. Various 
environmentalists interviewed had been involved in the formal processes and 
activism surrounding similar cases, with two environmentalists not directly 
involved in opposition to Escarpment Mine. Comments about other cases were 
                                                        
7 'Climate justice activists' refers to activists or campaigners who are opposed to fossil fuels as the main 
contribution to climate change and its associated effects (P. Bond & Dorsey, 2010). Although not in this 
particular case, climate justice activists also campaign for the rights of those that will be most impacted by the 
catastrophic effects of climate change.  
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used to support findings about Escarpment Mine. Additionally, two people I 
interviewed were recommended contacts from other environmentalists, and while 
they did not fit the environmentalist criteria, their perceptions and experiences of 
opposing Escarpment Mine supported other participants’ views.  
 
I also interviewed selected council officials who were involved in the decisions and 
participation processes for the Escarpment Mine proposal. The aim of the 
interviews with council officers was to gauge how others involved perceived the 
environmentalists and their influence. Council officers are involved in the decision-
making process in two main areas. First, they are responsible for publicly notifying 
the proposal and communicating with the public about submissions. Second, they 
prepare a report and recommendations for the council hearing commissioners, 
based on the application and the range of submissions received. Thus, their 
perceptions of environmentalists involved in the process was critical to fulfil the 
research objectives, and complementary to the interviews with environmentalists. 
Council officials were approached through contact details provided on council 
websites. Interviewees included officers from the West Coast Regional Council and 
the Buller District Council, as well as one of the three commissioners who were 
chosen by the councils to make the decision.  
 
Table 2. 1 illustrates the research participants, the groupings they belonged to, and 
how they were involved in different aspects of the case. In the following chapters, I 
have referred to participants by a randomly assigned number between 1 and 16 
when discussing their ideas or quoting them directly.  
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Table 2.1: Research participants 
Affiliation Number 
of 
people 
Involved in 
formal 
process 
and/or made 
submission 
Involved in 
another 
similar 
formal 
process 
Environmental 
activism 
Environmentalist 
groups 
4 ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Small 
environmentalist 
group 
2 ✓ X Minimal 
Council 4  ✓ ✓ X 
Local 
environmentalists 
3 X X ✓ 
Other 
environmentalist 
groups 
2 X ✓ ✓ 
TOTAL 16 10 6 11 
 
Approval from the Human Ethics Committee of Victoria University of Wellington 
was received in June 2012, as per Appendix 3. Any potential ethical issues arising 
from the interviews were discussed and resolved through the ethics application 
process. All interviewees were given an information sheet and consent form to sign 
(see Appendix 1). Interviewees were reminded that they were not required to 
answer all or any questions they did not wish to. With participants’ consent, I 
digitally recorded the interviews. While opinions and data have remained 
confidential and participants’ names and organisation are not identified, there may 
be situations where other individuals who are intimately involved in the case may 
be able to identify participants in my research. This is potentially problematic, as 
individuals and organisations involved have reputations to uphold that may be 
damaged if certain responses were attributed to them. This possible identification 
was acknowledged in the consent form and information sheet provided to 
interviewees (Appendix 1), and discussed with each interviewee. I have ensured 
that any identifiers such as age, specific occupation, resident location and role in 
organisation are not revealed in my thesis to avoid the potential for such 
identification. Interestingly, many of the participants stated, without prompting, 
that they had no objection to their real names being used in association with their 
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opinions, but for consistency, I have opted for all participants to remain 
confidential. 
 
Semi-structured interviews make use of a topic guide, where the interview uses 
questions or topics to guide the conversation with the freedom to ask further 
questions as other issues arise (Dunn, 2010). My topic guide (Appendix 2) was 
based on my objectives and various theoretical frameworks of democracy. 
Questions referred to participants lived experiences of the planning process, 
aiming to gather an understanding of their experiences and perspectives on what 
had occurred, as per the constructivist qualitative research approach discussed 
earlier in this chapter. This is in contrast with undertaking a social survey 
interview method, which would ask about “what they ‘would do’, or what they 
have ‘generally done’ under certain circumstances” (Mason, 2002, p. 64). Such 
survey interview methods would imply an approach that is aiming to uncover 
statistical ‘factual’ information, contrary to a constructivist and post-structural 
approach. Because of the semi-structured nature of interviews, some interviews 
also contained a variety of unplanned questions depending on the flow of the 
conversation. The topic guide was indicative of general themes of the conversation, 
and new avenues of discussion emerged as each interview progressed. 
Furthermore, I used open-ended questions, which are crucial for a constructivist 
approach as they allow the research participants to express their perspectives 
from their own cultural and historical context (Creswell, 2003).  
 
In July and August, I transcribed or summarised interviews, depending on the level 
of relevance to my research. I provided transcripts or summaries of the interviews 
to each participant, which they were invited to amend, comment on, or withdraw 
information from. Three participants made minor amendments to the transcripts 
and four replied that no changes were necessary. Other participants did not 
respond to this invitation. My completed thesis will also be available to 
participants, so that they are able to utilise any findings for their own work.  
2.2.4 Analysis 
I used a Foucauldian discourse analysis to analyse my data, using both inductive 
and deductive coding techniques. In line with using a constructivist approach, I 
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focused on generating theory rather than verifying theory (Creswell, 2003). I used 
largely an inductive approach to analysis, although as Creswell (2003) notes, 
qualitative research is an iterative process, often with inductive and deductive 
processes used alternately to develop ideas and group data. In coding data, I found 
that certain codes were developed intuitively (inductively) as a result of the 
interview process, interview content and reflection. In addition, part of my analysis 
involves using theoretical frameworks of democratic decision-making from my 
literature review to code my data (deductive coding). Nonetheless, in accordance 
with a constructivist and discursive approach, I am emphasising interviewees’ own 
perspectives and the discourses that emerge through the interviews, which 
involved building on the codes that arose from the data and expanding on them 
with codes from the literature.  
  
In using discourse analysis, I aimed to gain understandings of the circumstances 
that have led to privileging particular discourse practices (Mason, 2002; Waitt, 
2010), as opposed to simply exploring the contextual factors for actions, as an 
interpretivist would do in their analysis. There are numerous forms of discourse 
analysis, with the common factor being that the analysis focuses on language and 
its role in society (Potter, 2008). Here a Foucauldian discourse analysis was used 
to explore power relationships evident between knowledges, or, the way in which 
discourses are normalised and become dominant over alternative knowledges 
(Cheek, 2008; Waitt, 2010). Another critical element is the identification of 
‘silences’ or omissions of information, as this indicates the power that a privileged 
discourse may have over silenced, alternative meanings or ways of thinking about 
the world (Waitt, 2010).  
 
While discourses appear to have fixed structures (about what is considered 
common-sense, normal or true), the way that discourses are embedded in social 
relations makes them prone to continuous instability (Waitt, 2010). This makes 
space for discourses to be constantly challenged, in turn generating contradictions 
and ambiguities within texts (which are interview transcripts in this case) (Waitt, 
2010). Contradictory themes often emerge in qualitative research given the 
complexity of participants’ meanings (Rubin & Rubin, 1995). The role of the 
research is to interpret the meaning of these contradictions (Rubin & Rubin, 1995), 
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particularly in Foucauldian discourse analysis, where such contradictions may 
indicate challenges to and/or the invisibility of dominant discourses (Waitt, 2010). 
My research uses this concept to reveal the intensity of such discourses, and the 
efficacy of challenging them. This is particularly the case in Chapter five, where I 
discuss the power relationships between different knowledges presented in the 
formal process, and in Chapter six, where certain discourses and understandings of 
democracy prevail over others.  
 
Foucauldian discourse analysis also acknowledges the iterative nature of analysis, 
whereby the research influences the researcher, which in turn influences the way 
that the researcher interprets data (Waitt, 2010). This iterative process has been 
beneficial in my research process to uncover new layers of meaning from the data.  
2.3 Synopsis 
A constructivist epistemology and post-structural approach to this research allows 
for the subjective perspectives of the research participants to be analysed in 
relation to power and discourse. The research process is made more transparent 
through the acknowledgement of my positionality and the influence that my own 
subjective experiences may have on the interpretation and analysis of data. Semi-
structured interviews were used with the purpose of allowing participants to talk 
about their experiences from their perspective and to allow for new topics of 
importance to emerge. The activism surrounding Escarpment Mine and the 
planning consent process, as a single case study, fosters an analysis which is in-
depth, and while the findings are context specific, there are findings that 
contribute to the broader understanding of the discourses at play in planning 
consent processes in general.  
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Chapter three: 
Environmental activism and 
politics in New Zealand 
 
 
 
 
This chapter discusses the context of environmentalist participation in formal 
processes and informal participation through environmental activism. This 
illustrates how environmentalists are able to be effective in government and/or 
council decisions about the environment, and what expectations may have been 
established about the influence of different environmentalist mechanisms on 
decisions taken. More specifically, this chapter discusses the factors that create the 
nexus between formal processes and informal participation through activism, and 
how different compositions of the two are able to effect change.  
 
I start by introducing the proposal for Escarpment Mine and associated factors: the 
company Bathurst; the submission process led by councils for formal participation; 
and the environmentalist opposition to the mine. I then discuss Escarpment Mine 
in relation to other similar cases where environmentalism has been prevalent. 
These parallel cases are most closely related to issues which are evident in the 
opposition to Escarpment Mine, in particular, highlighting the nexus between 
influence in formal processes and environmentalist action or protest outside of 
these formal processes. I have chosen cases that also link to the RMA and the 
Crown Minerals Act 1991 (CMA). These cases are: ‘2 precious 2 mine’; the Save 
Happy Valley Coalition; and the campaign against the proposal for a hydro dam on 
the Mokihinui River8. I discuss how the ‘2 precious 2 mine’ protests in 2010 
provide a backdrop for the way mining on conservation land is perceived in New 
Zealand. This is also an example of how protest action can be highly effective 
                                                        
8 There have been many campaigns that have been far-reaching that are not discussed in this chapter (such as 
the Native Forest Campaign of the late 1970s, or the protests against genetic engineering from the late 1990s). 
These are also important cases but have less in common with the Escarpment Mine proposal. 
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alongside formal participation. Secondly, in comparing the Escarpment Mine case 
with the Save Happy Valley Coalition, I illustrate two different approaches to 
environmentalist opposition to coal mining on conservation land when the RMA is 
the primary legislation applicable. Thirdly, I show the resemblance between 
Escarpment Mine and the Save the Mokihinui campaign, highlighting the nexus 
between formal participation and informal participation, and the effectiveness of 
combined participation.  
 
In addition to environmentalist protest, all of these examples operate under 
legislation which has differing requirements for formal participation. I primarily 
discuss the RMA, as well as its relationship to the Conservation Act and the CMA, in 
order to demonstrate the legislative requirements enabling participation. These 
statutes tend to favour neoliberal ideals, raising issues for democracy. 
Furthermore, these requirements for formal participation may lead decision-
makers to deny the validity of activism. The hegemonic idea that participation can 
only occur through formal processes also raises issues for how democracy is 
practised, especially by those with decision-making power. 
3.1 Escarpment Mine on the Denniston Plateau and parallel 
cases 
The Denniston Plateau lies north of Westport on the West Coast of the South 
Island, as shown in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. Bathurst Resources Limited, an Australian 
mining company, was granted resource consent in 2011 for an open-cast coal mine 
in the Denniston Plateau9 (Archer et al., 2011). This project was considered under 
the RMA10, by the West Coast Regional Council and the Buller District Council, the 
boundaries of which can be seen in Figure 3.3. As listed in Table 3.1, the formal 
written submission process was 24 September to 22 October 2010, with significant 
opposition to the project on environmental grounds (Ridge & Inwood, 2011). The 
hearing committee was held over 13 days in June and July 2011 (Archer et al., 
                                                        
9 The Denniston Plateau was the site of an underground coal mine from the 1870s, peaking in the 
late 1800s, and slowing to a halt from the 1960s to the 1990s (Nathan, 2013; Sherwood & Phillips, 
n.d.). However, one participant stated that the underground mining and associated infrastructure 
only modified up to 7% of the plateau (participant 2). It seems this modification was mainly 
underground, meaning that most of the plateau still comprises of undisturbed conservation land 
(participant 2).  
10 The RMA process will be detailed in Section 3.2. 
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2011). In 2012, Forest and Bird and the West Coast Environmental Network 
Incorporated appealed the decision to the Environment Court, with the decision on 
the hearing to be announced in 2013 (The Environment Court of New Zealand, 
2012). The Escarpment Mine proposal and associated environmentalist concerns 
have many similarities to the three parallel cases chosen; concern about mining on 
conservation land, formal participation under the RMA and other submission 
processes, and activism outside of these processes.   
 
Table 3.1: Important dates in the formal process of Escarpment Mine 
Time period Activity 
September and October 
2010 
Formal submission process 
June and July 2011 Hearing committee (council led) 
October to December 2012 Environment Court hearing 
Early 2013 Environment Court decision to be 
announced 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Map of New Zealand, with the location of the Denniston Plateau (as indicated with red 
arrow). Source: Land Information New Zealand (n.d.). 
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Figure 3.2: The Denniston Plateau (as indicated with red arrow) in relation to Westport. Source: 
Land Information New Zealand (n.d.). 
 
 
Figure 3.3: The West Coast Regional Council’s boundary area, illustrating the three district councils 
within this area. Source: Department of Internal Affairs (2011).  
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3.1.1 Environmentalist opposition to Escarpment Mine 
There are various groups in opposition to the mine, with three appearing to be the 
most publicly active: Forest and Bird, West Coast Environment Network, and Coal 
Action Network Aotearoa. The West Coast Environment Network is a group local to 
the West Coast, while the Coal Action Network is a nationwide network of climate 
justice campaigners against coal mining and processing in New Zealand (Coal 
Action Network Aotearoa, 2012). Forest and Bird is a well-established New 
Zealand conservation organisation that has been in operation since 1923 (Forest 
and Bird, 2012b).  
 
Two factors are of central concern to the environmentalists involved in protest 
against this mine: conservation and climate change.  The end-use of Escarpment 
Mine’s coal will release greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, regardless of where 
it is used. Human-induced greenhouse gas emissions are the primary cause of 
climate change, with severe global consequences (IPCC, 2007; Oreskes, 2004). 
However, the New Zealand government continues to support exploration for oil 
and gas, and increased coal mining and production (Ministry of Economic 
Development, 2011), increasing greenhouse gas emissions. More coal mines11 will 
increase New Zealand’s contribution to climate change, and thus, to severe global 
impacts. Forest and Bird say that Escarpment Mine will increase New Zealand's 
coal exports by up to 63% per year (Forest and Bird, 2012a). 
 
Furthermore, the biodiversity of the Denniston Plateau is at threat from habitat 
destruction caused by Escarpment Mine (Forest and Bird, 2012a). The area is a 
prime conservation area for native flora and fauna, and DoC has also listed 
significant ecological concerns in their technical report about the proposal (West 
Coast Environment Network, 2011a). Forest and Bird say that the area should be 
under Schedule 4 of the CMA, which would protect it from mining (Forest and Bird, 
2012b). Bathurst Resources has argued that these conservation concerns will be 
mitigated through conservation projects, yet environmentalists state that these 
efforts would not be able to repair the damage done by the mine (Martin, 2011).  
 
                                                        
11 There are approximately 22 coal mines currently operating in New Zealand (Ministry of 
Economic Development, 2013). 
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While Escarpment Mine is one specific case of a proposal for a mine on 
conservation land, the 2 precious 2 mine campaign illustrates strong public 
opposition to any form of mining on conservation land across New Zealand. 
3.1.2 ‘2 precious 2 mine’: New Zealand’s conservation land and the art of 
nationwide protest 
The 2010 “2 precious 2 mine” campaign started as a response to the government’s 
proposal to remove conservation land from the protection of Schedule 4 of the 
CMA, in order for it to be possible to mine on this land. Land listed in Schedule 4 is 
protected from any mining activity and includes some of New Zealand’s most 
prized areas of native flora and fauna.  
 
This case demonstrates the nexus between participation in formal processes and 
environmentalist protest outside of formal processes. In May 2010, New Zealand 
had its largest protest march yet, with approximately 50,000 people marching in 
different centres around the country in protest to the government’s proposal of 
removing 7058 hectares of conservation areas from Schedule 4  (Coleman-Ross, 
2010; NZPA and NZHerald Staff, 2010; ONE News, 2010). The protest included an 
estimated 40,000 people who marched up Queen Street in Auckland (NZPA and 
NZHerald Staff, 2010; ONE News, 2010). A representative from the Federated 
Mountain Clubs stated “The message to the Government is clear - keep your greedy 
hands off our precious landscapes” (NZPA and NZHerald Staff, 2010, para. 17). The 
protest was spurred by the proposal for allowing mining in National Parks12, the 
highest tier of conservation land (Parliamentary Commissioner for the 
Environment, 2010). Alongside raising awareness around mining on conservation 
land, the protests highlighted related issues, with many protestors holding anti-
mining views and calling for action against climate change (Greenpeace, 2010).  
 
This protest, campaigning and relentless public debate through the media, was 
combined with over 37,000 formal submissions on the legislative changes, with the 
vast majority being against any conservation areas being removed from Schedule 4 
(Ministry of Economic Development, 2010). Concerns cited were mostly focused 
                                                        
12 All National Parks are included in Schedule 4 of the CMA, as well as some areas from the other 
categories of conservation land (Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, 2010). 
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on conservation, as well as concerns about climate change and the lack of 
economic viability (Ministry of Economic Development, 2010). As a consequence of 
these submissions and the protests, in July 2010, the government abandoned their 
plans to remove the proposed areas from Schedule 4 (Ministry of Business 
Innovation and Employment, 2011). Participation in formal processes and actions 
outside these processes both clearly had a strong impact.  
  
Escarpment Mine is not on Schedule 4 land; in fact it is classed as Stewardship 
Land, having one of the lower levels of conservation protection while still being 
managed by DoC. It was therefore unaffected by the government’s proposed 
changes to mining rules. Figure 3.4 shows the distribution of the different types of 
conservation land across the country. Approximately sixty percent of land 
managed by DoC is currently not protected from mining (Parliamentary 
Commissioner for the Environment, 2010). However it was unclear whether the 
public was aware of this figure or the diversity of conservation land, and how the 
outcomes of the protest would or would not affect the remainder of this 
conservation land. Opposition to Escarpment Mine can be considered a specific 
case that aligns with the values of the ‘2 precious 2 mine’ protests, despite it not 
being in Schedule 4 of the CMA. ‘2 precious 2 mine’ illustrates the widespread 
concern for preserving the conservation estate, but also perhaps a lack of 
understanding about the diversity of conservation land and the permitted 
activities that already exist on conservation land.  
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Figure 3.4: DoC owned land across New Zealand. Source: Department of Conservation (2011). 
3.1.2 Save Happy Valley 
Another specific example of mining on conservation land is the Stockton Mine, 
which has included different parcels of conservation land at various points in the 
mine’s development (Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, 2009). 
The Stockton Plateau lies 35km north of Westport (Solid Energy, 2012), just north 
of the Denniston Plateau where Escarpment Mine is proposed. Since the late 
1980s, the Stockton Mine has  been in operation as New Zealand’s largest open cast 
coal mine, currently owned by the Stockton Alliance13 (Solid Energy, 2012). The 
Escarpment Mine proposal is also for an open cast coal mine, with environmental 
concerns similar to those identified with the Stockton Mine. Mining’s destruction of 
the Stockton Plateau is often cited as a reason for protecting the Denniston Plateau, 
given that they were the last two landscapes of their kind (Forest and Bird, 2012a). 
                                                        
13 The Stockton Alliance is comprised of Solid Energy, a State Owned Enterprise, and Downer EDI 
Mining NZ, a works and engineering company (Solid Energy, 2012).  
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The landscapes of both plateaus have included tussock, unusual rock formations, 
and low-lying scrub, with native fauna thriving in the area including kiwi and a 
high diversity of invertebrate (Forest and Bird, 2012a). The Stockton mine has 
expanded gradually into the Upper Waimangaroa Valley, or Happy Valley 
(participant 11), employing a strategy that is allowable under the RMA, of seeking 
additional resource consents as needed. This means that only the effects of the 
additional activities are considered, and not the wider cumulative effects in 
relation to the adverse effects of other activities already consented (participant 
11).  
 
In 2004, the Save Happy Valley Coalition began, with a group of young radical 
activists from around the country who felt that it was futile to rely on participation 
under the formal processes of the RMA to halt the mine’s expansion. As they would 
state to the media,  “ ‘the process will fail this valley and therefore we are doing all 
the other work of public education and direct action and campaigning’ … which 
was totally true, cos every court did fail the valley” (participant 11). After a High 
Court decision in December 2005 upheld the consents granted for the Stockton 
Alliance’s Cypress Extension Mine in Happy Valley (NZPA, 2006), the Save Happy 
Valley Coalition decided that non-violent direct action was their best option for 
opposing Stockton Mine’s expansion (Martin, 2011). Their main action was 
establishing an occupation of the proposed mine area in 2006, and occupying the 
area for three years (Martin, 2011). Activists lived on site (a one hour drive from 
Westport followed by a three to five hour tramp) and had logistical support from 
other activists (participants 8 and 11). There were also Save Happy Valley 
Coalition meetings held in a number of cities across New Zealand, with various 
other protests and media exposure. The Save Happy Valley Coalition held a 
number of public meetings, although they tended to focus on more radical action 
such as the occupation of the valley and other non-violent direct actions (The Wire 
(Radio show), 2007; participants 8 and 11).  
 
Over seven months in 2006 and 2007, the group was infiltrated by someone posing 
as an activist on behalf of Thompson and Clark, a private detective agency 
supplying information to Solid Energy ("The activist who turned police informer", 
2008; The Wire (Radio show), 2007). The spokesperson for the Coalition,  said in a 
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radio interview that it was unlawful that Thompson and Clark hired an infiltrator 
“to undermine these campaigns that are trying to raise important issues such as 
climate change which are really critical in our society at the current time”(The 
Wire (Radio show), 2007). In 2012, the outgoing chair of Solid Energy defended 
their stance, claiming there was legitimate concern to warrant spying on the Save 
Happy Valley Coalition, and that protestors “will use whatever tactics no matter 
how lawful or how scurrilous, they will use whatever tactics they can to pursue 
their ends" (John Palmer, as quoted in Steeman, 2012, para. 18).  
 
This case highlights the power and privilege that mining companies have in the 
political system and in society. It is difficult to measure the influence that these 
activists have had on society, but certainly it appears that their protests were 
highly challenging to the companies involved. In this case, radical protest and 
direct action, not accompanied by participation in the formal process, was 
ineffective in influencing the decisions to grant the consents. A Solid Energy annual 
report states that the construction for access to the Cypress Extension site began in 
2010, and it appears that the mine will come into production over 2011-2014 
(Solid Energy, 2011). There has been little information publicly available about 
whether this has already begun.  
3.1.4 Mokihinui 
This next case demonstrates the nexus of formal and informal participation, and 
how having diversity in the formal decision-making panel, in combination with a 
strong public campaign, can lead to a successful outcome for conservation. The 
Mokihinui River is approximately 50km north of Westport. Meridian Energy 
applied for resource consents for the Mokihinui Hydro Power Scheme in 2007, 
which would have involved damming part of the river (West Coast Regional 
Council and Buller District Council, 2010). The project would have generated 85-
100 megawatts of power (Meridian Energy, 2010), securing cheaper electricity 
supply to the West Coast, which is currently expensive due to the reliance on one 
main transmission line entering the region (Arnold, 2010).  
 
The hearings for the consents, led by the West Coast Regional Council and the 
Buller District Council, were held between August 2008 and April 2009 (Meridian 
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Energy, 2009). These were the same two councils involved in the Escarpment Mine 
consent process. There were 298 submissions against the Mokihinui proposal 
(Arnold, 2010)14, yet despite this, in 2010, the commissioners granted consent for 
the dam, stating that they had “determined that the scheme is consistent with the 
sustainable management of natural and physical resources and should be allowed 
to proceed”15 (Mokihinui Hydro Proposal Decision Summary 31 March 2010, 
2010). One of the three commissioners, an ecologist, did not agree to the consents 
being granted, and in the decision summary, he stated: 
Environments such as the Mokihinui catchment are finite resources confined to parts of 
New Zealand and I consider that the change that the proposed dam and its associated 
reservoir would impart to this unmodified environment cannot be adequately mitigated, 
nor can it be recreated to the same degree or scale now or in the foreseeable future 
(Mokihinui Hydro Proposal Decision Summary 31 March 2010, 2010, section 123). 
 
A number of groups appealed the consents through the Environment Court on 
similar grounds: DoC, Forest and Bird, the West Coast Environment Network and 
Whitewater New Zealand (Department of Conservation, 2010; Meridian Energy, 
2012). DoC (2010) argued that the dam and associated infrastructure would 
significantly damage the river, native bush and threatened wildlife in the area. In 
contrast, Meridian Energy’s position on the appeals was that the Mokihinui was 
one of two “exceptional renewable energy projects that can extend New Zealand’s 
reputation for creating world class engineering, environmental and socially 
acceptable solutions” (Meridian Energy, 2010, p. 3). Furthermore, and similar to 
arguments made about the economic benefits of Escarpment Mine, Meridian 
Energy stated “It is very important to our country’s growth aspirations that 
projects like these are built” (Meridian Energy, 2010, p. 3). The argument of 
economic growth has often been used to support the use of natural resources in 
generating income, often to the detriment of the environment.  
 
As well as being involved in the formal processes, environmental groups were 
involved in a nationwide public campaign to save the Mokihinui River from being 
                                                        
14 In comparison, there were 109 submissions in support of the project (Peacock, Allan, & Bayley, 
2008), less than half the number of those opposed.  
15 Section 5 of the RMA states that the purpose of the act is to promote sustainable management, 
followed by a definition of sustainable management. This is discussed further in Section 3.2.1 of this 
chapter.  
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dammed. The strength of the campaign by various groups and their involvement in 
the formal processes clearly had an impact. In May 2012, Meridian Energy 
announced it would not proceed with the project, and formally withdrew the 
application from the Environment Court (Meridian Energy, 2012). Meridian 
Energy (2012) expressed that while the project was economically beneficial to the 
area, the potential costs involved for gaining access to DoC’s stewardship land 
were too high to risk proceeding with the project. Forest and Bird president, 
Andrew Cutler, said that “It's great to see that grass roots campaigns can still win 
against developments backed by huge businesses” (Forest and Bird, 2012d, para. 
10).  
 
While the Mokihinui Hydro proposal was formally considered under the RMA, the 
Mokihinui planning consent process had significant input from DoC, unlike 
Escarpment Mine where DoC did not present an oral submission at the council 
hearing. Participants I interviewed criticised DoC’s lack of involvement in the 
hearing for Escarpment Mine (participants 3, 5, 8, 9, 10, 13 and 14). Although the 
Mokihinui project consents were granted by the hearing committee, having 
appropriate ecological expertise on the committee appeared to emphasise the 
environmental concerns with the project. In the case of Escarpment Mine, there 
was minimal ecological expertise on the hearing committee, and Bathurst 
appeared to be un-phased by the cost of the Environment Court hearings or the 
DoC access arrangement, unlike Meridian, who cited these costs as the main reason 
for withdrawing the proposal (Meridian Energy, 2012).  
 
While the outcomes of each of these three cases were different, they highlight the 
ways in which activism can be effective in influencing decisions made about the 
environment, and that formal participation is not isolated from informal 
participation in democracy through activism. It is evident that context is critical. 
Save Mokihinui and ‘2 precious 2 mine’ demonstrated the strength of the 
combination of formal participation and actions outside formal processes, but the 
outcomes of this combination are yet to be seen in Escarpment Mine. Save Happy 
Valley illustrated the privileging of the company’s economic reasoning, and the 
inability for radical direct action to halt the mine. These cases demonstrate that 
activism is a central part of democracy, that the formal decision-making process 
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under the RMA is not consistent, and that decisions made about such projects are 
susceptible to activism and public pressure. In order for democracy’s key 
principles of justice, equality and people’s participation16 to be fulfilled, there must 
be acknowledgement of the nexus between formal participation processes and 
activism.  
3.2 Formal participation processes under legislation 
Escarpment Mine is a proposal that encompasses various decision-making 
processes under the RMA, the CMA and the Conservation Act 1987. In my research 
on how environmentalists have engaged in the formal participation processes, I 
have focused on the RMA. This is because the permits granted under the CMA do 
not require public participation, and the concessions that may be required under 
the Conservation Act have yet to occur.  
3.2.1 Resource Management Act 1991 
The purpose of the RMA “is to promote the sustainable management of natural and 
physical resources” (Resource Management Act 1991, Part 2, Section 5). 
The definition of sustainable management includes:  
(a) sustaining the potential of natural and physical resources (excluding minerals) to meet 
the reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations; and 
(b) safeguarding the life-supporting capacity of air, water, soil, and ecosystems (Resource 
Management Act 1991, Part 2, Section 5). 
Under the RMA, city, district and regional councils are given the authority to make 
decisions about the environment and must consider the environmental effects of 
any proposals, as well as the social, economic, and cultural effects on communities. 
Any adverse environmental effects must be avoided, remedied or mitigated 
(Resource Management Act 1991, Part 2, Section 5). 
 
The applicant, in the Escarpment Mine case Bathurst Resources Limited, applied to 
both district and regional councils depending on the type of consent required. 
Regional councils and district councils oversee activities that have more than 
minor effects on the environment via policies and rules in district and regional 
plans as prescribed by the RMA. Plans provide for types of activities that require 
                                                        
16 This is discussed in detail in Chapter four.  
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different types of resource consents in order to be undertaken. District councils are 
responsible for land-use consents and regional councils are responsible for water 
permits and discharges to air and water. Accordingly, Bathurst applied to the West 
Coast Regional Council for discharge and water permits associated with mining the 
coal, as well as for coal processing, transportation and stockpiling facilities (Ridge 
& Inwood, 2011). In addition, Bathurst applied to the Buller District Council for a 
number of land use consents: mining; widening a road; constructing and operating 
two pipelines, a coal processing plant, a coal handling facility and an electrical 
substation; and using and transporting hazardous substances (Ridge & Inwood, 
2011). 
 
On receiving the applications, council officers decide whether it will be publicly 
notified based on the extent of the effects on the environment (Fuller, 2008). This 
public notification enables the public to make submissions for or against a project 
(Fuller, 2008). Escarpment Mine, like other large scale projects, was publicly 
notified in late 2010. After the submission process and time for officers to prepare 
a report and recommendations, a hearing was held for the applicant (Bathurst) 
and submitters (including environmentalists) to make oral presentations. At this 
point, the councils involved can delegate their decision-making authority to chosen 
commissioners (Resource Management Act 1991, Section 34A). In this case, 
members of four environmentalist groups were amongst those that submitted 
against the mine (Ridge & Inwood, 2011). Bathurst was granted the consents for 
Escarpment Mine by the councils, with the commissioners emphasising the 
considerable economic benefits to the region (Archer et al., 2011). These benefits 
of the proposal were given significantly more weight than the ecological and 
conservation concerns accentuated by the environmentalists opposed to the 
project (Archer et al., 2011).  
 
If a person who has made a submission during this council process does not agree 
with the decisions made by the councils, they are able to make an appeal in the 
Environment Court (Ministry for the Environment, 2009a). The court is able to 
overturn a decision or to enforce a council’s decision (Ministry for the 
Environment, 2009a). Forest and Bird and the West Coast Environment Network 
appealed the councils’ decisions in the Environment Court in late 2012, with the 
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decision to be announced later in 2013 (The Environment Court of New Zealand, 
2012).  The Environment Court makes a decision after hearing all the evidence 
provided at the council hearing, and additional expert evidence where supplied by 
the appellant or defendant (Ministry for the Environment, 2009b). The 
Environment Court decision may be taken to the High Court, but only on points of 
law (Ministry for the Environment, 2009b). 
3.2.2 Crown Minerals Act 1991 and the Conservation Act 1987 
The CMA governs permits for exploration and extraction of minerals, oil and gas 
(Heatley, 2012). While developers of a mining project have to apply for resource 
consents under the RMA for environmental effects of mining activities such as 
discharge to air and water and the construction of any buildings, the permits 
granted under the CMA are for permission to explore or extract minerals and to 
access land. As such, Bathurst bought the mining permits from L&M Coal (who had 
originally acquired the permits) in early 2010, and then also bought out L&M Coal 
to become Buller Coal Ltd, a subsidiary of Bathurst Resources Ltd (Hartley, 2010). 
The CMA also defines the royalties that are paid to the Government by mining 
companies (Heatley, 2012).  Under the CMA, specific access permits are not 
publicly notified, and thus, my analysis of formal participation in the Escarpment 
Mine case instead focuses on the RMA. 
 
The Conservation Act 1987 is the legislation under which DoC grants concessions 
to build on land managed by DoC. Part 3B, Sections 17O to 17ZJ of the act outlines 
the process for making decisions about concessions. However, as per Section 
17O(3), “a concession is not required in respect of - (a) any mining activity 
authorised under the Crown Minerals Act 1991”. This means that factors normally 
considered under the Conservation Act are not considered if the area has been 
authorised for mining, such as with Escarpment Mine. 
 
There are various categories of conservation land, and the Denniston Plateau is 
categorised as stewardship land, meaning it has minimal conservation protection. 
There have been various calls for the Denniston Plateau to be classed as Schedule 4 
land under the CMA, meaning that it would be protected from mining  (TVNZ, 
2012). Despite being granted mining permits under the CMA, a company still needs 
38 
 
permission from the landowner for access arrangements in order to proceed with 
the mine. In the case of Escarpment Mine, Bathurst still needs access permission 
from the Department of Conservation, which administers the land on the 
Denniston Plateau. Under the Conservation Act, if DoC recommends to the Minister 
of Conservation that a concession be required for the use of conservation land 
associated with the functioning of the mine, the company will have to apply for a 
concession. This concession application will involve public notification and a 
submission period. This is yet to occur for Escarpment Mine.  
 
There are interesting intersections of these two acts. In 2011 before the national 
elections, Minister of Conservation Kate Wilkinson and Minister of Energy and 
Resources Gerry Brownlee said that significant proposals to mine on conservation 
land should involve the public, signalling that a case like Escarpment Mine would 
be publicly notified (Stephenson, 2011). However, a day after elections, this 
statement was retracted (Stephenson, 2011). This has been criticised by the public 
and numerous environmentalists. It is interesting to note that the Ministers are 
responsible for making these permit and concession decisions under the CMA and 
Conservation Act, while decision-making under the RMA gives the responsibility to 
a hearing committee that perhaps could be considered less biased than the 
government of the day.  
 
This section has illustrated the complex interactions of the legislation involved in 
proposals for mining on conservation land. These acts also raise questions 
surrounding the value of public involvement, and how environmentalists may have 
significant contributions to make when permitted to voice these concerns formally 
through public notification processes.  
3.3 Environmentalism and the rise of a neoliberal agenda 
As will be discussed in Chapter four, types of participation in democracy are 
critical to understanding the interconnectedness between environmentalist 
activism and political decision-making. This chapter thus far has discussed the 
current state of affairs with recent cases which are comparable to Escarpment 
Mine. Nevertheless, the history of how these decision-making frameworks came 
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about is also important to understand how particular processes and values are 
privileged by decision-makers.  
 
Downes (2000) suggests that the Muldoon Government (1975 to 1984) used the 
global energy crisis to hasten political decisions about energy without public 
involvement in New Zealand, leading to strong environmental movements calling 
for participation. Eckersley (1992) reiterates this concept by suggesting that “the 
early wave of environmental activism was generally seen as but a facet of the civil 
rights movement in its concern for more grassroots democratic participation in 
societal decision-making, in this case, land and resource usage” (Eckersley, 1992, p. 
9). While activism was about specific environmental concerns, more importantly, it 
sought a system change and an increase in formal public participation processes. 
The Save Manapouri Campaign illustrates this well.  
3.3.1 Save Manapouri and the legacy of environmentalism 
Controversy over proposals to increase the level of Lake Manapouri spurred 
protest, public meetings, petitions and media attention from the 1950s to 1970s 
across the country in a way that was unprecedented in New Zealand’s history 
(Peat, 1994; Wilson, 1982). The proposal involved building a hydro-electric power 
station in such a way that would raise the levels of Lake Manapouri and Lake Te 
Anau between 8 and 26 metres, to provide enough electricity to power Comalco’s 
aluminium smelter plant at Tiwai Point (Peat, 1994; Wilson, 1982). This rise would 
have caused the destruction of a large area of native flora and significant habitat 
for native fauna, including species that were nationally endangered (Peat, 1994).  
 
Opposition was initiated largely by local people, and the Save Manapouri campaign 
spread significantly in 1969, with a large meeting in Invercargill rousing numerous 
‘Save Manapouri’ committees that were established in various parts of the country 
(Wilson, 1982). A ‘Save Manapouri’ petition with 265,000 signatures was delivered 
to parliament in 1970 (Peat, 1994). Due to public pressure, a Commission of 
Inquiry took place over three months in 1970, whereby three commissioners 
heard evidence from over 30 groups, only two of which supported the proposed 
rise to lake levels (Peat, 1994). Despite this opposition, the commission concluded 
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that the Crown was contractually bound to raise the lake levels in order to increase 
electricity generation (Peat, 1994). 
 
The Save Manapouri campaign was elevated to such a level that it became an 
election issue, and in 1972, the Labour government was elected with the promise 
that it would protect Lakes Manapouri and Te Anau, maintaining them at their 
natural levels (Wheen, 2002; Wilson, 1982). As a consequence of the campaign, the 
Guardians of Lakes Manapouri and Te Anau were established via legislation. The 
first guardians appointed were leaders of the Save Manapouri campaign (Wheen, 
2002). Their purpose was to be an independent advisory body to review the effects 
of the hydro-electric power schemes and to make recommendations to the 
Minister of the Environment (Peat, 1994). Peat (1994) states that “[t]he Manapouri 
issue arose because those in authority thought they could decide first and consult 
later, and to hell with public opinion” (p. 10). Yet it was public protest that 
eventually held the power and changed the course of the decision. This protest was 
before the rise in neoliberal policies in New Zealand, and demonstrated 
environmentalists’ push for more public participation in environmental decision-
making (Downes, 2000; Eckersley, 1992).  
3.3.2 The rise of neoliberal decision-making  
Neoliberal restructuring in New Zealand changed the nature of public involvement 
in environmental decision-making. The so-called ‘New Zealand Experiment’ 
beginning in 1984 saw New Zealand undergo market liberalisation in various 
sectors, in addition to many public organisations being partially or fully privatized 
(Larner, 2002). From the 1990s, neoliberalism in New Zealand is considered “roll-
out” neoliberalism, which is “concerned specifically with the aggressive 
reregulation, disciplining, and containment of those marginalized or dispossessed 
by the neoliberalization of the 1980s” (Peck & Tickell, 2002, p. 389). This entailed 
more government involvement in issues compared to earlier versions of 
neoliberalism where there was more deregulation (Peck & Tickell, 2002). The RMA 
was enacted in 1991 after some years of policy development, and is very much 
situated within a range of neoliberal reforms in New Zealand.  
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The RMA can in part be interpreted as a neoliberal policy, framing the 
environment as something that can be compromised for the benefit of 
socioeconomic factors, (Grundy & Gleeson, 1996, as cited in Jackson & Dixon, 
2007). Yet the RMA arose in complex interactions between a strong neoliberal 
agenda and a global focus on sustainable development (Grundy & Gleeson, 1996, as 
cited in Jackson & Dixon, 2007; Perkins & Thorns, 2001). So, counter to neoliberal 
tendencies and in order to achieve sustainable management, the RMA gives the 
state and local government the mandate for regulation and monitoring. This is an 
example of what Peck and Tickell (2002) call anti-regulation where 
neoliberalisation features deregulation while simultaneously consisting of 
overarching invisible normalised regulations, or “metaregulation” (Peck & Tickell, 
2002, p. 400).  
 
The RMA’s neoliberal traits also manifest in the way that public participation was 
formally incorporated into the Act, yet simultaneously limited. Under the RMA, 
considerable public participation occurs in the development of the district and 
regional plans, the aim of which is to assist the councils in achieving the purpose of 
the act to promote sustainable management (Resource Management Act 1991, Part 
5). The plans prescribe what activities are acceptable in designated areas; 
therefore in principle most consent applications should result in little opposition, 
except in cases which do not comply with the plans. Specific cases which do not 
comply are generally publicly notified, providing an opportunity for public 
participation. Yet this dual participation process, and indeed the legislative 
requirement for participation as Downes (2000) suggests, weakens the unity 
created when the public were entirely excluded from participating:  
The danger for movement groups in a market-liberal political environment… is not that 
they may be drawn in, neutralised and co-opted by the state, but rather that the 
dismantlement of the state dissipates the movement’s energies and leaves it with a much 
smaller target for political action (Downes, 2000, p. 488). 
With the RMA in place, environmental groups in New Zealand are therefore forced 
to formally approach each case separately, rather than unifying their efforts and 
addressing the systemic issue which may be the cause of multiple concerns. One 
example of this is the need to approach the climate change concerns about 
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greenhouse gas emissions through formal participation in each coal mine consent, 
rather than addressing fossil fuel extraction in New Zealand more broadly.  
 
Furthermore, Gunder and Mouat (2002) suggest that issues of power are not fairly 
dealt with under the RMA, leaving some actors unable to resist or participate, and 
other actors dominating decisions. This is of particular concern when it is apparent 
that certain actors, knowledges or values are consistently privileged over others. 
In order for the free market to prevail, the main tenet of neoliberalism, neoliberal 
policy simultaneously favours knowledges and values that are considered  
measurable, technical or economic (Castree, 2010; Peck & Tickell, 2002). Perkins 
and Thorns (2001) suggest that in order for efficiency to prevail in the distribution 
of resources under the RMA, science is used to support different interests. They 
state that “[t]he effectiveness and efficiency criteria upon which costs and benefits 
were to be judged were not specified in the legislation but reflect the dominance of 
the economist’s model of efficiency” (p. 641). In the case of genetic engineering in 
New Zealand, Weaver and Motion (2002) suggest that “in a neo-liberal political 
economy, public relations may be used to promote wealth creation as a public 
interest priority” (p. 325) over “the public’s democratic right to make informed 
decisions” (p. 340). Economic development and hard science are still prioritised as 
legitimate knowledges when considering environmental management under the 
RMA.  
 
Due to the technical nature of these knowledges, they are also considered 
apolitical. This is consistent with neoliberal economic management, whereby these 
processes “are increasingly technocratic in form and therefore superficially 
“depoliticized,” acquiring the privileged status of a taken-for-granted or 
foundational policy orientation” (Peck & Tickell, 2002, p. 389). Similarly, McCarthy 
and Prudham (2004) suggest that neoliberalism’s hegemony is illustrated through 
“the ways in which profoundly political and ideological projects have successfully 
masqueraded as a set of objective, natural and technocratic truisms” (p. 276). One 
example of this is a case where information provided by a public interest group 
was not incorporated into a decision because “they did not present evidence in the 
accepted legal manner, or produce an acknowledged specialist to give expert 
advice” (Gunder & Mouat, 2002, p. 139). A more recent example of the limitation of 
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knowledges that are deemed acceptable under the RMA concerns climate change. 
Despite the RMA being New Zealand’s primary environmental legislation, the 
effects of the end-use of coal on the climate cannot be considered under the RMA, 
as the decision-makers have no authority to consider the causes of climate change 
as a concern (Re applications for declarations by Buller Coal Limited and Solid 
Energy Limited, and West Coast ENT Incorporated  [2012] NZEnvC 40). This 
privileging of certain knowledges (namely economic and technical) is particularly 
prevalent in the case of Escarpment Mine, and will be discussed in Chapter five. 
 
In order to participate in decisions made about the environment, it may be 
necessary for environmentalists to operate outside of the formal participation 
processes offered by legislation, to broaden the debate about how such issues are 
dealt with in politics. In 1999, the New Zealand Study of Values found that of those 
responding, nearly 90% had signed a petition, and nearly 20% had attended 
demonstrations, amongst other actions (Perry and Webster, 1999, as in Bellamy & 
Henderson, 2002, p. 100). However, many people believe that they have little 
influence over politicians after elections (Bellamy & Henderson, 2002). As seen 
with Save Manapouri, environmentalist actions outside formal processes were, in 
the past, able to change the course of politics. Environmentalist opposition to 
Escarpment Mine illustrates some of these tensions about participating in 
neoliberal politics and how actions outside of formal processes intersect with 
political decisions. Despite the successes in increasing public participation, the 
more recent privileging of neoliberal knowledges may exclude important voices 
and environmental concerns from the arena of debate, raising questions about the 
democratic limits of formal decision-making processes.  
3.4 Synopsis 
Environmentalist opposition to Escarpment Mine has been evident in both formal 
participation processes under the RMA and through activism such as campaigning, 
protest, petition, media and ecological information gathering. Since the RMA was 
enacted in 1991, participation in environmental decision-making, and indeed 
democracy, has been shaped by formal processes under a neoliberal agenda. Under 
the RMA, formal submissions in opposition to developments are limited to specific 
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cases only and therefore are unlikely to have an overarching long-lasting effect. 
However, the parallel cases of environmentalists’ actions in New Zealand highlight 
that participation in the formal processes does not act in isolation from informal 
participation in democracy. Campaigning and increasing public involvement in 
issues certainly increases the chances that decision-makers will consider 
environmentalist perspectives, even if they deny the influence that activism has in 
formal processes. These two areas of political participation are critical for 
influencing decisions. This raises questions for the way in which we think about 
democracy in environmental decision-making. Who participates in decisions about 
the environment, and what is deemed to be valid or legitimate participation? How 
could formal decision-making incorporate environmentalist activism in such a way 
that delivers democracy? 
 
Environmentalist activism is part of democracy, and a significant driver to political 
change. Attaining and maintaining democracy is not as simple as employing a 
formal process for participation. The interactions between formal participation 
and informal participation through activism raises questions about democracy. 
Furthermore, environmentalists’ concerns about biodiversity conservation and 
climate change effects of Escarpment Mine raises issues for how democratic 
decision-making considers concerns of a public nature despite limited public 
participation. How does democracy function when strong disagreement is present? 
The next chapter discusses such theoretical questions, and poses a new framework 
for considering disagreement in democracy.  
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Chapter four: 
Participation, disagreement and 
democracy 
 
 
 
 
This literature review explores theories of disagreement in democracy in relation 
to participation and activism. First I discuss definitions of environmentalism and 
activism, which provides the foundation for how environmental activism 
corresponds with theories of democracy. Secondly, I discuss democracy, with a 
particular focus on deliberative democracy and radical democracy. Each of these 
frameworks has a different way of incorporating disagreement, which highlights a 
number of issues about how activism is perceived within democracy. While 
deliberative democracy focuses on rational deliberations between decision-makers 
and stakeholders that ideally lead to consensus and harmony, radical democracy 
encourages the empowerment of disagreeing voices, with the understanding that 
disagreement will always be present. These theories highlight how 
reconceptualising activism and disagreement as an essential part of democracy 
necessitates a critical analysis of formal processes for public participation (or a 
limited submission process, as the case may be) and how the underlying quest for 
consensus decreases democratic ideals.  
 
At the end of this chapter, I develop a framework for democracy that incorporates 
selected aspects from the models of democracy discussed. This framework is used 
in Chapter six to analyse the interview data about the decision to grant consents 
for Escarpment Mine.  
4.1 Environmentalism as activism  
The concept of environmentalism includes a multitude of identities and actions. 
Environmentalism is often defined as a movement with individuals and groups 
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aiming to conserve or protect some element of the environment, and/or support 
pro-environmental technologies and behaviours (Rootes 1997 as cited in Carter, 
2007; Gottlieb, 2001; Guha, 2000; Jasonoff, 2006)17. Carter (2007) suggests that 
conceptualising the environmental movement as united is inaccurate. The 
diversity of the environmental movement includes well established conservation 
NGOs, international groups, direct action and more radical groups, and local 
grassroots groups (Carter, 2007; Doherty, Paterson, & Seel, 2000), with emphasis 
on diverse discursive frames such as wildlife management, conservation, 
preservation, environmental health, and environmental justice (Brulle, 2010).  
 
One direction that some environmental groups have taken is to become more 
professionalised. Gottlieb (2001)  and Carter (2007) discuss the 
institutionalisation of such groups, with conservation groups being more highly 
institutionalised and having a stronger business focus. This involves a reliance on 
money from supporters and employing professional protesters and activists. 
Rootes (2003) reflects on how the role of environmental groups has changed with 
such institutionalisation, including forming partnerships with governments and 
industrial corporations. These institutionalised groups may have more financial 
resources and more harmonious relationships with government institutions than 
other types of environmentalist groups. 
 
Grassroots organisations are different again, with three broad distinctions: “first, 
radical social movements … secondly, small local groups campaigning against a 
specific locally unwanted land use … and, thirdly, broad coalitions of groups” 
(Carter, 2007, p. 155). Any of these types of environmental groups may also 
employ direct action tactics. Doherty et al. (2000) define direct action as “protest 
action where protesters engage in forms of action designed not only or necessarily 
to change government policy or to shift the climate of public opinion through the 
                                                        
17 While some theorists of New Social Movements would conceive of certain types of 
environmentalism as being an example of a new social movement (such as environmental direct 
action (Lawson & Garrod, 2001) or protest about global environmental concerns (Faulks, 1999)), 
my research does not make this connection due to the type of environmentalist action being 
considered in the case study. Environmentalist opposition to Escarpment Mine has taken the form 
of campaigning, public meetings and education, petitions and ecological information gathering 
about the proposed site. These environmentalists have also been involved in formal decision-
making processes as discussed in Chapter three. 
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media, but to change environmental conditions around them directly” (p. 1, 
emphasis in original). Cathles (2000) suggests that direct action is important, 
especially if local environmental groups have found that “petitions, letter writing, 
representations at public inquiries, legal challenges, and demonstrations” (p. 169) 
have not been successful.  
 
As illustrated, environmentalism integrates a diverse range of activist strategies 
and methods, from institutionalised lobbying and campaigning, to grassroots 
groups and direct action. When activism is conceptualised broadly, we can see that 
environmentalism incorporates various forms of activism. For Ganesh and Zoller 
(2012) activism includes communication (in both education and negotiation), 
confrontation and advocacy. Ganesh and Zoller (2012) also suggest that framing 
activists as violent or aggressive aims to highlight them as incapable of 
conversation, dialogue, or relationship building. Yet, on the contrary, activists often 
attempt and exhaust cooperative techniques before moving onto direct action and 
protest (Fung, 2005; Ganesh & Zoller, 2012).  
 
Young (2001) emphasises that theories of democracy very rarely discuss the 
implications or importance of activism or participation outside formal processes. 
This could include environmental activism. Given this gap identified in the 
literature, this research focuses on the role of environmentalism in democracy and 
decision-making, both within formal processes of participation and outside these 
formal processes, through activism18. Rootes (2003) suggests that while protest is 
still utilised as a tool by environmentalists:  
the increased centrality of environmental issues on public agenda has created greater 
opportunities for effective action by more conventional means, and it provides fewer 
provocations to more confrontational (and more newsworthy) forms of action (pp. 255-
256).  
Thus, a central question for this thesis is how the democratic processes of public 
participation under the RMA allow or constrain the ability of environmentalists to 
be effective in conventional processes, and accordingly, how activism should be a 
critical part of democracy.  
                                                        
18 There is vast literature on environmentalism’s inclusion in the media and influence on public 
opinions, leaving no gap in the literature in this area, hence my focus on a less-researched aspect of 
environmentalism and its influence in decision-making processes. 
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4.2 Democratic principles and participation 
New Zealand is a constitutional monarchy with a proportional representation 
electoral system (Bellamy & Henderson, 2002). New Zealand is also considered a 
representative democracy. This means that democracy is seen to be achieved 
through the electoral system, whereby representatives of the public are elected as 
government officials. May (2010) suggests that we are encouraged to think of 
politics only as a duty to vote, and consequently responsibility to respect and obey 
those in power who are given a mandate to make decisions on our behalf. 
Similarly, Beetham (2010) states that “[n]othing has more discredited the 
democratization process than the assumption that it is largely a matter of electoral 
democracy alone” (p. 8), which is the main principle of representative democracy.  
 
Yet politics is much broader than just voting. May (2010) suggests of Rancière’s 
work, that a democratic politics “emerges from below rather than being granted 
from above” and is egalitarian, with all those participating considering all others to 
be equal (p. 22). From a Rancièrean perspective, politics potentially happens 
almost anywhere, and yet politics seldom happens because “it is so urgently 
discouraged” (May, 2010, p. 22). Politics, inherently conflictual, is avoided in 
favour of the perceived ideals of harmony and consensus. Ideas and practices of 
representative democracy have generated dissatisfaction, leading to extensive 
theories pursuing a more inclusive, participatory, just and democratic system. Two 
of these theories that challenge and extend representative democracy are 
deliberative democracy and radical democracy. Before discussing these 
alternatives in the next section, I turn to consider an ethos of democracy and a 
fundamental feature of participation.  
4.2.1 Equality, justice, freedom and the rule of the people 
The ethos of democracy is the rule of the people. As Abraham Lincoln is often 
quoted, “Democracy is a government of the people, by the people, and for the 
people” (Mokre, 2006, p. 307). Mouffe (1992) states that “what constitutes modern 
democracy is the assertion that all human beings are free and equal” (p. 1). Justice, 
as another key tenet of democracy, can be defined as involving “a sense of 
connectedness and obligation to others” (Hillier, 2002). While Rawls proposed a 
justice with a fairness and neutrality of positioning (1971, as in Benhabib, 1992 
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and Hillier, 2002), Hillier (2002) and Benhabib (1992) recognise that while the 
principle of justice is necessary for democracy, how justice will function is 
influenced by people’s differing identities, values and discourses. The pursuit of 
justice is critical to and intertwined with democracy (Dryzek, 2013).  
 
Bellamy and Henderson (2002) suggest that the principles of democracy are two-
fold: “popular control over public decision-making and decision-makers; and 
equality between citizens in the exercise of that control” (p. 4, emphasis in original). 
With equality and freedom at the core, democracy has also become something 
associated with institutions of the state (Patton, 2005). Barry (1996) states that 
democracy is “a communicative process, a political procedure between individuals 
and institutions, where the former decide collectively binding decisions which are 
then enforced by the latter” (p. 118). While equality, freedom and the rule of the 
masses are at the core of democracy, institutions and states have often taken the 
role of coordinating democratic decision-making and actualising democracy.  Yet 
May (2010) suggests that from a Rancièrean perspective, “the state-form is 
necessarily hierarchical, and cannot therefore be a model for instituting equality” 
(p. 104), which is one of the key tenets of democracy. This clearly has implications 
for how the state implements democratic decision-making processes.  
  
There are various characteristics and ideals that a democracy is expected to 
demonstrate, yet these are seldom fully realised. Derrida suggests that democracy 
can never be achieved but is always working towards itself (May, 2010), which is 
consistent with radical democrats’ idea of democracy as a “never-ending process, 
always to come” (Bohman, 1996, p. 4). Thus, it is important to analyse what is 
working well about the current state of democracy and what is lacking in order to 
progress it. In discussing a model for assessing various countries’ levels of 
democracy, Beetham (2010) suggests that core values of democracy are 
participation, authorization, representation, accountability, transparency, 
responsiveness and solidarity. For the purposes of this research, I focus on 
participation in democracy, who should participate and why.  
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4.2.2 Participation 
Frameworks of democracy are often defined by how much and what type of 
participation is idealised or practiced. The ethos of democracy, the rule of the 
people, lends itself to the concept that individuals know their own interests best 
(Faulks, 1999). This is consistent with Orum and Dale (2009), who suggest that at 
the core of modern democracy is “that people are free to participate in the actions 
that govern and direct their own lives and fates” (p. 287).  Faulks (1999) proposes 
a broad definition of political participation being: 
the active engagement by individuals and groups with the governmental processes that 
affect their lives…  [including] conventional political participation such as voting, standing 
for office, [or] campaigning for a political party … and unconventional acts, which may be 
seen as legitimate, such as signing a petition or attending a peaceful demonstration, or 
illegal, such as violent protest or refusing to pay taxes (p. 143).  
Participation in democratic decision-making allows individuals to voice their 
interests, and is considered essential for democracy to function.  
 
Requirements for meeting democracy’s ideal of participation are the right of 
people to participate, having the capacity to participate, having agencies for 
participation and an adequate level of participatory culture (Beetham, 2010). Innes 
and Booher (2004) suggest many reasons for undertaking participation: to 
investigate public preferences; to enhance decisions utilising local knowledge; 
increasing fairness in society; validating decisions; and to fulfil legislative 
requirements. Participation is also beneficial as it can transform societal issues, 
create collectivity, and be public and visible, as well as be an opportunity to test 
ideas and gain feedback (Orum & Dale, 2009). Given these reasons and benefits of 
participation, in addition to various struggles by the public to be involved in 
governments’ decisions, many government policies have formal participation 
processes or requirements for engaging the public.  
 
One way to think about participation is to redistribute power in society. Arnstein 
(1969), a key theorist in participation, suggests that participation is: 
the redistribution of power that enables the have-not citizens, presently excluded from the 
political and economic processes, to be deliberately included in the future. It is the strategy 
by which the have-nots … can induce significant social reform which enables them to share in 
the benefits of the affluent society (p. 216).  
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This redistribution of power is critical to understanding the frameworks of 
democracy that I discuss shortly. 
 
Although in practice types of participation overlap and interrelate, various 
theoretical distinctions can be made. As demonstrated in Figure 4.1, Arnstein 
(1969) groups the various types of public participation into a scale from the least 
to the most power devolved from decision-makers.  
 
Figure 4.1: Eight Rungs on a Ladder of Citizen Participation (Arnstein, 1969, p. 217). 
 
Here, forms of non-participation are manipulation and therapy (where the 
individual is made to feel at blame for wanting to participate and, instead, is 
educated about what they could do better). Arnstein (1969) suggests that 
informing, consultation and placation are only tokenistic versions of participation, 
whereby the public may have their voice heard, but decision-makers still have the 
authority to decide whether to incorporate their opinions. Arnstein (1969) states 
that “participation without redistribution of power… allows the power-holders to 
claim that all sides were considered, but it makes it possible for only some of those 
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sides to benefit” (p. 216). This is highly prevalent in the degrees of tokenistic 
public participation. Higher up the ladder depicts types of participation that give 
more power to the public, or, with citizen control, the public obtaining the majority 
of decision-making or managerial power (Arnstein, 1969).  
 
This ladder is consistent with other theories of participation. Informational 
communication, as defined by Rowe and Frewer (2000), is where a project 
manager or governmental body informs the public of an activity or decision 
without any opportunity to offer feedback. Consultation can be seen as information 
being requested and collated from the public by the project manager or 
governmental body on a specific topic (Rowe & Frewer, 2000). However, this 
process is defined and controlled by those collating the information (Rowe & 
Frewer, 2000), similar to Arnstein’s tokenistic participation. Collaborative 
participation, as proposed by Innes and Booher (2004), is multi-dimensional, 
where communication, learning and action all happen simultaneously, with a wide 
range of stakeholders interacting and influencing each other.  
 
Nevertheless, there are theorists who propose that increased participation does 
not necessarily lead to better deliberations or better outcomes. Cohen and Fung 
(2004) suggest that better deliberation may occur with less participation, and that 
more participation might lead to inferior discussions. Similarly, the public may not 
comprehend complex environmental issues and therefore are unable to participate 
meaningfully (Jeong, 2002). Maloney and Miller (2008) argue that activism, 
participation and deliberation are separate concepts that need to be considered 
individually, while they may certainly interact and reinforce each other. These 
distinctions illustrate how participation, particularly that as led or required by 
governments, can be limited and not achieve the goals that democracy aspires to. 
Nonetheless, there is scope for meaningful participation in deliberations if 
designed with democratic principles in mind. Furthermore, the inclusion of 
activism outside formal processes in political participation (or confrontational 
disagreement) is one of the major differences between deliberative democracy and 
radical democracy, which I discuss more in the following section.  
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4.3 Deliberative democracy and radical democracy 
A fundamental difference between deliberative democracy and radical democracy 
is the way they regard harmony and disagreement. Deliberative democracy is 
founded on Habermas’s theories, in which rational deliberation and debate are 
privileged, guiding decisions towards consensus (Bond, 2011a; Munton, 2003; 
Pugh, 2005). Communicative planning also shares this fundamental concept, as a 
planning practice that promotes participation in the form of deliberation and 
aiming for consensus-like decisions (Bäcklund & Mäntysalo, 2010; Pugh, 2005). 
Deliberative democracy implies a high level of rational deliberation in decisions 
that are made, and can be seen as an extension of representative democracy 
(Carpini, Cook, & Jacobs, 2004). Deliberative democracy advocates for increased 
participation in deliberations especially by those affected by collective decisions 
(Walter, 2008), which is seen as an improvement on representative democracy.  
 
The underlying aim for consensus is contested by radical democrats. Mouffe and 
Laclau, key theorists of radical democracy, instead theorise that disagreement will 
always be present in society, and that these underlying differences may be 
irreconcilable (Little, 2002). Thus, theories of democracies that believe in the 
possibility of consensus will never be functional nor fulfil the ethos of democracy 
(Little, 2002), whereby justice and equality prevails. Radical democracy promotes 
agonism, whereby those in disagreement relate as adversaries in respectful 
engagement (Mouffe, 1992, 2000, 2005). Despite fundamental differences, I 
suggest radical democracy and deliberative democracy must not be dichotomised. 
There is significant room to deploy aspects of both theories in such a way that 
benefits understandings of democratic decision-making, as I illustrate in this 
section, after discussing the differences.  
4.3.1 Critiques of a pure consensus 
Rancière (2004) states that consensus was proposed as a “pacification of 
conflicts… and yet it brought about anything but peace” (p. 4). Radical democracy 
places disagreement and diversity of opinion at the centre of democracy, meaning 
that “democracy is envisaged not as the mechanism for solving disagreements but 
rather as a means of enabling their expression” (Little, 2002, p. 378). Some 
differences will be irreconcilable, thus, there is a need for making space in the 
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public and political realm to “enable the expression of difference” (Little, 2002, p. 
380). Accordingly, one of radical democracy’s main critiques of deliberative 
democracy is its aim for consensus.  
 
However, while deliberative democracy leans towards consensus, Mouffe’s critique 
overemphasises deliberative democrats’ goal of achieving pure consensus (Bond, 
2011a). Dryzek (2001), one of the key proponents of deliberative democracy, 
states that consensus is clearly not possible when there are competing discourses, 
and suggests that deliberative democrats have long asserted that consensus is not 
the aim of deliberative democracy. Similarly, Young, a deliberative democrat, also 
suggests deliberative democracy “does not require that consensus upon a unified 
‘common good’ be the aim of public discussion” (2000, as in Talisse, 2005, p. 423). 
Moreover, Benhabib (1992) suggests that consensus remains open for future 
deliberations.  
 
Instead of a pure consensus, Dryzek (2001, p. 661) proposes “workable 
agreements” whereby agreement can be reached “for courses of action for 
different reasons”. Dryzek (2001) emphasises that the more resonance within an 
agreement, the more discursive legitimacy there is in the decisions made. Such 
agreements are made via rational deliberations – a point also contested by radical 
democrats.  
4.3.2 Rational deliberations: the potential for coercion? 
In deliberative democracy, deliberation can be defined as “discussion that involves 
judicious argument, critical listening, and earnest decision-making” (Gastil 2000, p. 
22, as in Carpini 2004, p. 317). Participating in deliberations involves justifying 
one’s beliefs or preferences with convincing reasons, rather than simply stating 
these preferences (Bohman, 1996). Deliberation can happen both inside and 
outside government (through media, conversation, public meetings for example), 
and between diverse groups of people (Abelson et. al, 2003; Carpini, Cook and 
Jacobs, 2004). Mutz (2008) states that various theorists disagree “whether it must 
necessarily be public, or whether informal conversations among ordinary people 
qualify” (p. 525). Most relevant to this research, is the idea that deliberation occurs 
between the public, local authorities, and project developers, making participation 
55 
 
a significant part of democratic decision-making. It is important to note here that 
local authorities are as much participants in the decision-making process as any 
other actor, although they are deemed to be the ‘neutral’ and objective facilitators 
of decision-making processes in planning practices that employ deliberative 
democracy ideals such as communicative planning (Pløger, 2004; Pugh, 2005). 
 
While the emphasis on rationality in deliberations has been critiqued by more 
recent deliberative democrats (for example, Dryzek 2001, and Young 2001), early 
proponents of deliberative democracy emphasised the requirement for rational 
deliberations (Held, 2006). A rational argument considers facts, the future and 
other people in place of individual preferences (Offe & Preuss, 1991, as in Held, 
2006). The aim is to uncover impartial truth, meaning “being open to, reasoning 
from, and assessing all points of view before deciding what is right or just; it does 
not mean simply following the precepts of self-interest” (Held, 2006, p. 239). Such 
deliberations do not allow for strong emotion, despite decisions often being 
fraught with emotion, or personal values that may not be contested through 
reason. Held (2006) also suggests that such impartiality is not appropriate for 
deliberations involving high moral conflicts, because “the matter cannot be 
resolved by appeal to the facts (for what facts are to be counted as relevant will be 
determined by prior conceptual choices) or an analysis of the relevant concepts 
involved (for those will also be contested)” (p. 242). Similarly, Bohman (1996) 
states that “[d]eliberation, it would seem, works only for relatively homogeneous 
groups who share many values and beliefs” (p. 2). But, as is common throughout 
society, differing values and morals create strong disagreement.  
 
Deliberation does pose benefits to society. Abelson (2003) suggests that problem-
solving as a group is central to deliberation, “allow[ing] individuals with different 
backgrounds, interests and values to listen, understand, potentially persuade and 
ultimately come to more reasoned, informed and public-spirited decisions” 
(Abelson et al., 2003, p. 241). Ideally, learning and increased understanding of 
diverse views occurs through sharing of information and knowledge in 
deliberations (Held, 2006; Munton, 2003; Talisse, 2005). Key tenets of deliberative 
democracy include “reciprocity, publicity, accountability, basic liberty, basic 
opportunity and fair opportunity” (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, as in Hillier, 
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2002, p. 254). These outcomes and principles are based on an ideal situation, yet 
power relations between different actors and the exclusion of some people in the 
deliberations can make this ideal implausible.  
 
While Held (2006) states that the ideal of deliberative democracy involves “a 
rationally motivated agreement, not an outcome produced by coercion, 
manipulation or bargaining” (p. 238), others suggest that deliberations may be a 
site for manipulation, coercion and compromise (Carpini et al., 2004; Ganesh & 
Zoller, 2012). With consensus being the foundation of deliberative democracy, 
Hillier (2002) suggests “one should always be aware of what trade-offs, 
compromises and omissions have gone into the making of any apparent 
consensus” (p. 59). Walter (2008) suggests that the possibility for deliberations to 
be non-coercive only holds true if those involved have equal abilities to challenge 
arguments. Furthermore, coercion can occur when an issue is deemed to be 
outside the scope of the discussion (for example, if the issue is deemed to be 
applicable to another law and not the one in question), and is not permitted to be 
considered by those with decision-making power, despite being raised as an issue 
(Walter, 2008). Ganesh and Zoller (2012) suggest that activists can be 
disadvantaged in dialogue with corporations and governments, as discussions of 
more serious issues may be evaded by those with more power. This may intensify 
the power that corporations or governments already have (Ganesh & Zoller, 2012).  
 
Ganesh and Zoller (2012) further suggest that when there is the aim for consensus 
in deliberations, activists may be reluctant to engage in dialogue, as there is a 
strong risk of co-option. This reluctance may drive the notion of activists as being 
incapable of dialogue and agreement (Ganesh & Zoller, 2012). However, a radical 
democratic approach proposes that given there is always potential for an 
underlying difference and disagreement, dialogue or discussions are unlikely to 
lead to consensus, meaning that the site of discussion is less likely to be one of 
manipulation or co-option, and the very process of discussion is also negotiable.  
4.3.3 Deliberation, consensus and exclusion 
In addition to being a site of potential coercion, deliberations may also exclude 
some people from the process. While the above highlights issues that might arise 
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when deliberation is faced with strong disagreement, other times opinions may 
simply be excluded from the deliberations entirely.  Fishkin (1995, as in Carpini 
2004) suggests that there is always an incompleteness to public deliberation. 
Therefore, deliberation can only ever be improved upon, not perfected.  
 
From a radical democratic perspective, Mouffe (2000, 2005) suggests that there 
are inherent weaknesses in the deliberative model.  She suggests that deliberations 
that are inherently predisposed towards consensus will always exclude some 
voices and possibilities, as it creates a divide between ‘us’ and ‘them’. The excluded 
‘them’ are then classed as enemies in an antagonistic relationship, meaning they 
are unable to be engaged with respectably as adversaries (Mouffe, 2005). 
Furthermore, as Ganesh and Zoller (2012) argue, activists are more likely to be 
excluded on this basis, as processes that emphasise reaching agreement, firstly, 
privilege dialogue over activism, and secondly, privilege “dialogic activist methods 
…over contestation” (p. 84). This limits the opportunities available for activists’ 
engagement. Encouraging the involvement of underlying differences without the 
pressure to achieve consensus stimulates a fuller and more meaningful 
participation of activists and citizens.  
 
In addition to advocating against consensus building, radical democracy, like 
Arnstein’s (1969) early work on participation, advocates that power be 
redistributed in a way that encourages the empowerment of marginalised groups 
(Little, 2002). Mouffe’s aim in radical democracy is to construct a framework that 
brings to light the various ways that power relations are assembled, highlighting 
forms of exclusion (Little, 2002). This redistribution of power is also alluded to in 
deliberative democracy. Dryzek and Young’s versions of deliberative democracy 
“seek to make deliberation as flat as possible [so] that hierarchical relations 
between voices are avoided” (Walter, 2008, p. 532). Furthermore, both Young and 
Dryzek agree that “expertise must find its place among other voices” (Walter, 
2008, p. 537), being considered as equals with storytelling and non-expert 
knowledge. This augments earlier versions of deliberative democracy that 
emphasise the rational nature that deliberations must have. In theory,  these 
problems of exclusion, coercion and power may be diminished if those that 
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disagree are accepted and respected as part of a bigger picture of difference, rather 
than enemies to be undermined.  
4.3.4 Agonism, the adversary and moments of agreement 
Radical democracy argues that difference and disagreement will most often be 
present. Rancière’s theories of disagreement assert that “it is not in the name of an 
identity or of a sameness that equality is acted out; it is in the name of difference” 
(May, 2010, p. 15). In other words, granted that one of the key features in the ethos 
of democracy is equality, for the ethos of democracy to be achieved, difference 
must be allowed to be expressed. Mouffe’s radical democracy suggests that while 
elements of consensus may happen momentarily, these moments of consensus will 
not endure and there may be underlying differences that are irreconcilable (Little, 
2002). This gives rise to the concepts of agonism and the adversary.  
 
In Mouffe’s radical democracy, those in disagreement are not enemies to be fought 
against, as in antagonism, rather they are to be engaged with as adversaries with 
respect for each other and respect for the process of engagement (Mouffe, 2000, 
2005). This social conflict is central to democracy (Ganesh & Zoller, 2012). 
Furthermore, in such agonism, there is a sense of “a permanent provocation that 
lies between adversaries that are legitimate enemies” (Mouffe, 1995, as in Bond, 
2011b, p. 797). Similarly, Hillier (2002) suggests agonism is the “possibility of 
permanence of conflict” (p. 14). McClymont (2011) defines agonism as:  
irresolvable disagreement over political meanings and actions, though each party accepts 
the right of the other to express an opinion. It is a form of political engagement which 
acknowledges the permanence of conflict, viewing this as necessary for democratic politics 
to function, rather than as detrimental to it (p. 240). 
Agonism is central to the ideas of radical democracy and agonistic planning, which 
have arisen out of critiques of deliberative democracy and collaborative planning.  
 
Agonism is contrary to the approach to disagreement in antagonism, whereby 
identities are compromised through discourses that are fundamentally different to 
their own and cannot be resolved. The limits of these conflicting identities and 
their associated discourses have no commonalities (Howarth, 2000). Antagonistic 
social relations arise when parties “are unable to attain their identities (and 
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therefore their interests) and because they construct an ‘enemy’ who is deemed 
responsible for this ‘failure’” (Howarth, 2000, p. 105). These parties are not simply 
different or opposite, but ‘anti’ the other (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). Antagonisms 
simultaneously form and threaten each other, an interdependent instability, where 
“the presence of the ‘Other’ prevents me from being totally myself” (Laclau & 
Mouffe, 2001, p. 125). Because of this fundamental ‘anti’ identity, enemies compete 
for their opinion and position to be more powerful and become hegemonic 
discourses (Mouffe, 2005). As Bond (2007) articulates, antagonism is key to the 
formation of political identities, and “it is through antagonism that the limits of 
discourses are made visible” (p. 61).  
 
Ganesh and Zoller (2012)  quite rightly argue that if accepting Mouffe’s idea of the 
adversary, “then research on activist dialogue should treat tension as inevitable 
throughout the process instead of either escalatory or abnormal” (p. 85). With 
radical democracy’s emphasis on agonism, activists become included as 
adversaries, instead of enemies to be overpowered, excluded or coerced. The 
vibrancy created through agonistic relations is core to Mouffe’s (and others’) ideals 
of democracy (Mouffe, 2005). 
 
In planning practice, Pløger (2004) duly suggests that planners and public 
authorities would have to approach conflicts very differently if conflicts between 
irreconcilable points were treated as disagreements between adversaries in an 
agonistic relationship rather than antagonistic relationships. One reason, he 
suggests, that conflicts are seen as antagonism, is that “antagonism as ‘unsolvable’ 
has to be dealt with by power (legal means), whereas agonism demands time-
consuming or ‘endless’ communicative processes” (p. 72). Bond (2011b) provides 
practical examples of how spaces may be re-created to establish agonism, 
including: 
rethinking how meetings are run, agendas are set and who takes part in the group… 
holding them in different places, in a workshop or small discussion group style, as walking 
tours of development sites, thus drawing in groups who would not normally visit the town 
hall even when meetings are open to the public (p. 19).  
These different methods may initially require time, skills and resources that 
planners and public authorities may not be willing or able to invest, especially if 
60 
 
they are approaching problems and differing viewpoints with an antagonistic lens. 
A deliberative democratic approach implies that deliberations and processes of 
communication will ‘solve’ any issues of disagreement. Yet as Pløger (2004) 
stresses, agonism cannot be erased through legal procedures and it necessitates 
novel approaches to place disagreement at the centre of planning practices.  
 
As well as making difference central to democracy, agonistic relationships, 
identities and interests are theorised as fluid and not fixed in time or place (Ganesh 
& Zoller, 2012). Radical democracy emphasises the fluidity of social relations: “[i]t 
becomes necessary to constantly discuss and challenge all existing definitions of 
society, as well as collective and individual identities” (Mokre, 2006, p. 315). This 
fluidity is essential for understanding agonism. The concepts of the adversary and 
agonistic relationships returns us to Dryzek’s (2001) concept of workable 
agreements in deliberative democracy, whereby agreements are reached but 
remain open to further deliberations, particularly as social relations change over 
time and space. Despite coming from two theoretical perspectives, these workable 
agreements, whether from a deliberative democrat perspective or the concept of 
agonism from radical democracy, may result in similar processes and outcomes for 
recognising and working with disagreement.  
4.4 Framework for democracy and disagreement in decision-
making 
I propose a framework that incorporates aspects of both deliberative democracy 
and radical democracy. I developed this framework by drawing on the key points 
already raised. Beaumont and Loopmans (2008) analyse two cities’ urban 
democracy approaches and conclude that neither communicative planning (like 
deliberative democracy) nor agonism and pluralism were “sufficient for ensuring a 
deepening of democratic engagement in urban governance” (p. 110). While 
questioning the practicalities of doing so, they posit the synthesis of both theories 
as a possibility for furthering democracy. The framework developed for this 
research contributes to generating such theory.  
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One of the main critiques of radical democracy is that there has been little 
empirical evidence of its practical applications, although some research has been 
undertaken to evaluate agonistic theories in regard to planning practice (see Brand 
& Gaffikin, 2007; Bäcklund & Mäntysalo, 2010; Hillier, 2002; McClymont, 2011; 
Pløger, 2004). It is hard to imagine how decisions would progress when accepting 
there is irreconcilable disagreement. There are similar critiques of deliberative 
democracy, with a weak relationship between theories and evidence (Carpini et al., 
2004; Mutz, 2008). Carpini et al. (2004) suggest that while benefits of public 
deliberation are numerous, these benefits are often untested assumptions. Mutz 
(2008) also states that there are various ways of achieving the outcomes that 
deliberation proposes, and advocates that studies be undertaken that demonstrate 
the effectiveness of deliberation compared to other methods. This research 
investigates such gaps in the literature and illustrates evidence of how aspects of 
both theories can be realised in planning practice.  
 
Mouffe’s radical democracy, while advocating for dissensus, does require a 
consensus on the way that democratic institutions function (Mouffe, 2005). It 
requires a consensus on the democratic ideals of equality and liberty (Bond, 
2011a)  and the principles of pluralism, or, “the right to believe in different things 
from others in our society and to have democratic opportunities to express those 
differences” (Little, 2002, p. 379). I also propose that agreement needs to be met 
on these fundamental principles, as well as justice and the rule of the people (this 
is represented by the green circle in Figure 4.2 below).  
 
Whilst proponents of deliberative democracy and radical democracy insist on their 
fundamental differences, I argue that in practice, these two theories overlap and 
interrelate. The main difference between them is that founding theorists of 
deliberative democracy rely on Habermas, who perceives humans’ desire to reach 
agreement as the basis for all communications. Mouffe and Laclau instead 
emphasise that “focusing on conflict and dispute instead of consensus, maintain[s] 
that the possibility of contesting claims to power is the most important quality of 
democracy” (Mokre, 2006, p. 312). However, while these are different starting 
points, when discussing features of each of these forms of democracy, there is 
significant scope for overlap. For example, Dryzek’s (2001) deliberative democracy 
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is building towards workable agreements, not pure consensus. Mouffe proposes an 
agonistic approach with temporary moments of agreement (Little, 2002), and 
fluidity in relationships, interests and identities. This sounds remarkably 
compatible with Dryzek’s (2001) workable agreement.  
 
Nevertheless there are still differences. The idea that agonism and antagonism are 
diametrically opposed is simplifying the nature of disagreement. Both of these 
concepts are relational, and require more than one party. I suggest these relations, 
as agonistic or antagonistic, are not fixed, but fluid and bound to change as 
relationships change. A relationship might be agonistic on one aspect of difference, 
and antagonistic on another, or have one party antagonistic with the other 
agonistic. This also highlights the nexus between informal political participation 
through activism and participation in formal processes, and how both types of 
participation express various dimensions of both agonism and antagonism. 
Institutions may also partake in creating these dynamics, such as the adversarial 
nature of decision-making under the RMA, and choosing which values are 
privileged or drive a decision, leading to parties becoming increasingly (or 
decreasingly) antagonistic. Pløger (2004) suggests that while working with 
agonism is favourable and possible in planning processes, it is yet to be developed.  
 
As a result of these considerations, I propose that a framework for working with 
disagreement in a democratic way should incorporate the following objectives, in 
order to fulfil the ethos of democracy, equality, justice and the rule of the people. 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the relationships between each principle of the framework. In 
the diagram, orange circles (and arrows coming from agonism) represent a 
principle that when expressed, is aligned with agonism. Red circles indicate 
expressions of antagonism, which sometimes also relate to agonistic principles (as 
with the case of informal antagonistic activism interacting with the concept of 
temporary and fluid agreements). The one purple arrow that is dotted indicates a 
less significant relationship emerging from the literature. The green circle, 
encompassing all other principles, represents the overarching democratic ideals of 
equality, justice and rule of the people.   
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Figure 4.2: Framework for democratic decision-making.  
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Table 4.1: Expanded framework for democratic decision-making  
Principle Defining feature Theoretical 
association 
Underlying 
difference 
accepted 
 
Some differences are irreconcilable, and 
space for these differences to manifest is 
critical for democracy 
Radical 
democracy 
Antagonistic 
activism 
accepted as valid 
participation 
Antagonistic activism is valuable for 
creating debate on important issues, 
specifically when issues relate to the 
overarching democratic principles of 
equality, justice and rule of the people.  
Unclear in the 
literature on 
democracy.  
Ganesh and 
Zoller (2012) 
on activism 
and dialogue.  
Antagonism shifts 
to agonism 
Antagonism that does not fulfil the 
democratic ideals of equality, justice and 
rule of the people must shift towards 
agonism to still remain within the realm of 
democracy.  
Radical 
democracy, 
Hillier (2002) 
and Pløger 
(2004) 
Transparency in 
information and 
process 
 
Transparency allows for agonism, 
meaningful participation, and for the 
overarching principles of equality and 
justice.  
 
Deliberative 
democracy 
Temporary and 
fluid agreements 
Moments of consensus are temporary and 
open to further deliberations  
Deliberative 
democracy 
and radical 
democracy  
 
Table 4.1 presents the defining feature of each of the principles of the framework, 
as well as the body of literature that each principle has arisen from. Having 
introduced the framework that will be used to reflect on the case in Chapter six, I 
now explain these principles in more detail. I have developed these principles 
through uniting what I see as the most valuable elements of deliberative 
democracy and radical democracy.  
 
Underlying difference accepted 
Decision-makers and those participating must acknowledge that there could be 
underlying difference and in such cases, that long-term full agreement is unlikely 
to be reached. Opposition will come in various forms throughout formal 
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participation processes as led by the state, and informal participation through 
activism. Differences should be considered and engaged with in agonistic ways. 
This is central to Mouffe’s (2000, 2005) radical democracy.  
 
Antagonistic activism accepted as valid participation 
Disagreement will always be present, regardless of the scope of formal 
participation processes. Formal processes will never be able to contain discussions 
about agreements to be made. Protests and other antagonistic activism can be a 
way for society to prepare for dialogue, and the antagonistic approaches create 
possibilities or imaginings for deliberation that might not have occurred otherwise 
(Ganesh & Zoller, 2012). Talisse (2005) argues that deliberative democracy 
accepts activism as a way for increasing or “establishing a properly deliberative 
system” (p. 439), but that deliberation must be privileged over activism once this 
has been attained. But, perhaps more appropriately, Fung (2005) suggests that 
formal deliberations will most often be unsuccessful because of inequality, and 
thus, activism has a place in democracy in order for such power relations to be 
challenged and for democracy to be achieved. Deliberations will not be able to 
solely fulfil democratic principles, and a continuing recognition of activism as part 
of decision-making is needed to achieve democracy. Activism is a strength the 
public can mobilise to raise issues and set the agenda that is often defined by those 
with power (e.g., the state or corporations). Such activism will be an on-going 
process. 
 
Antagonism shifts to agonism 
While some antagonistic relationships aim to challenge lack of equality, justice and 
rule of the people, other antagonisms are not so worthy. In order for democracy to 
be advanced, such antagonisms need to work towards agonism to respectfully 
engage with adversaries. This concept arises both from radical democracy (Mouffe, 
2000, 2005) and agonistic planning (Brand & Gaffikin, 2007; Bäcklund & 
Mäntysalo, 2010; Hillier, 2002; McClymont, 2011; Pløger, 2004).  
 
Transparency in information and process 
Deliberations between all parties should be transparent, both in terms of the 
process and the availability of information, so that negotiations are fair. This 
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allows for agonism, whereby adversaries are engaged with, and furthers equality. 
Power differences and inequality may never completely be eliminated, however, 
this transparency will help deepen an equal capacity to engage in deliberations. 
This aligns with deliberative democratic approaches that promote more fair, equal 
and just deliberations (Dryzek, 2001; Young, 2001).  
 
Temporary and fluid agreements 
Moments of consensus should be understood as temporary and still open for 
deliberations, like deliberative democracy’s workable agreement (Dryzek, 2001), 
with fluidity of relationships, identities and interests (Benhabib, 1992). As well as 
being derived from deliberative democracy, this also aligns with Mouffe’s concept 
of moments of consensus (Little, 2002).  
 
This framework is utilized in Chapter six to explore democracy in the case of 
Escarpment Mine. The case is discussed in relation to principles of the framework 
that are evident through the formal decision-making process under the RMA, as 
well as through environmentalist actions outside of this process. While the 
framework’s principles are not easily measurable, they are certainly identifiable in 
my case through qualitative research. The next chapter, Chapter five, discusses the 
findings relating to the research objectives about the influence that 
environmentalists were able to have in the decisions that were made about 
Escarpment Mine. Environmentalists felt they did not have influence in the formal 
process. Issues that emerged as reasons for this inability to influence the decisions 
made are discussed, and later associated with the issues they raise for democracy.  
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Chapter five:  
Environmentalists’ influence in the 
decision 
 
 
 
 
This chapter addresses the second and third research questions: to explore how 
environmentalists’ actions both outside and within formal participation processes 
have influenced the decision to grant consent for coal mining on conservation land 
in the case of Escarpment Mine. Firstly, I discuss specific actions that are 
considered to be outside of the formal processes, or environmental activism such 
as ecological surveys, protest and campaigning, and the way in which this is 
perceived to have no influence on the formal decision-making process. I then 
explore the value of environmental activism about Escarpment Mine more broadly, 
with potential influence on New Zealand society.  
 
Secondly, I discuss how the environmentalists who were involved in the 
submission process under the RMA see their ability to have influence within the 
formal participation process. Most felt that their submissions had no influence, and 
thus I explore the factors that led to this perceived lack of influence. Certain 
economic and measurable knowledges appear to be privileged over knowledges 
which have a more holistic, global and interconnected approach to the 
environment, leading to a discussion of the way the RMA favours a fragmented 
approach to the environment. Furthermore, perceived objectivity may be given 
more weight in the process. The prevalence of neoliberal discourse is also 
discussed. Lastly, I discuss how the favouring of certain knowledges raises serious 
questions for democracy.  
 
The primary data in this chapter is from interviews with 16 people (see Chapter 
two). Other sources complement and expand on the interviewees’ views, such as 
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council reports, the commissioner’s final decision, written and oral submissions 
from environmental groups, applicant evidence and academic literature. As 
established in Chapter two, the methodological approach uses a Foucauldian 
discourse analysis to explore the power of different knowledges, and how these 
discourses or knowledges dominate or are undermined in relation to each other 
and the people that present such knowledges.  
5.1 Influence of environmentalist actions outside formal 
processes 
Before discussing the way in which environmentalist action against Escarpment 
Mine may have influenced the decisions made, it is necessary to describe what 
kinds of actions have taken place. The most wide-reaching actions have been 
undertaken by Forest and Bird, which nominated Save the Denniston Plateau as 
one of their main campaigns of 2011 and 2012 (Forest and Bird, 2012a). This 
campaign has involved a variety of media coverage, including press releases, blog 
posts, email newsletters and a petition. One of the main actions coordinated by 
Forest and Bird was the Denniston Plateau Bioblitz whereby New Zealand’s top 
entomologist, invertebrate specialist, liverwort specialist, botanist and other 
experts led teams of volunteers on the plateau over a weekend to record and 
assess the ecosystems and species present (participants 2, 3, 9 and 11). A number 
of species were discovered to be living there that were not known in this habitat, 
some were living in ways unusual to their species (for example, a tree weta 
burrowing in the ground) and at least one new species19 was discovered, the 
Avatar Moth (participant 2). The Bioblitz covered 5900 hectares of the Denniston 
Plateau, an area much larger than the proposed coal mine (participant 2). Based on 
ecological information gathered at the BioBlitz, Forest and Bird has made a 
proposal for a protected area of the whole of the plateau, due to its unique ecology 
(participants 1 and 2).  
 
Various other groups and individuals also took part in other environmentalist 
actions against Escarpment Mine. Actions included writing numerous letters to the 
local paper and circulating email newsletters to their members and interested 
                                                        
19 Other potential new species were still being classified at the time of interview(participant 2) 
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parties (participants 8, 9, 10, 12 and 16). There was also a protest of 
approximately 200 people outside Bathurst’s new offices in Wellington in March 
2012, coordinated and supported by various environmentalist groups (Rutherford, 
2012).  
 
While it is likely that these actions influenced the public, three people interviewed 
explicitly stated that the environmentalist campaigning and activism had no 
influence over the formal decision-making process, nor was it appropriate to have 
such influence (participants 2, 4 and 7). Only one of these was an environmentalist, 
who recognised that her actions in campaigning and other activism were more for 
creating a shift in values in society (participant 2). From the councils’ perspective, 
one participant stressed that the hearing committee can only consider people’s 
formal submissions, not activism or other actions (participant 4), while another 
stressed that in general, activism “should be given no weight whatsoever” 
(participant 7). One environmentalist recognised this, and stated the formal 
processes with the hearing committee and the Environment Court are “not 
worried about what you’re saying out in the public arena; they’re focusing totally 
on what you put before them” (participant 2). However, past cases where activism 
was a strength that influenced the decisions made were mentioned by various 
participants. These cases included the Mokihinui (participant 3 and 8) and the 
Save Manapouri Campaign (participant 8), both discussed in Chapter three, nuclear 
free legislation (participant 8), the creation of the RMA (participants 2 and 8), and 
establishing DoC (participant 2). This indicates that perhaps the influence of such 
activism is more visible in hindsight. 
 
While the environmentalists’ actions were not perceived to have any influence on 
the decisions made by the hearing committee, there were mentions of it affecting 
the company and society. Firstly, the actions may have cost the company money 
through increased security measures and decreased shareholder support. 
Secondly, the environmentalists felt that their actions contributed to a shift in 
values in society towards environmental protection.  
 
In terms of costing the company extra money, one example given was that the 
company had hired security guards for the start of the hearing due to fears there 
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would be radical protest action, despite no previous indications this may occur 
(participant 5). Other environmentalists noted that activism can highlight the 
obstacles that Bathurst still has to face before gaining permission and initiating the 
project, which discourages shareholders (participants 9 and 12). Delaying the mine 
by opposing it was seen as a positive effect of campaigning and extending the 
formal decision-making process. Even though it may not stop the project 
completely, delaying it could mean weakened support by shareholders, as was the 
case here (participants 9 and 12). This idea that environmentalists’ actions can 
influence the company through potential risks on profit or investment parallels the 
Mokihinui case. Meridian withdrew their proposal due to the expected high costs 
of the Environment Court proceedings after DoC, Forest and Bird, the West Coast 
Environment Network and Whitewater New Zealand appealed the council’s 
original decision in the Environment Court (Department of Conservation, 2010; 
Meridian Energy, 2012). 
 
For environmentalists interviewed, the most important aspect of their activism 
was to create an informed public and ultimately a value shift in society, against 
new coal mines or mining coal on conservation land. One participant noted that 
environmentalists recognised the activism against Escarpment Mine was probably 
not going to change the outcome for the Denniston Plateau, but that it was part of a 
bigger movement building over time against coal’s contribution to climate change, 
and for the conservation of biodiversity (participant 14). One environmentalist 
with decades of experience noted that “you’re never going to get political change 
unless there is a mass movement calling for it” (participant 1). This emphasises the 
importance of political activism that occurs outside of the formal participation 
processes as offered by government. It suggests that campaigning and garnering 
public support is highly valued by environmentalists in seeking to effect change. 
 
Similarly, the value of local action and protest is recognised. An experienced 
environmentalist said she was largely against new coal mines for climate change 
reasons (participant 1). She had lost hope in international agreements against 
climate change, but emphasised that local action against contributions to climate 
change would “achieve far more than all the international negotiations we’ve had 
to date” (participant 1). Another participant noted that “it is far more important to 
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struggle and figure out how to collectively organise together to make things 
different or better, than it is to vote” (participant 11). These comments reflect 
dissatisfaction with representative democracy models, and with larger institutions 
that have made decisions about climate change mitigation and the environment.  
 
While the campaigning was seen as important, one local noted that campaigning 
was more effective in gaining support from people nationwide than from the town 
itself (participant 13). This was perceived as being because Westport is very pro-
mining, with livelihoods depending on it (participant 13). Walton (2007) discusses 
a different case where there was strong opposition to mining in the town of 
Reefton, also on the West Coast of New Zealand near Westport. She suggests that 
there is a dichotomy about such decisions on the West Coast: people are either for 
the sensible management of natural resources through logging and mining, or they 
are for the “locking up” of resources through “extremist” conservation measures 
(p. 198). Similarly, participants 8 and 13 expressed the divide between the local 
“rednecks” and environmentalists who were mostly outsiders. In contrast, two 
other environmentalists indicated that their own overt opposition to the mine 
allowed people from the local community – who were neither fully opposed nor 
supportive of the mine – to openly discuss their concerns about the mine with 
them (participants 2 and 3).  
 
Two interviewees felt that campaigning was intertwined with the formal process, 
as it aims to encourage more people to make submissions and be involved in the 
formal process, though neither participant had been active in campaigning on a 
large scale (participants 9 and 10). However, another participant noted that “while 
you’ve got a government where their central economic strategy is the absolute 
opposite of what we want and need, then I think no amount of letters to 
ministers… or lobbying is going to make the slightest bit of difference” (participant 
1). One environmentalist suggested that the state enables such companies to 
destroy the environment, rather than being a neutral facilitator between various 
interest groups (participant 3). The latter two comments imply a sense of 
hopelessness about influencing the current government, seen to prioritise mining 
and development, while yet others still had faith that campaigning could influence 
government (participants 9 and 10).   
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While the importance of activism and campaigning was emphasised for a number 
of reasons, including raising awareness, creating a value shift in society and 
inadvertently increasing costs to the company, it was perceived as not having 
influence on the decisions made – yet neither did the participation through the 
formal submission process.  
5.2 Influence within formal processes 
Six participants made formal submissions against Escarpment Mine. Overall, 
environmentalist participants felt their submissions had no or little influence over 
the decisions made to grant the consents for Escarpment Mine. Two participants 
explicitly said their submissions had no influence on the final decision 
(participants 3 and 8). Two were unsure and noted that their submissions seemed 
to have had no effect (participants 9 and 10). One participant in a coordination role 
for one group’s submission felt that they could not have enough influence because 
of the way in which climate change was not considered by the decision-makers 
(participant 2). This was echoed by the experience of participant 15 in another 
similar case. Three participants who did not make a submission observed that in 
general, submissions in opposition to mining developments on the West Coast 
were not taken into account (participants 12, 14 and 16). Either from their 
experience in making a submission against Escarpment Mine or through observing 
this case and others, environmentalists felt that participating in the formal process 
had no influence on the decisions made. In reading the commissioners decision 
report (Archer et al., 2011), it appears that while the commissioners may have 
considered the environmentalists arguments in their submissions, they 
disregarded this evidence in favour of evidence that maintained the economic 
benefits of the proposal and the quantifiable approach to conservation. 
 
Four participants emphasized that activism and mass movements are more 
effective than being involved in the formal RMA submission process (participants 
1, 2, 8 and 11). One environmentalist said that he was hopeful Escarpment Mine 
would not go ahead, but that “it will be a result of good campaigning rather than 
the RMA process, yeah I could more or less guarantee the judge will say yes to it” 
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(participant 8). In comparing campaigning and taking part in the formal process, 
another environmentalist said, “I guess if you kind of weighed it up, maybe there 
would be no point putting a submission in” (participant 9). Consistent with section 
5.1 above, activism and campaigning are seen as significantly more valuable in 
creating a public call for change than partaking in the formal submission process.  
 
Despite these general feelings, there was also a sense that environmentalist 
opposition provided some scrutiny to the process. As Orum and Dale (2009) 
suggest, participation provides “[a] check and constraint on the actions of public 
officials” (p. 287). One environmentalist felt that their group’s actions were 
valuable to society in scrutinising the proposal and decisions by taking the time to 
read and critique the applicants’ evidence and the DoC reports (participant 10). A 
sense of responsibility was noted by one participant, as her organisation’s role was 
to act as an independent watchdog to protect nature (participant 2). The three 
council officers interviewed (participants 5, 6 and 7) also noted that 
environmentalists submissions contributed to accountability for both the council 
and the company, with one saying “it may well provide a more informed decision 
than if there was no opposition” (participant 7). 
 
DoC did not present an oral submission at the hearing, despite making a written 
submission that expressed some concerns about the project. Some DoC staff 
members attended to observe the hearing, but did not participate in the 
discussions20 (participants 3 and 10). Five environmentalists and one council 
officer asserted that this hindered the decision-making process as the absence of 
DoC’s ecological experts meant that conservation concerns could not be fully 
discussed (participants 3, 5, 9, 10, 11 and 13). This will be discussed in more detail 
Chapter six, in relation to the transparency of the decision-making process.  
 
Despite this lack of DoC’s involvement, there were conditions relating to 
conservation that Bathurst agreed to as part of the commissioners granting the 
consents. While it could appear that environmentalists’ concerns about 
conservation, on the surface, may have contributed to the conditions imposed on 
                                                        
20 As explained in Chapter two, DoC declined an interview with me as part of this research, thus I 
was unable to obtain an answer from DoC as to why they chose not to present at the hearing.  
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Bathurst in terms of rehabilitation, compensation and biodiversity offsetting, this 
was not the case, for the reasons set out below (in subsections 5.3.5 and 5.3.7). The 
conditions that Bathurst had agreed to at the time of the hearing consisted of a 102 
page report including conditions about soil conservation and sediment control, 
vegetation and flora, finished landforms, rehabilitation and monitoring, aquatic 
ecosystems and water management, natural hazards, historic heritage and amenity 
value (Resource and Environmental Management Nelson Limited, 2011). The area 
was established as ecologically significant “by applicant's technical reports and 
through the review of the application commissioned by Council” (participant 5, by 
email 14 January 2013), and thus, ecological conditions of the proposal were not 
established or influenced by submitters’ evidence.  
 
Four environmentalist groups who submitted in opposition to the mine specified 
concerns on climate change and conservation, and argued that they would not be 
able to be avoided, remedied or mitigated in this case, as required for adverse 
environmental effects under the RMA (Section 5 (2a)). While it appears their 
concerns may correlate with a few of the conditions imposed on the company, 
these groups actually criticised the mitigation offered in the Escarpment Mine 
proposal. In the words of the expert supporting Forest and Bird’s submission: 
the challenge is to rehabilitate the site in such a way that the ecosystems that are affected 
by the activity will be restored for the future. The mine rehabilitation plan falls far short of 
this ideal and this is acknowledged by the applicant’s experts. What they do not point out, 
or possibly realise, is how far short such rehabilitation falls of even mimicking what exists  
(North, 2011, p. 19).  
Similarly, the West Coast Environment Network’s (2011b) submission said “the 
profound changes in substrate and hydrology” would “permanently alter the 
vegetation” regardless of the rehabilitation efforts (p. 8). Two submissions also 
noted that the conditions proposed, with Bathurst conducting pest control of the 
Denniston Plateau in order to support biodiversity, were barely relevant as the 
plateau already had very low numbers of exotic pests.  
 
The irreversibility of the adverse effects of Escarpment Mine was highlighted by 
various submitters and interview participants. Submissions by two groups also 
referred to being opposed on the grounds that end-use of coal contributes to 
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climate change. This was not an effect that could be mitigated, and climate change 
was also disallowed from being considered in the hearing process. The way in 
which different knowledges were legitimised and the subverting of the climate 
change argument is discussed in the next section. One participant noted that the 
group he was part of tended to focus on making submissions on projects they 
wanted to stop, rather than submitting with the purpose of changing the 
conditions or lowering the impact of a proposal (participant 14). Because of what 
he believed to be the irreversibility of the damage of proposals like Escarpment 
Mine, he suggested that “putting conditions wouldn’t actually make much 
difference;…. once you dig up the ground, you can do it in a good way or a bad way, 
but either way you’ve lost what you’ve had and you’re never going to get it back” 
(participant 14). Thus, the concerns highlighted by this group would not be able to 
influence the decisions to a level deemed acceptable by the environmentalists, 
regardless of the conditions imposed. As will be discussed, the difference in values 
and knowledges of the environmentalists and decision-makers, was such that full 
agreement would have been impossible.  
5.3 What knowledge counts: Privileged perspectives and 
negating the big picture 
Certain knowledges were considered to be more important than others in the 
decision-making process. From the perspective of the environmentalists 
interviewed and in the commissioners decision report, the social and economic 
benefits of the proposal were given significantly more weight than the holistic 
ecological and conservation concerns accentuated by the environmentalists 
opposed. This aligns with neoliberalism’s emphasis on quantifiable and 
measurable knowledges, through the privileging of economic rationale, as 
discussed in subsection 5.3.6.  
 
This section considers the role and cost of expertise, followed by an exploration of 
participants’ experiences of knowledges that were privileged or disregarded in the 
formal decision-making process. These are: economic development, climate 
change, conservation, biodiversity trading and a fragmented approach to the 
environment.  
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5.3.1 The role and cost of expertise 
Expert evidence is a crucial part of the formal decision-making process. The 
applicant company is expected to provide expert evidence to support numerous 
aspects of their proposal, and the council also employs experts to peer review the 
evidence provided to ensure its validity and objectivity. Submitters are also able to 
bring experts to support their case for or against a proposal. However, it is costly 
to employ experts, leaving NGOs and small community organisations at a 
significant disadvantage. This creates inequality, particularly as experts’ evidence 
is seen to be far more important to the decisions made than non-expert evidence. 
Thus, submitters’ concerns are less likely to be given as much weight as any 
evidence offered by the company.    
 
The cost of hiring experts was seen as a barrier to environmentalists’ participation 
being counted in the formal decision-making process. Various participants 
remarked that it is difficult for submitters to provide expert evidence for all 
aspects of a large complex project, given the cost involved in hiring experts 
(participants 2, 3, 5, 10, 13 and 14). This is particularly difficult when an 
Environment Court hearing is likely, meaning more experts will be needed soon 
after (participant 10). The Environmental Legal Aid Fund was cited by two 
participants as useful when they had used it for Environment Court cases 
(participants 2 and 14), but they also noted that the amount available was “a very 
small portion of what it costs to run a good case” (participant 2) and only provided 
funding for one expert and no lawyers. Another suggested that the Environment 
Court was increasingly less accessible, with more expenses and less financial 
support available (participant 11).  
 
The commissioners tend to take into account expert evidence that is provided to 
them, which leaves environmentalists at a considerable disadvantage, as noted, 
because they generally cannot afford to provide experts to counter each aspect of 
the company’s expert evidence (participants 10 and 14). Opposing voices tend to 
be lay-people who have worked on their evidence in their spare time (participant 
14). While environmentalists may use favours from experts in their support 
networks to provide their evidence (participant 3), companies have the financial 
resources to pay for numerous experts to support their case. The imbalance of 
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financial resources available to hire experts creates “such a tilted field that I don’t 
think community groups are taken seriously at hearings at all” (participant 14). 
One of the council officers also suggested that it would be unusual for the 
commissioners to rely on the lay-person’s evidence “unless that particular lay-
person submitter can come along with … an expert to refute [expert evidence from 
the company]” (participant 5). Another environmentalist participant noted that 
even lay-knowledge of someone who has lived beside a river for 30 years may not 
be counted simply because the person is not considered a qualified expert 
(participant 8). This injustice about the financial accessibility of experts led one 
participant to suggest that “it’s very difficult to have a democratic process when 
one side have all the resources against another” (participant 13). Moreover, the 
kind of expertise that is engaged by the applicant will obviously be that which most 
effectively supports their case. Although the same can be said of opposing 
submitters’ expertise, they are less able to cover as many elements of the case 
because they have fewer resources.  
 
The company’s experts provided evidence that tended to be consistent with the 
privileged knowledges of economic development and the fragmented approach of 
biodiversity trading for mitigating adverse effects to conservation.  
5.3.2 The economic development rationale 
Most environmentalist participants suggested that economic development and the 
proposed economic benefits to the region were highly privileged by the decision-
makers (participants 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 11, 12 and 13), despite the short-term nature of 
such benefits (participants 1, 3, 8, 9 and 13). One said that short-term economic 
development effectively “trumped the destruction forever of unique biodiversity of 
the plateau” (participant 1).  
 
Before citing some environmental concerns, the commissioners in their decision 
stated that:  
We have decided to grant this application, but not without some considerable reservations 
and anguish. The most and almost overwhelming factor that we had to consider is the 
enormous financial benefit that the mine will bring to the Buller district and the West Coast 
region … The real issue with this application is whether the cost is worth paying for the 
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benefits that will be derived. It is the classic development/environment conundrum 
(Archer et al., 2011, p. 102). 
The experts the company employed to provide evidence on the economic benefits 
from the proposal stated that while the economic impact estimates could be either 
overstated or conservative, they expected that: 
Over the current proposed 5 year mine life, the mine will generate on average in [the] West 
Coast region an additional 424 jobs and $138 million per year of added value, including 
$41 million per year of wages and salaries (Butcher, 2011, pp. 11-12).  
Various participants questioned the argument that Escarpment Mine would 
increase employment in the area, with the main counter-arguments being that the 
area already had high employment and miners would be residing in other parts of 
the country (participants 2, 9, 11, 12 and 13). Furthermore, while the local 
employment potential was lauded by the company in the evidence they provided 
(Butcher, 2011), one participant suggested that profit, not employment, was the 
presiding motive for the company. She continued, stating: 
there is no way that a company like Bathurst… sat in their Australian board rooms and 
thought, ‘oh what shall we do for the next five years, oh we should create some jobs! 
Westport! That’s a small community on the West Coast that blah blah blah…’ Bullshit, 
bullshit. But it’s a narrative that they use (participant 11).  
 
Another participant also noted the injustice in the company reaping the profit by 
destroying the local environment (participant 13). He went on to say “it’s a fallacy 
that it’s going to bring long-term benefits to the area: as soon as they’ve ripped the 
guts out of it, or the market declines, it’ll be gone” (participant 13). This supports 
the idea that economic development was privileged at the expense of the 
environment.  
 
Curiously, one of the council officers interviewed suggested that the process 
focuses too much on the environment and not the economic benefits:  
we get so so focused on the environmental, the physical environmental effects of the flora 
and fauna and all those sorts of things, but the RMA is also s'posed to be about the 
economic effects, and I don’t think we’ve got … that,  … if you’re a greenie, you’re saying oh 
ok, this process is real good! [laughs] But I sometimes think, you know, if you look at the 
benefits that mining industry can bring to a region, it’s huge. The jobs and the employment 
and the money, it’s a massive impact. And although we’re s'posed to be considering the 
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[social] wellbeing and all that kinda thing under the RMA, it seems to play very much a 
back foot to the physical and environmental effects of that mining process (participant 5).  
This is quite contradictory to the perception of the environmentalists involved, 
who felt that the economic arguments were hugely privileged over environmental 
concerns, specifically climate change and adverse effects to conservation. As 
discussed in Chapter three, the RMA’s purpose requires a balance between the 
social, cultural and economic wellbeing of communities and the sustainable 
management of the environment. Yet, as illustrated in this chapter, it is contentious 
as to what exactly this balance means.  
5.3.3 The dismissal of climate change 
The end-use of the coal from Escarpment Mine and its contribution to climate 
change was dismissed as a legitimate argument by the commissioners. In the 
Section 42A report written by council officers21, the summary of submissions 
stresses the percentage of submissions that commented on a certain issue (Ridge & 
Inwood, 2011). Climate change and the potential greenhouse gases released by 
Escarpment Mine’s coal was a contentious issue raised in approximately 8% of the 
submissions received by the councils22 (Ridge & Inwood, 2011). Of the twelve 
environmentalists interviewed, ten cited coal’s contribution to climate change as a 
major concern about the proposal (participants 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14 and 15).  
 
However, the councils deemed this to be outside their authority to consider in 
their decision under the RMA. The commissioners stated: 
We cannot say that we disagree with any of the sentiments concerning climate change and 
its potential danger … but it is our opinion that the effects of burning coal on global 
“climate change” as such is not a matter that we can properly consider in our consideration 
of this application23 (Archer et al., 2011, p. 75).  
                                                        
21 This report was presented at the hearing and given to the applicant and all submitters two weeks 
prior the hearing, as per the RMA, Section 42A.  
22 This is a flawed way of presenting the submissions, as they were not a representative sample and 
some submissions spoke for organisations representing a very large number of people, while other 
submitters represented only themselves as individuals. 
23 One of two main reasons the commissioners cited for their inability to consider the adverse 
effects of climate change was that the coal was likely to be burnt in India or China, making the 
release of greenhouse gases not relevant to New Zealand legislation (Archer et al., 2011). The other 
reason was that the submitters did not provide sufficient evidence to ascertain the exact 
significance of effects that Escarpment Mine’s coal will have on climate change: “the effects of the 
contribution of the EMP [Escarpment Mine Project] coal to the world climate change problem 
caused by greenhouse gas emissions must be trivial and mere bagatelle“ (Archer et al., 2011, p. 77). 
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The Section 42A report written by council officers states that climate change was 
not able to be considered under the Resource Management (Energy and Climate 
Change) Amendment Act 2004 as per Section 3(b)(ii)24 (Ridge & Inwood, 2011, p. 
9), which states that:  
The purpose of this Act is to amend the principal Act….  
(b) to require local authorities— 
(i) to plan for the effects of climate change; but 
(ii) not to consider the effects on climate change of discharges into air of greenhouse gases.  
In part due to a submission focused on Escarpment Mine’s contribution to climate 
change, Buller Coal Limited (a subsidiary of Bathurst Resources) and Solid Energy 
went to the Environment Court in March 2012 to seek a declaration that climate 
change could not be considered by local authorities under the RMA (Re 
applications for declarations by Buller Coal Limited and Solid Energy Limited, and 
West Coast ENT Incorporated  [2012] NZEnvC 40). Bathurst Resources did not 
apply for consents for discharges into air, but rather discharges to land and water, 
about which the RMA does not explicitly state that councils cannot consider 
climate change (participant 7). Thus, the environmental groups opposed argued 
that the effects of the end-use of Escarpment Mine’s coal on climate change could 
and should be considered in the decisions to grant the consents for discharges to 
land and water (participant 7). While this Environment Court declaration would 
have more general implications than the Escarpment Mine decision specifically 
(participant 10), this point could have changed the way that the commissioners 
should have considered climate change, meaning that their decision to not 
consider climate change could have been overturned. The Environment Court 
decision upheld the councils’ point of view that the RMA does not give councils 
authority to consider climate change in such applications (Re applications for 
declarations by Buller Coal Limited and Solid Energy Limited, and West Coast ENT 
Incorporated  [2012] NZEnvC 40). This was appealed in the High Court by Forest 
and Bird and the West Coast Environment Network, and is currently awaiting 
hearing in the Supreme Court (Berry, 2012).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
The commissioners’ arguments are aligned with neoliberalism’s emphasis on certain, quantifiable 
evidence and inability to cope with uncertainty and wide-ranging scope and boundaries of effects.  
24 This was referred to as RMA Section 3(b)(ii), which actually does not exist as a section under the 
RMA. Given the context in the report, this is considered a minor error and that the intention was to 
refer to the Resource Management (Energy and Climate Change) Amendment Act 2004.  
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Various participants expressed disbelief that New Zealand’s principal legislation 
about the environment did not allow the decision-makers to consider 
contributions to climate change, despite it being perceived to be the primary issue 
facing humanity and the environment (participants 1, 2, 3, 8 and 11). Two people 
said it was “a no-brainer” to consider climate change in an application for coal 
mining (participants 2 and 3). Participant 1 stated “this is crazy, this is the most 
important environmental issue facing humanity and nature, and under our 
premiere New Zealand environmental statute we can’t talk about it?”. One 
participant argued that the RMA’s purpose of promoting sustainable management 
was not consistent with its inability to consider coal’s connection to climate 
change, which she stated was “the most unsustainable thing on our planet” 
(participant 2).  
 
The commissioners wrote that even if they were able to consider climate change 
under the RMA, “we would find that the effects of this proposal if it were to 
proceed, would be very much less than minor on the weather patterns of the world 
in general and the country and the West Coast region in particular and so we do 
not propose to refuse consent on this ground” (Archer et al., 2011, p. 75). This 
sentiment was echoed by participant 1, who feared that even if the councils had 
decided that they were legally able to consider climate change, there still would 
have been the question of how much weight they would have given climate change 
in regard to the various other factors. These perceptions about the exclusion of 
climate change are particularly relevant considering that the definition of effect 
under Section 3 of the RMA includes “any cumulative effect which arises over time 
or in combination with other effects—regardless of the scale, intensity, duration, 
or frequency of the effect”. This appears to be inconsistent with the adverse effects 
of the end-use of coal, as by mining coal for export, the end-use will inevitably 
involve releasing greenhouse gases into the atmosphere and contributing to 
irreversible global climate change.  
 
One of the council officers interviewed suggested that solutions to climate change 
need to be led by central government, and was not a consideration for the RMA to 
deal with on a case by case basis: “Climate change considerations of where the 
coal’s going and what’s going to happen to it, you know, aren’t for the RMA” 
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(participant 5). One reason given was that climate change mitigation needs to be 
dealt with either on a global or national scale (Archer et al., 2011). This could be 
through the Emissions Trading Scheme, although three participants noted this had 
been ineffective in deterring the mining of coal for export when the profits were 
high (participants 1, 2 and 3). Participant 3 felt that given that climate change is a 
national issue, the decisions about Escarpment Mine should not have been granted 
at a local government level:  
…the government says climate change is a national issue, and yet how come a local district 
council, a local tiddly biddly regional council can have the ability, a few commissioners, to 
make a massive decision like that? I actually think it’s beyond them and … the people 
making the decisions are not skilled and knowledgeable and experienced enough to be 
making the decisions [about Escarpment Mine] (participant 3). 
 
One of the council officers interviewed stated that because at the time of the 
council hearing there was no case-law pertaining to whether climate change could 
be considered by local authorities, “everyone that actually submitted on 
greenhouse gases was given a fair say during the hearing” (participant 6). This was 
in contrast to a later council hearing for a different coal mine where anyone 
submitting about climate change was requested to discontinue (participants 11 
and 15). However, even though these submissions were heard in the case of 
Escarpment Mine, they were not considered legitimate in the final decisions made. 
If we are to consider democratic decision-making processes as sites for the public 
to raise issues and be heard on what is important to them, such as climate change, 
this outcome certainly goes against democratic principles. This issue of climate 
change being negated in the formal process raises questions for the constraints 
placed on democracy, when the adverse effects of climate change are global 
(participants 2 and 11). Democracy is also constrained in the way the adverse 
effects of climate change, which are extensive beyond the commissioners’ realm to 
consider, are disregarded because the effects are so vast, uncertain and wide-
reaching that they do not fit within the measurable knowledges that neoliberalism 
favours. The favouring of measurable knowledges is discussed in Section 5.3.6.  
5.3.4 Conservation vs. biodiversity trading 
While climate change, as a global environmental concern, was disregarded as a 
reason for halting a new coal mine, other much more local environmental effects 
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were considered in the decisions made – but only in a fragmented way. The 
applicant’s technical report on conservation and the peer reviews of the report 
confirmed the ecological significance of the plateau (participant 5, via email 
January 14, 2013), which was consistent with the environmentalists’ belief that the 
plateau was unique (participants 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13 and 14). However, 
divergence in the ways adverse effects to the ecology should be mitigated 
illustrated a difference in how the environment was perceived: as fragmented 
parts or as a holistic socio-ecological system. The knowledge that was aligned with 
the fragmented approach, biodiversity trading, was given more weight by the 
commissioners.  
 
Conservation of the flora and fauna of the plateau was discussed at length both in 
the hearing and by all the participants. One of the council officers suggested that 
the area was clearly nationally significant due to its significant indigenous flora 
and fauna, as per Section 6c of the RMA (participant 5), which states the need to 
provide for “the protection of areas of significant indigenous vegetation and 
significant habitats of indigenous fauna”. Therefore, the company would need to 
undertake considerable rehabilitation of the area (participant 5). Two local 
environmentalists described the plateau as a “natural mainland island” where kiwi 
thrived, because it was naturally predator free and did not require trapping, 
fencing or 1080 to be protected (participants 8 and 9), similar to predator free 
islands where native species also thrive. One suggested that protecting the plateau 
could potentially save DoC money as it did not require any of the funding that 
other mainland islands need in order to be predator free (participant 9). 
 
The decision to grant consent for Escarpment Mine and associated coal processing 
and transport, involved conditions for mitigating or remedying an array of adverse 
environmental effects. There were 24 consents granted, including various 
discharge permits for contaminants to water, land and air. The two permits that 
most directly affect biodiversity conservation are:  
To enter or pass across the bed of any waterbody; or damage, destroy, disturb, or remove 
any plant or the habitats of such plants or of animals in, on, under or over the bed of a 
waterbody (Resource and Environmental Management Nelson Limited, 2011, p. 6 and 14). 
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To enable land disturbance and associated activities (including but not limited to 
vegetation clearance and structures) (Resource and Environmental Management Nelson 
Limited, 2011, p. 12). 
 
Prior to the hearing, a participant from an environmental NGO was engaged in 
early discussions with Bathurst with a view to agree to conservation measures 
(participant 2). However, while she was initially open to reaching some kind of 
agreement, she said “it became apparent in that process that what they meant by a 
reserve and what was an ecologically sound reserve … was poles apart” 
(participant 2). She indicated that the mine and associated infrastructure would 
“ruin the integrity of that whole area”, deeming the small reserve that Bathurst 
was proposing a futile pretence at conservation. The area the NGO proposed as a 
reserve encompassed and far exceeded the proposed mine area, as that was what 
they believed to be necessary to protect the significant flora and fauna.  
 
In the application process and before the hearing took place, one of the council 
officers had noticed that the application was particularly lacking in the area of 
conservation and rehabilitation, and that the applicant should have consulted 
more with DoC earlier (participant 5). She said “that part of their application was 
just really poorly done [and they] … hadn’t realized the importance of that” 
(participant 5). This was reflected in the Buller District Council’s part of the Section 
92 report25, requesting more information from the applicant primarily about the 
damage to and rehabilitation of the terrestrial ecology of the plateau (Buller 
District Council and West Coast Regional Council, 2011b). However, participant 5 
still felt that Bathurst’s proposal did not meet the requirements in this area by the 
time of the hearing:  
they had sort of rushed around and come up with this weed and pest programme on this 
680 hectares … [and I had said] a number of times, ‘look I don’t think that’s, you know, 
that’s not enough. And you’re running the risk of coming along to the hearing and it’s all 
going to fall over’ (participant 5).  
She felt that this could have been remedied if the company had begun 
conversations with DoC earlier in the proposal planning stages.  
 
                                                        
25 In accordance with Section 92 of the RMA, council officers can request more information or 
action from the applicant. 
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The conservation, mitigation and rehabilitation conditions as agreed on between 
the company and commissioners fragment the various aspects of the environment 
into components that relate to the type of resource consents required and the 
kinds of effects the RMA controls. Thus, the mitigation focuses on reducing 
negative effects of discharges and pollution to waterways, and effects on specific 
species on the plateau (participants 1, 2, 8 and 10). However, the ecology of an 
area is threatened if divided (participants 2 and 10). One environmentalist 
suggested that with the consent process under the RMA “you end up with 
something that’s really patchy and the ecological integrity is compromised” 
(participant 10). One of the council officers also noted that loss of habitat could not 
be remedied: “you can propose all the rehabilitation under the sun, but we’re also 
talking a very unique environment, and all the specialists [agreed] … you can’t 
restore that back to its original condition” (participant 5). As Castree (2010) 
suggests, neoliberal approaches to nature are problematic as the exchange of 
money does not account for intrinsic ecological value.  
 
One environmentalist also stressed the irreversibility of the adverse effects of the 
Escarpment Mine proposal (participant 14). The precautionary principle26 was 
highlighted by another environmentalist, who said it should be applied in this case:  
if there’s a risk of having irreversible damage to ecology on conservation land, then I think 
that the commissioners should err on the side of caution… [especially because] we’re not 
sure what species are up there [and] … surely we need to find out first, so we need to find 
out what we’re going to lose (participant 9). 
Again, this ‘precautionary’ argument was dismissed by the commissioners in their 
final decision in favour of the economic benefits of the proposal:  
it would have been easy to reject this application had we been inclined to take a more 
precautionary approach. We are greatly influenced however by the significant economic 
gains that the district and region and the country as a whole will enjoy if the mine proceeds 
(Archer et al., 2011, p. 103). 
 
In terms of specific mitigation, success with vegetation direct transfer27 (VDT) on 
the neighbouring Stockton Mine informed some of the rehabilitation measures 
                                                        
26 The precautionary principle states that “Where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing 
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation” (United Nations, 1992). 
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proposed for Escarpment Mine (participant 5). However, VDT was only thought a 
viable option for a small portion of the area (participant 5). One environmentalist 
stressed that the on-site rehabilitation that was offered by Bathurst would 
drastically change the ecology of the plateau by replacing the wetlands, moors and 
tussock lands with free-draining broken rock that would eventually turn into 
beech forest (participant 8).  
 
The concept of biodiversity trading fits with the paradigm of fragmenting the 
environment. Biodiversity trading is whereby the developer compensates for the 
environmental destruction in one area by supporting biodiversity in another, with 
biodiversity offsetting in similar landscapes or compensation in areas with 
different biodiversity (participant 7; Walker, Brower, Stephens, & Lee, 2009). In 
Escarpment Mine, Bathurst proposed an offset by undertaking pest control in the 
Heaphy area (Resource and Environmental Management Nelson Limited, 2011). 
However, as one environmentalist noted, this was hardly compensating as DoC had 
already been doing pest control in the Heaphy area (participant 13).  
 
The conditions agreed to in the council hearing formed part of the appeal to the 
Environment Court in late 2012, as noted in Chapter three. At the time of writing, 
the Environment Court decision was yet to be announced. Forest and Bird stated in 
a media release following the Environment Court hearing that:  
We argued the plateau’s conservation values are too high to be destroyed. We argued that 
plans to put the soil back after mining and replant the surface will not restore what is lost 
(Forest and Bird, 2012c, para. 2).  
It is unknown whether Forest and Bird and the West Coast Environment Network 
will appeal the Environment Court’s decision to a higher court if the outcome is not 
favourable to the issues they have highlighted. 
 
The problem one environmentalist highlighted with biodiversity trading, is that 
the baselines for habitat and species numbers on which such trading is based, 
continuously shrinks as new developments take place:  
                                                                                                                                                                  
27 Vegetation direct transfer is where a section of vegetative material (including various microbes 
and invertebrates) is uplifted and transferred to another site, until the original location (or nearby) 
is available for replanting (participant 5). 
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it’s destruction by the salami slice syndrome… I feel like ripping up the evidence where 
people say, … ‘it’s only 5% of this nationally endangered population, there’s still 95% of it 
out there’, well they’ll cut out that 5% and then they’ll still be, ‘oh it’s only another 5% so 
we’ll cut another [bit]…’, until you’ve pushed it down to a critical level (participant 2).  
Participant 2 also suggested “how do you measure the intrinsic value of an 
ecological ecosystem that exists nowhere else?” She suggested that the profit from 
coal was more easily measured, meaning that “they kinda get a bit more weight 
than some nefarious kind of value” such as significant habitats or ecological 
systems. She also critiqued the way the RMA encouraged “finding science to back 
up bloody everything” (participant 2). 
 
There are widely divergent views on the value of biodiversity offsetting. Walker et 
al. (2009) suggest that biodiversity trading “to date has facilitated development 
while perpetuating biodiversity loss” (p. 149). Maron et al. (2012) suggest that 
biodiversity offsetting only be conducted when “the impacted biodiversity and 
ecosystem values can be explicitly defined and measured” (p. 146). Forest and 
Bird’s Bioblitz was an activist attempt to increase information about the Denniston 
Plateau (participants 9). At best, from environmentalists’ perspectives, it could be 
seen that recognising the significance of the ecosystems on the plateau may to its 
protection, or, at worst, more ecological knowledge on which to base biodiversity 
offsetting conditions. But regardless of the ecological knowledge offered, Walker et 
al. (2009) suggest that weak design and negligent enforcement by authorities will 
not be overcome. One of the reasons for this is ecological complexity which has:  
levels of organization from genes to ecosystems, an extraordinary number of elements at 
each level that vary in time and space, and diverse interactions within and between levels 
(Walker et al., 2009, p. 150).  
Furthermore, net biodiversity loss is persistently facilitated by “non-equivalent 
exchanges” (Walker et al., 2009, p. 152). A clear example lies in Bathurst’s proposal 
for pest control of the Heaphy area, which is nothing like the low scrub and 
wetlands of the Denniston Plateau.  
 
Büscher, Sullivan, Neves, Igoe and Brockington (2012) suggest that “many 
conservationists can seem to choose the safe road of doing conservation” (p. 15) 
within neoliberal discourses, that offer technical solutions incentivised through by 
economic gain such as biodiversity trading. Conversely, those that oppose 
88 
 
neoliberal conservation practices are typically not heard (Büscher et al., 2012), as 
was the case in environmentalist opposition to the biodiversity offsetting 
measures in Escarpment Mine.  
5.3.5 The future of the Denniston Plateau 
Numerous participants, including one council officer, felt that the RMA allowed for 
companies to apply for consents in a fragmented way. The lack of full plans, due to 
the ability to uncover them over time through multiple consents, meant that the 
impacts of the whole project were not able to be considered (participants 2, 3, 5, 8, 
10, 12 and 13).  One council officer interviewed noted that before the final 
application by the company for consents, the planning team at the council had 
requested the applicant include more of their plans in the one application, as the 
coal-handling facility and trucking movements had not been incorporated. 
Participant 5 stated “we need to see the full package … you gotta be really careful 
that you’re not dealing with things in a piecemeal fashion and you’re getting the 
whole caboodle, so you can assess all the effects.” 
 
While still granting the consents, the commissioners did also suggest that the 
future of the plateau be clarified, potentially with DoC establishing a certain 
proportion of the plateau as a protected area (Archer et al., 2011). One participant 
noted that the current stewardship28 status of the land on the Denniston Plateau 
did little to protect it, even though it was still DoC land (participant 8). Similarly, 
one environmentalist suggested that a strategic approach be taken to allocate 
areas that will be conserved, allowing for other areas to be mined (participant 10). 
While any form of coal mining, in her opinion, would never be acceptable because 
of coal’s contribution to climate change, at a minimum, this would ease some of the 
conservation concerns. 
5.3.6 Fragmented approach to the environment  
In the case of the Escarpment Mine decision, the environment was perceived by 
the company and commissioners to be dividable and not interconnected. This was 
shown with the councils’ unwillingness to recognize Escarpment Mine’s 
                                                        
28 See Chapter three for details on stewardship land, in particular subsections 3.1.2 and 3.2.2. 
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contribution to climate change under their interpretation of the RMA29, as the 
effects were too broad and complex, and the way in which biodiversity 
conservation was approached in a tradable fashion. The RMA allows this to occur, 
possibly even encouraging decision-makers to consider the environment as a sum 
of its parts rather than having much more significant intrinsic value as a whole, 
despite sections in the purpose (Part 2) of the RMA that indicate the contrary. 
 
This is consistent with the neoliberal nature of the RMA, as under neoliberalism, 
the free market is privileged, requiring calculable knowledges and trading in order 
to function (Castree, 2010; Peck & Tickell, 2002). This is evident in the decision-
making process for Escarpment Mine, with the favouring of calculable knowledges. 
As can be seen in the preceding subsections, proposed economic benefits and 
biodiversity trading were privileged to the extent that arguments founded on other 
knowledges were extenuated or disregarded. Climate change, with its global effects 
and lack of containment, was outside the realm that such measurable approaches 
could consider. The intrinsic value of the ecology of the Denniston Plateau and the 
irreversibility of the damage that the mine would cause was also disregarded. 
Ecological aspects of the environment were seen as replaceable, and damage was 
perceived as able to be mitigated through biodiversity trading and rehabilitation.  
  
Imposing neoliberal paradigms on nature can become problematic as “the way 
various different actors value the non-human world cannot be satisfied by them 
expressing their non-monetary values through the expenditure or receipt of 
money” (Castree, 2010, p. 1731). Similarly, as established in this section, to 
environmentalists involved, the irreversibility of effects of Escarpment Mine meant 
that the intrinsic value of the Denniston Plateau could not be replaced, replicated 
or compensated for. The knowledges that were favoured in the decision-making 
process were aligned with the dominant neoliberal discourse, with economic 
development and the separate aspects of the environment privileged over intrinsic 
values and uncertain knowledges. Neoliberal discourses significantly privilege 
quantifiable knowledges over other knowledges, and also claim to be apolitical, 
                                                        
29 As the Escarpment Mine council hearing was prior to the Environment Court hearing in 2012 that 
determined that climate change could not be considered for applications for coal mining consents, 
the disregarding of the climate change argument still lay with the council and commissioners’ 
interpretation of the RMA.  
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further reinforcing a neoliberal hegemony (McCarthy & Prudham, 2004; Peck & 
Tickell, 2002; Purcell, 2009). 
5.4 Perceived objectivity and the “philosophical stance” 
In addition to quantifiable knowledges being privileged in the decision-making 
process, the perceived objectivity of evidence and neutrality of submitters was 
highly favoured. From a constructivist post-structural perspective as detailed in 
Chapter two, all knowledge is socially constructed, and meaning is created within 
specific contexts, thus, pure objectivity is unattainable.  
 
Nonetheless, as defined by a senior council officer, an: 
objective independent expert would be basically taking an objective perspective and would 
be necessarily, so they would be … presenting what they believe as a technical expert, is an 
appropriate course of action, …[so] if they’ve got concerns on the technical aspects of the 
proposal, they’ll be explaining that and why (participant 7). 
In a practice note, the Environment Court (n.d.) requires that expert witnesses 
before the court: 
 (b) state the witness's qualifications as an expert; 
(c) describe the ambit of the evidence given and state either that the evidence is within the 
expert's area of expertise, or that the witness is relying on some other (identified) 
evidence; 
(d) identify the data, information, facts, and assumptions considered in forming the 
witness's opinions; 
(e) state the reasons for the opinions expressed; 
… 
(g) specify any literature or other material used or relied upon in support of the opinions 
expressed; 
(h) describe any examinations, tests, or other investigations on which the expert witness 
has relied, and identify, and give details of, the qualifications of any person who carried 
them out 
While not mandatory at council hearings, such qualification and expertise is 
generally expected for experts presenting at council hearings.  
 
Elaborating on the previous section, in this case, people who were considered 
more objective tended to present knowledges that were measurable and specific to 
this particular application. People who had passion and broader reaching beliefs 
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about the adverse effects to conservation and climate change that this mine and 
other mines would have, were perceived as having less objectivity. While council 
officers suggested that environmentalists’ bias was a reason for doubting their 
arguments, similarly there was evidence that commissioners and council officers 
were prone to bias. Yet without the power to make the decisions, the 
environmentalists were the party that were disadvantaged through these 
perceptions of subjectivity. Perceived lack of objectivity appears to be a major 
obstacle for considering environmentalists’ evidence as equal to others’ expertise, 
and thus, it is not heard. Here I discuss the perceived objectivity or lack thereof of 
environmentalists, independent experts, council staff and commissioners.  
5.4.1 Environmentalists’ advocacy 
A perceived “philosophical stance” stopped environmentalists’ evidence being 
valued as much as other evidence, according to a senior council officer:  
Environmental groups may make submissions which are philosophically based rather than 
technically based, … the other thing that needs to be factored …is, is the submitter being an 
advocate or is the person speaking on behalf of a submission or on a submission giving 
objective balanced viewpoints?…Because you can get people who are highly qualified, but 
if they’re advocating a position, then, ah, [pause] their objectivity is at question. …For 
example, if someone’s come up who’s said oh, you know we’re opposed to any form of coal 
mining, then you would have to question whether the evidence they were providing was 
objective (participant 7). 
One environmentalist in particular was also aware of this perception and how it 
disadvantaged environmentalists in the submission process. She said that she 
needed experts to advocate for the conservation of the plateau, but their perceived 
objectivity would disappear if they did, further shrinking their ability to influence 
the formal process: 
I get so frustrated, where I’ve got experts that are so willing to speak out against 
something, but because they’re [presenting evidence in formal processes], they dare not 
speak out. And I’m just like, I need them to speak out! I need them to be telling our Prime 
Minister this shouldn’t be happening! But the lawyers are saying don’t let them talk 
because if they talk and if they are out in the media as making a statement of advocacy, 
that’s it, their independence is gone (participant 2). 
She also suggested that the RMA “fails to recognise that experts actually naturally 
of right should and can be advocates” (participant 2). All experts are arguing for a 
position, yet discourses of objectivity legitimise some evidence over other more 
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‘objective’ evidence. Furthermore, she proposed that experts’ opinions, based on 
expertise and experience, be regarded as valuable rather than being dismissed as 
advocacy. She emphasized that the focus on objectivity prevented experts from 
forming an opinion based on their experience and knowledge (participant 2).  
 
This aligns with the way in which measurable knowledges (as in the previous 
section) are privileged under the dominant discourses of neoliberalism and the 
pretence that such knowledges are “depoliticised” and thus further privileged in 
decision-making (Peck & Tickell, 2002, p. 389). The senior council officer quoted 
above demonstrates that if a submitter is not deemed to be providing ‘objective’ 
views, their evidence is at question (participant 7). As established in Chapter three, 
subsection 3.2.2, measurable knowledges that are perceived to be objective, are 
privileged under neoliberal decision-making processes. Such knowledges are 
considered apolitical and become ‘common-sense’, forming the hegemonic 
neoliberal discourse that supersedes other knowledges (McCarthy & Prudham, 
2004; Peck & Tickell, 2002; Purcell, 2009). 
 
As a consequence of the privilege accorded objectivity, environmentalists have 
adapted their approaches in order to be effective in this process. Or as one 
interviewee said, in preparing submissions:  
we have to try and persuade them. My view is you must do that with factual information. 
And what does, I think, blow it completely is when you say something that is a kind of 
generalised position, um, or a statement that is not actually based on fact. … you have to 
just simply give people the facts. …if you give them the facts, um, then they have to speak 
for themselves. Um, and so I think the science is really important (participant 3).  
While knowledge must come from somewhere, this participant felt that ‘fact’ was 
objective and the use of fact in rational arguments had the power to persuade. This 
emphasis on rationality is consistent with a deliberative democracy approach 
(Bond, 2011a; Munton, 2003; Pugh, 2005). While the rational deliberations of 
deliberative democracy advocate participation and inclusion, radical democrats 
and critics of deliberative democracy suggest that the emphasis on ‘rational’ 
debates excludes important voices and arguments (Little, 2002). Such exclusion is 
contradictory to the ethos of democracy, which is for equality, justice and the rule 
of the masses. This exclusion is discussed further in Chapter six.  
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5.4.2 The bias of “independent” experts  
In contrast to environmentalists and their experts, experts provided by the 
company however, tended to be taken as unquestionably objective by the 
commissioners (participants 5, 10 and 14). During the hearing, Bathurst drew on a 
number of experts to provide evidence to support their case. There were 27 people 
presenting on behalf of Bathurst, with experts in the areas of acoustic engineering, 
lighting, landscape architecture, roading engineering, ecology and rehabilitation, 
economic, recreation, heritage and others (participant 5; Buller District Council 
and West Coast Regional Council, 2011a).  
 
Four environmentalists suggested that experts provided by the company were 
selective in the evidence they presented, both to support the company’s argument 
and potentially secure future employment for themselves (participants 2, 8, 10 and 
13). One stated “there are a small number of people that are always employed to 
do these jobs … [and they are chosen] for their ability to push their judgments one 
way or another” (participant 10), while another suggested that they “massage their 
facts” (participant 8). Another environmentalist stated that she had found 
information under the Official Information Act 1982 (OIA) on previous cases to 
suggest that  
an expert will write the evidence and then someone working for the company will try and 
rewrite it to kind of just reword it in their favour and… it’s not factually incorrect, but 
they’re picking up on points that … [are] kinda selective (participant 2).  
Participant 8 said that the companies have “got the money to bring in experts to 
counter anything we say… you can buy experts who will give you what you want”. 
From these environmentalists’ perspectives, language can be manipulated to 
defend Bathurst’s proposal, regardless of the actual adverse effects that the mine 
might cause. One council officer noted that the councils coordinate a peer review of 
the applicant’s evidence prior to the decision-making to confirm that it is not 
biased (participant 6). Yet this assessment of objectivity is contradicted by 
participants 2, 8, 10 and 13 who perceived the evidence provided to be subjective.  
 
Three participants suggested that because these experts that are paid by the 
company, the company will influence their reports “because if they put the wrong 
thing, they won’t be hired again” (participant 2). Participant 13 also said “if they 
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don’t come up with the answers the company wants, they don’t get employed 
again”. Nevertheless, another participant mentioned that any experts have their 
professional reputation to uphold, and that this made them more likely to present 
unbiased evidence (participant 6). Experts’ perceived desire to uphold their 
reputation is certainly connected to the privileging of measurable knowledges, 
whereby those that utilised the dominant, ‘apolitical’, neoliberal discourses in their 
evidence would be perceived to be more objective. With the commissioners taking 
expert knowledge at face value and the experts potentially being selective about 
the knowledge they present and how they present it, this creates an unfair 
advantage to the companies who have the resources to employ multiple experts.  
5.4.3 Councils and commissioners: neutral facilitators and  
decision-makers? 
There were three commissioners on the hearing committee for Escarpment Mine. 
One was a local councillor with an environmental management background, 
another a lawyer, and the third an environmental consultant (participant 5). One of 
the council staff interviewed suggested that it would have been ideal to have had 
an ecologist on the hearing committee, but that it was not possible to find one at 
that time that was not already associated with a mining company in the area 
(participant 5). Many participants held the view that in general when involved in 
planning consent decisions, commissioners, elected councillors and council staff 
had or may have had conflicts of interest (participants 3, 5, 8, 12 and 16).  
 
While only one of three commissioners in this case was an elected councillor, there 
was a concern that elected members of both councils all have mining or farming 
backgrounds, and that this makes them biased toward allowing new developments 
(participants 3, 8 and 13). However, the commissioner interviewed suggested that 
in general the local community appreciated having a local commissioner 
(participant 4). Furthermore, a council officer commenting on the local 
commissioner in this case, suggested that “he’s not like, you know, what a lot of 
people would perceive as a West Coaster, for mining, let’s rip shit and bust, you 
know, that’s not [him], he’s very middle of the road” (participant 5). This was 
contrasted with one environmentalist’s perception of him which was that he has 
“always been very anti-green, very pro-development, so I mean, we know [he] is 
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always going to say yes” to developments (participant 8). Clearly perceptions of 
the objectivity or bias of commissioners is also a subjective matter.  
 
Four participants felt that decisions by these councils were often pre-determined 
(2, 8, 9 and 14), and that hearing panels can be structured to favour certain 
elements of a proposal (participant 2). One environmentalist stated: 
…it seems that often the decision is pre-determined. Like, it doesn’t actually matter what 
you say in your submission, the decision is never going to go your way … and partly that’s 
because who the commissioners often are… councillors who have been elected on a 
platform of being pro-mining (participant 14). 
This perception that hearing committees may be structured to determine certain 
decisions is consistent with a council officer’s view; that the councils tend not to 
employ commissioners that they have not worked with before “because it’s a real 
unknown quantity; you don’t want to have somebody that then goes left field and 
turns out to be totally anti-mining [laughs] and has got their own sort of views on 
it” (participant 5). This quote could imply that it would have been acceptable for a 
commissioner to be pro-mining, and that this would not have tainted their 
objectivity. Commissioners were also deemed to be influenced by the fact that they 
are paid for their work and would not get further employment (participant 8 and 
12) “if they go against the wishes of the council” (participant 12).  
 
A council officer suggested that local authorities had variable understandings of 
what counted as a conflict of interest (participant 5). She cited two cases where 
various parties in a hearing were family relations (experts, council officers and 
commissioners), and that senior council officers had been made aware but allowed 
it regardless. She suggested that this was a “generous view of what constitutes a 
conflict” and that it contradicts the need for councils to “be seen by the public to be 
objective and [with] no sort of agendas or bias one way or the other” (participant 
5). While one participant noted that commissioners are generally accredited 
through a central government initiative (participant 4), two others questioned the 
quality of commissioners on the West Coast in general given the minimal training 
entailed (participants 10 and 14). The commissioner interviewed suggested that as 
a commissioner:  
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if you feel that you are, compromised in any way, or go into any hearing with strong, ultra 
strong perceptions, so that you had a pre-meditated outcome or with any hint of perceived 
bias, then, which results in a conflict of interest, then you should be stepping aside 
(participant 4).  
This was something he felt that commissioners could easily do, yet this is not 
consistent with the way in which those interviewed perceived the bias of the 
commissioners.  
 
Certain values that the decision-makers may hold appear to privilege certain 
knowledges that justify the outcomes that are based on their values. Objectivity is 
surely a perception, not fact, and thus, those considered to be ‘advocates’ or with a 
‘philosophical stance’ should not be denied meaningful participation in the 
decision-making process, as their own position is no less objective than that of the 
council or applicant.  
5.5 Synopsis 
This chapter illustrates the lack of influence environmentalists were able to have 
on the decisions, and the ways in which objectivity and certain knowledges were 
favoured in the formal process, excluding environmentalists’ arguments. 
Environmentalists expressed that activism and mass movements were the most 
effective ways of creating a value shift where proposals like Escarpment Mine 
would no longer be acceptable to mainstream New Zealand. However, this is a 
longer-term gradual process, and in the short-term, environmentalists were 
unable to have influence in the formal decision-making process led by councils.  
 
Knowledges that were quantifiable and fragmented, such as economic 
development and biodiversity trading, were privileged in the process, leaving 
environmentalists global concerns about climate change and holistic ecological 
concerns outside of consideration. The perception and privilege accorded to 
objective knowledge, and those presenting such knowledge in the formal process, 
served to legitimise the applicant’s experts and delegitimise the environmentalists’ 
evidence. A mark of objectivity of the applicant’s and commissioners’ positions 
ignores the constructed nature of knowledge that applies to all parties.   
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Consistent with deliberative democracy outlined in Chapter four, the focus on 
“rational” debate is a major flaw for how people opposing a decision are able to be 
equally regarded during the decision-making process, both in terms of the 
measurable knowledges that are privileged, and the favouring of so-called 
objectivity. Walter (2008) suggests that Young and Dryzek, both proponents of 
deliberative democracy, both have “a commitment to equality that overrides any 
preference that might be given to those forms of argument that are normally 
privileged on the basis of rationality criteria” (p. 537). 
 
Young (2001) suggests that deliberation and rational debate are constrained by 
dominant discourses about what types of knowledge are considered rational. This 
means that activists trying to show opposition are either bound within these 
dominant discourses or simply left out of deliberations. In this case, the dominant 
discourses are neoliberal measurable approaches to the environment and to 
economic development, in contrast with environmentalists’ discourses of the 
plateau’s ecosystems as a whole, and the global consequences of climate change. 
The exclusion of environmentalist discourses denies democracy’s aim for equality.  
McClymont (2011) suggests that “any understanding of the world is political, and 
that each political ideology expresses this understanding through the articulation 
of a discourse which aims to express itself as ‘reality’” (p. 244). One such political 
ideology is neoliberal discourse, which has succeeded in becoming hegemonic, 
depoliticized and, thus, the only knowledge to be considered objective (McCarthy 
& Prudham, 2004; Peck & Tickell, 2002; Purcell, 2009). The hegemony of 
neoliberal discourse is prevalent in the case of Escarpment Mine. Antagonism 
manifests the limits of conflicting knowledges (Bond, 2007), which can be seen in 
the way that the neoliberal knowledges of the council officials conflict and do not 
overlap with the knowledges of the environmentalists. Thus, an antagonistic 
relationship emerges, whereby identities of both are simultaneously created and 
threatened by each other (Howarth, 2000; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001; Mouffe, 2005). 
Further exploration of antagonism in this case is discussed in the next chapter.  
 
Neoliberal knowledges alone will never fulfil the democratic ideals of the rule of 
the masses. Benhabib’s (1992) deliberative democracy recognises diversity, and 
advocates for “sensitiv[ity] to differences of identity, needs and modes of 
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reasoning” (p. 8). This includes the inclusion of both the emotional and rational in 
deliberations (Benhabib, 1992, as in Bond, 2011a). One environmentalist said:  
the more viewpoints that are put forward, the more democratic it is in that you’re covering 
a wider range of perspectives. I think that does increase the democracy at play, because … 
you’re just providing more diversity to, more diverse opinions on various matters 
(participant 9). 
Furthermore, knowledge will never be complete. Brand and Gaffikin (2007) 
suggest that “agonism recognizes that knowledge is always partial, and sometimes 
partisan, and that the search for enhanced knowledge is endless rather than 
exhaustive” (p. 293). Thus, an agonistic approach to democratic decision-making 
would not privilege certain knowledges to the extent that other knowledges are 
excluded, as has been the case with the privileging of neoliberal discourses in the 
Escarpment Mine decision. Elaborating on the democratic framework created in 
Chapter four, the fragmented approach to the environment raises questions for 
democracy. How can agonism be expressed when there are such opposing 
knowledges? How does the justification for excluding dissenting voices fit with 
democratic ideals? And indeed, how does democracy fare when faced with 
conflicting knowledges and values? 
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Chapter six: 
Escarpment Mine and reflections 
on the democratic framework 
 
 
 
 
This chapter explores how the case and the findings reflect the framework I 
proposed at the end of Chapter four, as presented in the diagram Figure 4.2 
(reprinted in figure 6.1 over). The analysis focuses on agonism and antagonism 
because these concepts are at the core of critiques of deliberative democracy and 
collaborative planning, and because agonism is the central principle of radical 
democracy. The character of discussion in this chapter moves from the pragmatic 
to take a more theoretical approach to questions of democracy.  
 
I start by reflecting on the ethos of democracy, and how ideas of power and 
equality are expressed in the decisions about Escarpment Mine. I then discuss how 
these are perpetuated through either agonism or antagonism. I explore the 
perceptions of transparency in the decision-making process and information 
shared, and how this contributes to power issues and relationships of an 
antagonistic nature. I discuss the idea of temporary agreements, open to further 
deliberation, and limited possibility of this occurring in the case.  
 
Moving to a more theoretical discussion, I explore the acceptance or denial of 
underlying difference, and how the aim for consensus in decision-making excludes 
or attempts to co-opt differing opinions. This can be explored through the idea of 
agonism as accepting difference and engaging adversaries. Furthermore, I discuss 
the implications of antagonistic activism as being an acceptable way for things to 
be voiced, and how this relates to Rancière’s concept of noise.  
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The synopsis of this chapter returns to the framework and illustrates how this case 
does not reflect the democratic ideals that arose from the literature in Chapter 
four, despite the Escarpment Mine decision being made under a supposedly 
democratic process under the RMA.  
 
  
 
Figure 6.1: Framework for democratic decision-making (with relevant section numbers for this 
chapter in the headings). 
6.1 Power, equality and democracy 
As established in Chapter four, section 4.2, equality, justice and rule of the people 
form the ethos of democracy, whereby the citizens have the right to participate 
meaningfully and equally in decisions that affect their lives. Equality here means 
that people have equality in access to information and equal opportunity to 
express their views and to influence decisions made. This framework also realises 
that equality may never be fulfilled because of structural inequality, but that 
equality is something that can be consistently worked towards. As Foucault (1982) 
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suggests, power relations are inherent in society, which “makes all the more 
politically necessary the analysis of [them]…, their historical formation, the source 
of their strength or fragility, the conditions that are necessary to transform some 
or to abolish others” (p. 343). 
 
However, the hegemonic neoliberalism that prevails tends to result in “decision-
making practices that are widely accepted as ‘democratic’ but that do not (or 
cannot) fundamentally challenge existing relations of power” (Purcell, 2009, p. 
141). Purcell (2009) suggests that communicative planning (see Chapter four, 
section 4.3) does just that; perpetuating prevailing power relations. Nevertheless, 
Brand and Gaffikin (2007) suggest that even though a critique of collaborative 
planning is that power inequalities “cannot be dissolved through logical 
argumentation” as collaborative planning proposes (p. 292), agonistic planning 
with different methods faces similar challenges as “the issues of power and 
inequity remain intractable” (p. 308). In echoing the way in which power has an 
impact on democracy, one participant suggests “[i]t can be mind-boggling when 
you look at it, sort of globally, it’s like, oh my god, power structures at play, and 
what you’re up against, and how on earth do you start to unravel it and put it back 
together to make it more democratic” (participant 9). 
 
The framework, established after reviewing literature in Chapter four, endeavours 
to unravel the case study of Escarpment Mine to explore the democratic nature of 
the decisions made. The framework in Figure 6.1 places equality, justice and the 
rule of the people as the overarching goals.  
 
Thus, a good starting point for analysing this case is to explore the overarching 
participation (or rule of the people) in the formal decision-making process. In 
considering Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of citizen participation, this case, with the 
little influence that environmentalist submitters were able to have (see Chapter 
four, 4.2.2), would fit into either informing or consulting the public, which she 
argues are degrees of tokenistic participation. While first appearing that the 
process was fair and allowed the public to have a say, this participation is clearly 
limited (as discussed in Chapter five). However, it is important to elucidate that 
under the RMA, the councils make district and regional plans that involve public 
102 
 
participation. The rules in the plan govern how, when and for what kinds of 
activities resource consents will be required. Given the public participation in the 
development of the district and regional plans, it is deemed that the rules outlined 
are with the public’s endorsement. Therefore, it is only for project applications for 
certain non-complying activities that have significant effects that the public get an 
additional ‘say’ through the submission process.  
 
Two council staff interviewed suggested that equality was present through fair 
participation in the formal decision-making process: 
I sorta felt as though everyone um, had a fair say in the hearing (participant 6).  
My role is just to make sure that the process is… a fair process that doesn’t disadvantage, or 
advantage one party over another (participant 7).  
Several participants (3, 10 and 13) also indicated that the RMA was good in that it 
allowed anyone from the public to make a submission and be heard (in publicly 
notified cases): “in other ways I think the RMA is probably quite good, anybody can 
put in a submission and go along” (participant 10). In addition: 
I really felt that New Zealand has quite a good system and of an ordinary person like me 
being able to be heard, and um, with just a little bit of help with some of my written stuff… 
it’s amazing how much respect that judges and commissioners at that level give you as a 
lay person, you know?... I think that’s a fantastic democratic process (participant 3). 
The commissioner interviewed suggested that because of the fine tuning of the 
processes under the RMA since it was enacted in 1991, that he “can’t think of a 
better way [to have public participation] than the process that’s actually already in 
place… I think it’s probably as good as we’re going to get” (participant 4).  
 
Nonetheless, this was contradicted by environmentalists’ inability to have an effect 
in the formal decision-making process, as discussed in depth in Chapter five. 
Moreover, one participant said that the submission process feels “out of reach to 
your ordinary citizen” by appearing complicated (participant 9). She suggested 
that “simplifying the processes of… public engagement” would make it more 
democratic (participant 9). While some participants stressed the fairness of the 
process in that it allowed anyone to submit, participant 9 recognised that that this 
does not account for the exclusive nature of the formal participation process. The 
formal participation must initially take the form of formal written language, and, as 
established in Chapter five, the formal process gives preferential treatment to 
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submissions that align with the dominant discourses of neoliberalism and 
rationality. Additionally, council officers and environmentalists alike emphasised 
that lay-people’s knowledge is not given weight in the decisions made 
(participants 2, 5, 7, 8, 12, 14 and 16). In summary, equality is not met because of 
the emphasis on formal and rational participation.  
 
The way in which environmentalists were unable to achieve meaningful 
participation in the process indicates that equality was not paramount, despite 
claims to fairness and several participants’ statements that indicate the contrary. 
To explore the lack of equality, I turn to the extent to which agonism and 
antagonism were apparent in various circumstances, starting with another 
commonly held principle of democracy: transparency. Throughout this discussion 
and as established in Chapter four, subsection 4.3.4, I take agonism to be based on 
disagreement between adversaries where one respects the right of the other to 
disagree, and both parties understand that justice, equality and freedom underpin 
their relationship. Agonism is the acceptance of the potential permanence of 
disagreement (Mouffe, 1995, as in Bond, 2011b; Hillier, 2002; McClymont, 2011). 
Conversely, antagonism is the conflict between identities whose discourses have 
no commonalities, but simultaneously shape and threaten the other (Howarth, 
2000; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). Antagonistic relationships display enemy-like 
behaviour and a competing drive for attaining power over the other’s discourses 
(Mouffe, 2005).  
6.2 Transparency of process and access to information  
Clearly a key issue for equality and the redistribution of power in decision-making 
is the transparency of the decision-making process, and free access to information. 
These have arisen as issues in the case of Escarpment Mine, with particular regard 
to: the potential bias of commissioners; the lack of consultation and information 
given by the company; and difficulties accessing information from DoC, both under 
the OIA and with their absence at the council hearing. Dissatisfaction with the lack 
of transparency of process and access to information was high among 
environmentalist participants. This demonstrates the power the decision-makers 
had. A senior council officer suggested that: 
104 
 
opponents say there’s not enough consultation or enough information but there’s gotta be 
a balance and a limit. Because again, if you’re opposed to something then you’re always 
going to tend to say there’s not enough consultation or there’s not enough, so it’s very 
difficult to think of a, how that process could be improved (participant 7).  
Yet a lack of transparency and ability to access information prevents equality and 
justice from being fulfilled. It also implies an antagonistic relation, where the 
environmentalists have been perceived as enemies, with weakened rights to 
disagree on equal terms.  
6.2.1 Commissioners 
One of the main criticisms of such transparency, as discussed in Chapter five, was 
the way in which commissioners were chosen. As discussed in section 5.4.3, one 
planner indicated that the councils tend to employ commissioners that they have 
worked with before (participant 5). The council would prefer to know who they 
are working with rather than risk an unpredictable outcome that may be based on 
values (participant 5). Moreover, four environmentalists felt the hearing 
committees were often constructed to create a pre-determined outcome due to 
commissioners’ vested interests (participants 2, 8, 9 and 14). 
 
Four participants recommended removing the authority for choosing 
commissioners from the council, meaning that commissioners would be 
independently appointed (participants 8, 9, 12 and 14). A certification programme 
is currently in place for commissioners to become accredited, and it is mandatory 
for the majority of a hearing committee to be accredited (participant 4; Ministry 
for the Environment, 2011). Accreditation involves a two day foundation course, 
followed by recertification every three years, and by September 2014, all 
commissioners at a council led hearing will need to have this certification 
(Ministry for the Environment, 2011). However, given that  all three 
commissioners of the Escarpment Mine hearing committee were already 
accredited (Buller District Council and West Coast Regional Council, 2011a; 
Ministry for the Environment, 2011) and the questions that participants raised 
about their bias, it is dubious whether such accreditation will ensure independence 
and transparency in the decision-making process.  
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The neutrality of commissioners was questioned by a number of 
environmentalists; in the words of one:  
there’s agendas that are being pushed that contradict what the RMA is supposed to be 
about… there needs to be perhaps more neutrality in the process of assessing arguments 
for and against resource consents... Can more be done to create a more neutral set of 
commissioners who don’t have links with the industry? (participant 9). 
How to go about this is indeed a good question, and in need of much review to 
ensure that the process is transparent, and that commissioners have the ability to 
engage respectfully in agonistic discussions with diverse opinions. The decision-
making under the RMA appears to vary in different councils across the country, 
with certain values being considered differently. Currently, from the perception of 
the submitters interviewed, it appears commissioners in this case only considered 
issues that they chose to (such as quantifiable knowledges as established in 
Chapter five). This does not fulfil equality in decision-making as it prevented 
environmentalists from participating meaningfully. Furthermore, it created an 
antagonistic relationship as it did not respect the right for parties to disagree on 
equal terms.  
6.2.2 The company 
There are diverse perceptions about the way that the company consulted with 
various parties. The company had endeavoured to consult with the various 
submitters (participants 2, 5, 6 and 12). Participant 5, a council officer, said from 
evidence Bathurst provided at the hearing, that they had undertaken broad 
consultation particularly with residents in the area. However, two participants felt 
that the company did very little to engage with the local residents, even those 
living in proximity to the site (participant 12 and 16). Furthermore, when they met 
with a Bathurst representative, they said he did not mention the larger part of the 
proposal that would most closely affect them: “he omitted that little bit, you 
know… It was lies from the start” (participant 12). Another participant suggested 
that when she met with a representative of Bathurst and visited the plateau with 
them, that this person did not convey nor know the full extent of the proposal 
(participant 2). One local said that over the phone, the representative from 
Bathurst “started to bullshit me and I told him I knew a thing or two” (participant 
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13), again expressing the sentiment that Bathurst representatives were being 
deceitful in their communications with those that might oppose the project.  
 
One environmentalist felt that after initial meetings with the company, she and her 
organisation did not hear back from the company, despite indications that there 
would be further dialogue (participant 2). She also remembers discovering that 
Escarpment Mine was stage one of many stages, as Bathurst had bought extensive 
mining permits for the whole area (participant 2). It appears that Bathurst did not 
disclose their full plans for mining on the Denniston Plateau. This can be seen as 
taking an antagonistic approach, as the concealing of certain information from 
people who they saw as threats to the project was assuming an enemy-like 
relationship. It also denies equality for all parties, by preventing environmentalists 
to engage in informed discussions equally with other parties.  
6.2.3 DoC 
There were two main issues that emerged about DoC in the case of Escarpment 
Mine: their absence at the hearing, and the lack of information freely available 
from DoC to submitters.  
 
DoC did not present an oral submission at the hearing, despite some staff members 
attending to observe30 (participants 3 and 10). The main criticism of this was that 
as a state body funded, established to provide expertise on conservation, they were 
not available to provide evidence, answer questions from the commissioners or 
offer counter-arguments about conservation, mitigation, rehabilitation and 
biodiversity off-setting, despite conservation being one of the major environmental 
concerns of the proposal (participants 3, 5, 9, 10, 11 and 13). An environmentalist 
said, “they are on the state’s books to do that work and have that knowledge and 
present that evidence” (participant 11). One participant suggested it was 
“disgraceful” that DoC wasn’t at the hearing (participant 13), while another said 
“they’ve just been silent on the matter and I think that’s pretty shameful” 
(participant 9). Nonetheless, participant 3 recognised that even if DoC had been at 
                                                        
30 As explained in Chapter two, DoC declined an interview with me as part of this research, thus I 
was unable to obtain an answer from DoC as to why they chose not to present at the hearing.  
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the hearing and provided more ecological evidence, the commissioners’ decision 
might have remained the same.  
 
Two participants suspected that the government or Director General of DoC had 
indicated to DoC staff that they were not to be involved in the council hearing 
(participants 3 and 8). A couple mentioned that DoC was the main submitter 
against the Mokihinui hydro proposal in 2008 and 2009 (participants 6 and 1), as 
discussed in Chapter three. A council officer suggested that DoC used to present in 
an advocacy role much more frequently31, but that recently due to financial strain, 
“they concentrate on their own process” (participant 5). She said: 
They can’t sorta win either way. If they don’t turn up, people think oh well, they don’t have 
any issues … but then if they bowl along, then that’s costing them a lot, in terms of time and 
money, to talk, which they can address generally through their own processes (participant 
5).  
Some participants also mentioned that DoC had indicated they could deal with 
these issues at the access permit stage32 (participants 5 and 10). But compounding 
with the potential lack of democratic ideals, the access agreements that 
Escarpment Mine will need from DoC are not publicly notified33. This means that 
the only option to oppose the access agreement is through a judicial review at the 
high court, which is very expensive, and where the only arguments can be about 
whether the appropriate decision process was followed (participant 14). This 
environmentalist stated “it is public land, but the public are so excluded from the 
process” (participant 14). DoC’s absence at the hearing meant that there was 
insufficient information for thorough engagement with conservation arguments.  
 
Another way in which DoC decreased the possibilities for more ecological 
information was through access to information under the OIA. Two participants 
made three OIA requests to access information from DoC in order to provide 
ecological evidence for their submission. However, in their third request, they 
were expecting to find evidence of a pre-determined outcome for the DoC led 
                                                        
31 This is consistent with Section 6 (b) of the Conservation Act 1987, which states that one of the 
main functions of DoC is “to advocate the conservation of natural and historic resources”, but does 
not mandate in what form this should take.  
32 The access permit is where, under the CMA, the mining developer must seek permission from the 
land owner, in this case the Department of Conservation, to access the land where mining will take 
place. See Chapter three, 3.2.2 
33 Contrary to concessions, which are publicly notified.  
108 
 
access arrangements and concessions (as written in a letter that someone had 
alerted them to). But DoC refused to provide them with more information under 
the OIA unless they paid over $100034 which they were not willing to do 
(participant 9). This suggests an antagonistic relationship, whereby DoC were not 
willing to engage with these environmentalists respectfully. Another also 
suggested that the DoC reports and research undertaken about the Denniston 
Plateau had never been made publicly available, despite being “a government 
organisation funded by the taxpayer!” (participant 13).  
 
Another environmentalist also noted difficulty in the tardiness at which 
information would be provided after an OIA request (participant 10). This was 
particularly if the occasion arose that their group would request a judicial review 
of the decision and relied on the information from their OIA request to DoC in 
order to build their case (participant 10). She suggested that DoC reports should 
be available as soon as they are written: 
But they say …it would ah, prejudice the decision-maker or something, because of what we 
might do with that report I guess. But … if we wanted to go public with it, to try and 
influence them to change their decision then I would have thought that would have been 
fair game (participant 10).  
If information is accessible to all parties, then they have the capacity to engage in 
agonistic relationships and equality is much more likely to be in reach.  
6.3 Temporary agreements, open to further debate 
The framework suggests that moments of consensus should be understood as 
temporary and still open for further and future debate, as per Mouffe (in Little, 
2002) and like Dryzek’s (2001) workable agreement. Additionally, agonism 
respects difference knowing that opinions change over time and over different 
contexts. There has been no evidence of the kind of temporary agreements I 
propose in the framework in the case of Escarpment Mine. There are two ways the 
legislative structures of this case could be interpreted as creating room for future 
deliberations: the appeal process through the Environment Court, and the way in 
                                                        
34 A fee can be charged for an OIA request. Section 15, (2) of the OIA states “Any charge fixed shall 
be reasonable and regard may be had to the cost of the labour and materials involved in making the 
information available and to any costs incurred pursuant to a request of the applicant to make the 
information available urgently”. 
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which the RMA allows applicants to apply for consents on a case by case basis. 
Nevertheless, I critique the way in which these do not fit the framework in terms of 
equality, rule of the masses, and offering an agonistic space.  
 
As established in Chapter five, subsection 5.3.6, the RMA facilitates a fragmented 
approach to the environment, which contradicted the purpose of the act to achieve 
sustainable management. One way it does this is through allowing applicants to 
apply for consents at each stage as their larger project unfolds. As a consequence, 
the full adverse effects of a project on the environment cannot be considered 
together. Yet one participant felt that while this way of applying for consents was 
not something she fully understood, it also provided an opportunity for more 
resistance at each consent application (participant 3). She stated, that particularly 
given that society will gradually become more aware of environmental issues: 
I’m not sure that the company is right in thinking that they will get a rollover in five years, 
ten years, fifteen years’ time, for their ultimate goal which is 35 years. … if we lose the five 
years, we’re certainly going to fight the next one, and um, I wouldn’t expect the laws to be 
the same, and I don’t think they will be looser on environmental issues, they’re more likely 
to be… tighter (participant 3). 
 
Each stage of the appeal process, whereby an applicant or submitter can appeal the 
commissioners’ decision in the Environment Court (or appeal of an Environment 
Court decision in the High Court), could be seen as a formalized method of having 
some fluidity and openness in the decisions made. But once the consents have been 
granted at whichever is the highest level that it has been taken to (the council, 
Environment Court, or higher), there is no opportunity for further deliberation or 
engagement of opposing views, and those that have not made submissions to 
council in the original application process are not able to appeal the decision to the 
Environment Court. This adversarial system is established to provide certainty, 
while also giving the right to a hearing and appeal. This is different from agonistic 
theories that recognise the lack of fixity in decisions and politics more generally. As 
such, this is not the temporary agreement as proposed by the framework, as it 
does not allow new discussions on a decision to emerge. Moreover, as discussed in 
Chapter five, 5.3.1, the process of making an appeal can be costly and time 
consuming for environmental groups who are working largely on a voluntary basis 
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and often have little funding. Here, Forest and Bird and the West Coast 
Environment Network appealed the commissioners’ decision to the Environment 
Court. A hearing was held in late 2012, with the decision expected to be released 
after the time of writing35 (The Environment Court of New Zealand, 2012).  
 
The ideal temporary agreement is agonistic if it continues respectful engagement 
with those that disagree. As a deliberative democrat, Benhabib (1992) proposes an 
ethic which recognises “consensus of all to be a counterfactual illusion” (p.8). She 
promotes the respect of and responsiveness to different needs, identities and 
approaches to knowledge and argumentation. This suggests that the very 
framework for the formal decision-making process needs to allow for different 
ways of making decisions. A different mode of reasoning could include the 
continuation of deliberations as per a temporary agreement. However, this 
juxtaposes the formal decision-making process, where decisions are fixed and 
legally binding, and neoliberal discourses of economic development require the 
certainty of markets in order to function (Castree, 2010; Peck & Tickell, 2002). 
Thus it would be impossible for such a temporary agreement to occur in a case like 
Escarpment Mine.  
 
Although the access agreements under the CMA with DoC are a separate process, 
numerous participants noted that after the 2010 ‘2 precious 2 mine’ protests, the 
government agreed to publicly consult on significant mining proposals on 
conservation land; an agreement that was retracted after the 2011 national 
elections (Stephenson, 2011; participants 1 and 10). This could have been an 
indication of a temporary agreement allowing for further deliberations, but this 
was retracted. A couple of participants suggested that the public were not happy 
with this lack of public involvement: “people are very angry” (participant 1). This 
exclusion from the decision-making process indicates elements of antagonism due 
to the absence of the right to voice opinions or participate.   
 
                                                        
35 Little evidence about such processes was gathered in this research, as at the time of interviewing 
research participants, the hearing in the Environment Court had not yet taken place, and at the time 
of writing, the Environment Court decision had not been announced. 
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Temporary agreements being open to further debate did not appear in this case, 
and are unlikely to emerge in similar cases, as the projects require binding 
agreements in order to enforce the legal frameworks. The appeal processes 
through the Environment Court and High Court do not fit with the concept of 
temporary agreements, as the final decisions are still binding, and the appeals do 
not allow new parties to contest the decisions, only those that submitted in the 
initial council-led process.  
6.4 Accepting underlying difference 
Having discussed some of the more visible and pragmatic elements of the decision-
making process that clearly do not exhibit aspects of the framework, I now turn to 
the fundamental element: the acceptance (or otherwise) of underlying and 
irreconcilable differences.  
 
This section starts with discussions about relationships and interactions between 
environmentalists and council officers, and the extent to which they express 
agonism and antagonism. These expressions of agonism and antagonism are 
complex and also somewhat fluid depending on the context. I then discuss 
deliberative democracy and collaborative planning’s aim for consensus in relation 
to the impossibility of agreement in this case. This leads me to consider the 
perceptions about mediation and compromise, and how they may not allow for the 
respectful acceptance of difference. Lastly, I consider how the binding nature of 
formal decisions does not allow for situations where differences are irreconcilable.  
6.4.1 Environmentalists’ relationships with the councils and local 
communities  
Two council officers interviewed noted that they always tried to be as helpful as 
possible to submitters. One stated “I always try and maintain a good relationship 
whether I agree with their views or not… because you’re trying to facilitate the 
process and it shouldn’t be us against them or anything like that” (participant 5). 
She also emphasised that in general, she would talk through her report on the case 
with submitters, and explain how she formed those opinions and what can be 
considered under the RMA (participant 5). This could be seen as agonistic, 
however, it also contrasts with environmentalists’ experience of their relationships 
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with the councils as organisations, rather than with individual staff members. 
Despite contact with individual staff being good, two participants felt that the 
councils were difficult to deal with, with a political aversion to anything perceived 
to be environmentalist (participant 2), and unwilling to offer information 
(participant 10). Another participant suggested that she and others in the 
organisation were “a bit of a thorn in their side” because of the way they frequently 
report concerns to the council (participant 3). One environmentalist noted that 
previously he had felt frustrated with the councils involved as his views were so 
different from theirs, although he accepted that they do generally reflect public 
opinion in the area (participant 8). 
 
Being openly opposed to the mine may have the advantage of creating a respectful 
relationship where other people feel they can express a range of concerns. This 
may be an indication of antagonism in one space (as antagonistic environmentalist 
activism) leading to agonism in another (with non-environmentalists feeling 
comfortable expressing their similar concerns to environmentalists). One 
participant said “because we are openly opposed, it gives a license for people 
who’ve got reservations to talk to someone about it … They haven’t got the 
freedom to talk about it so openly within their own community” (participant 2). 
This was reiterated by another participant, who was surprised to realise people 
supported her in conversation with them, even though they may never become 
members of their group (participant 3). Nonetheless, some environmentalists had 
experienced negative responses to their environmentalism by members of the 
public (participants 1, 2, 8, 12 and 13), including through the media, face to face 
and, one participant, through actions of vandalism on their property. One 
environmentalist said, “I try and placate them [people against environmentalist 
values]… it’s pointless arguing with people. But a lot of these guys are full in your 
face. There’s no point in doing that” (participant 13). Another said “I’m more 
interested in the people that are maybe open and kinda still listening to what the 
issues are. … I think that people don’t like… aggressive arguments… so I’m not 
actually in favour of [an] aggressive sort of stance on something” (participant 3). 
While being on the receiving end of antagonistic behaviour, these two 
environmentalists expressed that they prefer an agonistic approach, engaging with 
people in a respectful manner. However, as we can see, respectful dialogic 
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approaches that can be considered agonistic must not be confused or necessarily 
associated with aiming for consensus, which can arise in dialogic approaches that 
force the privileging of mediation and compromise.  
6.4.2 Aiming for consensus and the flaws of mediation and compromise 
Collaborative planning and deliberative democracy have both been criticized for 
generally aiming for consensus, meaning other democratic values are undermined 
(see Chapter four, section 4.3). In the case of Escarpment Mine, numerous 
participants expressed that agreement or consensus would simply not be possible 
(participants 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13 and 14).  
 
Mouffe (2000) critiques deliberative democracy’s rational argumentation as it 
overlooks persuasion and relationships of power. As Bäcklund and Mäntysalo 
(2010) suggest, for Mouffe “consensus would be merely a temporary result of the 
stabilization of power relationships, necessarily involving exclusion itself” (p. 341). 
McClymont (2011) also suggests that consensus involves exclusion: “the growing 
hegemony of consensus can be seen as damaging to debate over real alternatives 
or incompatible views of the world” (p. 245). Thus, accepting difference, which is 
at the core of this framework and of radical democracy, is incompatible with the 
overarching goal to reach consensus.  
 
The complexity of these theories and the nature of the democracy each proposes is 
reflected in comments by interviewees. One senior council staff member stated 
that environmentalist groups and submitters “may well have a different viewpoint, 
but again it’s a matter of trying to make sure the process is fair and reasonable to 
all parties”. Yet he simultaneously questioned the validity of environmentalists’ 
evidence based on their “philosophical stance” (participant 7). As discussed in 
5.4.1, according to this council officer, the perceived philosophical stance that 
environmentalists had demonstrated their advocacy, meaning that the objectivity 
of their evidence was questionable (participant 7). This participant’s views show 
that individuals may hold contradictory values of aiming for democracy on the one 
hand, while also persisting with dominant ideologies on the other, such as 
measurable knowledges that are dominant under neoliberalism (see Chapter five).  
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Hillier (2002) suggests that consensus cannot generally be expected due to 
differing world views, but that: 
a negotiated agreement does offer the theoretical advantages over an elite decision of 
including diversity, of recognising and admitting the power differences, tensions and 
conflicts, not merely between specific interests, but between conceptions, forms of 
knowledge, and ways of valuing and discussing things (p. 69).  
However, as discussed shortly, evidence from the participants would suggest in 
general that negotiations are fraught with compromise, manipulation and co-
option (participants 2, 3 and 10). Furthermore, as Purcell (2009) suggests, 
deliberative democracy approaches (such as communicative planning and the 
overarching goal for consensus), are often enlisted to support neoliberalism, which 
“seeks actively to co-opt and incorporate democratic resistance” (p. 141), as seen 
in Chapter five’s discussions.  
 
While numerous participants expressed that in a case like Escarpment Mine 
agreement by all parties would not be possible, the commissioner interviewed did 
believe that consensus was generally possible. He stated “[i]t’s already shown that 
it is. I mean certainly because quite often, hearings are avoided by pre-hearing 
mediation” (participant 4). This is where the council mediates between the 
developer and opposition in order to amend the application to an acceptable 
proposal. But the question is what the implications are of mediation type 
approaches in cases like Escarpment Mine, particularly in light of general concerns 
about how agreement may be achieved.  
 
Formal mediation was not undertaken between Bathurst and environmentalists 
opposed to Escarpment Mine. Nonetheless, perceptions about mediation illustrate 
a reluctance to be involved in any kind of mediation due to the likelihood of 
compromise when in search of some kind of agreement. One environmentalist who 
made a submission opposing the mine noted that Bathurst had publicly announced 
that they were seeking mediation with opposition, yet never contacted her group 
about it (participant 10). Another environmentalist, representing a larger 
organisation, was open to discussing potential compromises with Bathurst’s 
proposal for a protected area. However, she “came away from that meeting and it 
was very clear that the kind of reserve they were talking about and what we were 
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talking about were not going to match”, despite the willingness on her part for “a 
bit of give and take” (participant 2). After discovering that their proposals were 
incompatible, the group publicly proposed a conservation site for the whole of the 
plateau, fitting with their values and expertise of the area. This illustrates a shift 
from agonism towards antagonism. Attempts at compromise between Bathurst 
and the group can be seen as engaging the adversary in discussion with both 
accepting the other’s knowledge as legitimate, and later, antagonistic as this 
engagement ended and did not commence again. It is antagonistic in that the 
group’s proposal for a conservation area indicates a position that does not allow or 
incorporate Bathurst’s position; but similarly, Bathurst’s proposal did not allow or 
incorporate the environmentalists’ conservation concerns. 
 
Three environmentalists commented that any kind of mediation was not valuable 
in previous cases nor would be valuable in this case (participants 2, 3 and 10). In 
another case, Environment Court mediation was seen as “ bending everybody’s 
arms behind their backs to make them agree to something, but the result was that 
an internally inconsistent agreement was reached” (participant 10). However, the 
commissioner interviewed indicated that it was not expensive to lodge an appeal 
in the Environment Court, and prior to a hearing, Environment Court mediation 
was a promising option which did not require experts or even lawyers (participant 
4). The commissioner interviewed felt that, in general, most of the outcomes of this 
type of mediation favoured the opposition, leading to tighter restrictions on the 
applicant: “the applicant finishes up with a tighter or more restrictive outcome 
than what the commissioners might have granted” (participant 4). But another 
participant stated that pre-court mediation was “an absolute waste of time” in all 
the cases they had been involved in, as the mediated outcomes were not desirable 
to any of the parties involved (participant 3). Although such processes may be 
superficially regarded as an agonistic approach, incorporating disagreeing 
viewpoints may cause extensive compromise and disregard the disagreement it 
initially aimed to respectfully engage.  
 
The risk of co-option was highlighted as an issue by one participant, and that 
mediation between opposing parties could inherently exclude voices acting in the 
public interest:  
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as well as maybe giving in on things you really shouldn’t, I guess there’s the danger that a 
deal will be made that the particular interests of the groups that are there will be met, but 
that wouldn’t be in the general public’s vested interests (participant 10). 
This participant suggested that reaching agreement can involve exclusion of 
important voices, and that just because an agreement is made, does not mean that 
the public’s interests, or indeed the overarching democratic principles of equality, 
justice and rule of the people, are achieved.  
 
The potential for compromise in other situations also arose as an issue. One 
environmentalist suggested that collaborative decision-making processes that her 
organisation had been involved with on other issues, had been “fraught with 
bullying” (participant 2). She also noted that “it has to be really well facilitated” in 
order for it to be effective. Two environmentalists mentioned two other cases 
where they critiqued collaborative and negotiable approaches as sites of coercion 
and compromise (participants 10 and 11). This is reiterated in the literature; the 
use of deliberation in planning practice has been critiqued as a site for coercion 
and co-option (Carpini et al., 2004; Ganesh & Zoller, 2012).  
 
One senior council officer suggested that biodiversity offsetting was a way for a 
developer to compromise, but that certain opposition groups may be 
“philosophically” opposed with an “unwillingness to accept compromise” 
(participant 7). Equally the company’s lack of willingness to compromise was 
highlighted as an issue by one environmentalist, who said that “there’s potential 
for a deal, but it would need the coal miners to get into a place where they’d be 
willing to make a deal, because at the moment, they’re totally not” (participant 10). 
The company’s mitigation plans for damage to conservation on the Denniston 
Plateau was for pest control in other areas (Resource and Environmental 
Management Nelson Limited, 2011). This was seen to be irrelevant to the damage 
that would be caused to the biodiversity on the plateau (participants 2, 3, 10 and 
13). This demonstrates conflicting discourses, with the privileging of the 
company’s discourse to the extent that the environmentalist discourse is neither 
respected for its difference nor incorporated equally with the company’s – both of 
which would have implied equality, one of the founding principles of democracy.  
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A member of one of the smaller environmental groups in opposition suggested that 
they do not expect their formal submissions to have much influence, because they 
tend to choose issues that they feel strongly about where no part of the proposal is 
reversible. This means that they are “not submitting to … changing the conditions 
or letting the project go ahead but with a lower impact, we’re generally trying to 
stop projects” (participant 14). Participant 7, a senior council officer, suggested 
that the more “vocal” environmental groups “have the philosophical viewpoint that 
there shouldn’t be coal mining…[which is] diametrically opposite to the proposal; 
then you don’t tend to get a lot of common ground.” This illustrates elements of 
antagonism in the environmentalists’ approach, yet in order to achieve the ethos of 
democracy (in particular equality and justice), this antagonism is appropriate. 
Justice, when applied to concerns about the global adverse effects of climate 
change, would indicate the need to halt any significant project that contributes to 
climate change – the tenet upon which the climate justice movement is based. 
Additionally, the irreversibility of the project also indicates the company’s 
antagonistic approach in disregarding the on-going difference of those in 
opposition. This irreversibility denies the possibility for the decisions to be made 
open for further debate. Given these opposing stances, agreement would not be 
possible in this case. Consensus should not and cannot be the overarching goal, 
illustrating a flaw in this kind of context of deliberative democracy and 
collaborative planning approaches with their fundamental aim for reaching 
agreement. 
 
Furthermore, compromise under neoliberal hegemony means that the very realm 
of compromise in negotiations is limited: “[c]itizens might have formal decision-
making power, but their range of decisions can become so narrow as to not really 
be decisions at all” (Purcell, 2009, p. 145). When negotiation is imminent, often the 
mitigation measures such as the biodiversity trading discussed in Chapter five are 
so limited in scope that the opposition is unable to make any agreement without 
fully compromising their values. Thus, any such decision is not incorporating 
disagreement; rather it is weakening the core reasons for disagreement in the first 
place. This is certainly not an agonistic approach. If agonism were present, the 
decision-making process would not push opponents to compromise their opinions 
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for the sake of reaching agreement; rather they would be engaging with each other 
as adversaries and accepting that some differences are irreconcilable.  
6.4.3 The binding formal process with the impossibility of agreement 
Linking to section 6.3, the formal process only creates binding agreements, 
preventing the possibility of agreeing on an outcome or renegotiating the decisions 
in future. Even though there were various conservation, mitigation and 
rehabilitation conditions included in the final decision to grant the mine, one 
council officer noted that they “ran out of time” to have thorough conditions, 
meaning it would have to go to the Environment Court (participant 5). She said 
that she thought:  
oh my god those conditions, because they’re a bit poorly pulled together in a rush. And the 
biodiversity stuff, because that hadn’t been really dealt with properly at the DoC level, 
yeah, it’s kind of a bit of a mess too there I think too, so I don’t know what the Environment 
Court is going to make of all that (participant 5).  
In the rush to create a binding agreement, error was rife, consistent with Brand 
and Gaffikin’s (2007) argument that collaborative planning often results in inexact 
decisions. They suggest that this is a result of the flawed aim for consensus: 
“collaborative planning’s prioritization of consensus invariably produces this 
noncommittal, since its failure to accommodate a more candid agonistic discourse 
makes it vulnerable to euphemism, surface agreement and equivocation” (p. 305). 
This failure to achieve agonistic discourse, and the resulting inexact outcomes, is 
also consistent with the lack of transparency in the process and information 
available, as discussed in section 6.2.  
 
In the Escarpment Mine decision, accommodating a more genuine agonistic 
discourse would have required more time, with more actors, and the deficit in this 
regard created equivocation.  Brand and Gaffikin (2007) promote agonistic 
planning (consistent with radical democracy), which perceives “the primary 
purpose of at once nurturing the widest possible expression of a very 
differentiated plurality, and, at the same time, accepting the possibility of 
irreconcilable disagreement” (p. 306). It does not forsake consensus; rather it 
places reaching agreement as a lower priority than the expression of disagreement 
(Purcell, 2009).   
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The issue of irreconcilability was highlighted by a well-experienced 
environmentalist – that regardless of the process, there will always be 
disagreement:  
I’m not sure that the main issue here is one of process. The main issue here is of two 
conflicting world views. Two conflicting visions of the future (participant 1). 
An antagonistic stance exists if, and only if, neither party considers the others 
views as acceptable or legitimate. In this case, as discussed in Chapter five, 
antagonism characterised the relationship because environmentalists’ knowledges 
were not perceived as legitimate. Several participants (1, 2, 5, 9 and 14) suggested 
that in this case (and similar cases), there was no room for negotiation as the 
conflict of world views and opinions would mean that  there is no “process that 
could resolve that with both parties coming out and feeling ok” (participant 2).  
 
This also points to a core failing of deliberative or collaborative approaches. 
Bäcklund and Mäntysalo (2010) state: 
The ability to recognize the better argument requires a shared reality with shared 
problems. Habermasian communicative planning theory is unable to acknowledge 
conflicting conceptions of reality as being equally valid (p. 341).  
As discussed in depth in Chapter five, quantifiable objective knowledges were the 
dominant reality. Environmentalists’ realities involved a holistic and global 
approach to the environment while the council and company had a reality that 
considered the environment in parts. The latter approach is a perspective 
facilitated by the effects based regime under the RMA that narrows the scope of 
what can be considered in a decision. Communicative planning cannot account for 
the different world views, thus the “better” argument will never arise because 
there will never be agreement on the reasons argued (Bäcklund & Mäntysalo, 
2010). This steers the ideal process to become one that accepts underlying 
difference, not as something to be disregarded, but as something to be worked 
with. 
6.5 Noise, antagonistic activism and legitimate voices 
Antagonistic activism (such as protest) should be an acceptable way for 
environmentalists to voice their disagreement. There is value in respecting 
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antagonistic views; it aids the shift towards agonism and respectful dialogues, and 
also raises new issues for discussion (see Ganesh and Zoller, 2012). Past cases of 
environmentalist opposition to planning consent cases in New Zealand as 
discussed in Chapter three illustrate the value and effectiveness of antagonistic 
activism in combination with participation in the formal process. Ganesh and 
Zoller (2012) suggest that activists are framed in ways that suggest they are 
incapable of conversation, dialogue, or relationship building. Yet, they note, 
activists often attempt and exhaust dialogic methods of resistance before turning 
to other methods such as direct action and protest. In this case for example, some 
environmentalists had attempted to influence the decisions in the formal 
participation process in 2010 before making the conservation of the Denniston 
Plateau one of their major public campaigns in 2011 (participant 3). In such 
circumstances, I suggest that antagonistic activism should be considered a 
legitimate voice. In giving space for and hearing such activism, it may appear to be 
Mouffe’s transformation of antagonism to agonism. But a more fitting way of 
conceptualising of antagonistic activism as legitimate may be Rancière’s concepts 
of noise and the political.  
 
In the case of Escarpment Mine, there appears to be a disconnect between 
environmentalist action outside the formal process and participation in the formal 
process itself. Though not specific to this case, the commissioner interviewed said 
that in general activism, protest, petitions or campaigns were not considered by 
commissioners in the decisions they made to grant consents (participant 4). He 
also noted that he does not (and that it would not be appropriate to) discuss any 
aspect of a decision outside of the formal process:  
it’s made very clear to everybody, whoever the chair is generally speaking says at the 
commencement of the hearing, we will make our decision based on the information we 
receive here at this hearing (participant 4). 
However, as discussed in Chapter five, environmentalists perceived their 
participation in the formal process to be futile, and that the ability to make change 
lay more in campaigning, activism, and creating a public movement calling for 
change.  
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This disconnect between the formal process and activism outside this process is 
also illustrated in the level of participation in the formal process and in 
campaigning and activism. In the council officers Section 42A report, issues that 
submitters expressed were described as arising in certain percentages of the 
submissions. For example, it was written that 8% of submissions raised concerns 
relating to coal’s greenhouse gas emissions (Ridge & Inwood, 2011), yet one of the 
groups who submitted on this issue was Forest and Bird, who represents 
approximately 50,000 members across New Zealand (Royal Forest and Bird 
Protection Society of NZ Inc, 2010). This misrepresents the strength of the 
arguments, particularly considering other submissions, representing individuals, 
appear to have been counted equally in this report. In contrast, as part of the 
campaign against Escarpment Mine, an online petition was established in 2012, 
that to date has had over 10,000 online individual signatures (AVAAZ, 2012). 
While submissions made in the formal process numbered only 98 with 41 opposed 
(Ridge & Inwood, 2011), the numbers of those opposing (or supporting) the 
project in the public sphere appear to be much larger than the formal process can 
recognise. Yet the formal process is the only form of public participation that is 
taken into account in the decisions that are made.  
 
With the apparent aim for reaching agreement and disregarding underlying 
difference, it seems that the formal decision-making process is based on a 
deliberative democracy and communicative planning model. Mouffe (2000) 
suggests that when politics is based on the aim of consensus, genuine 
disagreement is forced outside of political processes, and into more activism. As 
Bäcklund and Mäntysalo (2010) suggest of Mouffe’s work, “[s]uch actors would 
thus become alienated from the political scene, becoming enemies to the political 
system, instead of adversaries within politics” (pp. 342-343). Thus, environmental 
activism and campaigning is perceived as antagonistic and outside of the decision-
making process.  
 
If the Environment Court decides to grant the consents for Escarpment Mine36, it is 
likely that even more activism against it will arise. Although not a common view of 
                                                        
36 At the time of writing, this was yet to be announced. 
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all the participants, one participant noted that they would be willing to carry out 
direct action if Bathurst is granted the consents (participant 12). She was angry, 
arguing that process was undemocratic, making her desperate and willing to 
undertake extreme measures. However another noted that he knew the limits of 
the law and was not willing to undertake any illegal activity (participant 8). 
Furthermore, participant 8 noted that, while he supported the actions of the 
occupiers in the Save Happy Valley campaign (see Chapter three), this kind of 
radical action somewhat distanced the public and was not able to influence the 
formal processes that made decisions to grant consents for the mine. The 
environmentalist movement against Escarpment Mine may become more diverse 
as more people make different choices about how to express their opposition in 
order to effect change.  
 
As discussed in Chapter three, the previous cases of antagonistic activism can 
effect change and may result in an outcome that aligns with a mainstream view 
over time. Antagonistic activism is important, especially in the case where activists 
have already attempted and exhausted deliberations and negotiations, and their 
opinions in such processes have been excluded. As McClymont (2011) suggests, 
“[e]xcluding a view does not eliminate it, but removes it from the arena of debate” 
(p. 251), which is a finding well-documented by research in consensus-based 
decision-making (McClymont, 2011). Radical democracy critiques deliberative 
democracy’s aim for consensus. Yet radical democracy’s emphasis on agonism 
(Mouffe, 2000, 2005) may prevent the recognition that antagonistic activism can 
have a significant role in achieving the democratic ideals of equality, justice and 
rule of the people.  
 
Rancière’s (1999) noise is one way of thinking about how activism can have 
influence in decisions. Noise can be defined as most powerful actors in society, 
“characteriz[ing] those included under the banner of their own exclusion (the 
subaltern) as mere noise, as the murmurs of the incomprehensible, spontaneous, 
or irrational within the field of the political” (Williams, 2007, p. 131).  The 
opposition to Escarpment Mine can be conceptualised as “noise” as the opinions 
and knowledges that environmentalists bring to the table are excluded from the 
arena of the political, as determined by the decision-makers and the formal 
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process. For example, climate change was excluded from being a legitimate 
argument, and the fragmented approach to the environment was far privileged 
over a more holistic approach that argued for the intrinsic ecological value of the 
plateau. These different world views were made invisible in the process, and thus, 
can be considered noise.  
 
In this concept of noise, Rancière (1999) states that the ‘police’ is:  
an order of bodies that defines the allocation of ways of doing, ways of being, and ways of 
saying, and sees that those bodies are assigned by name to a particular place and task; it is 
an order of the visible and the sayable that sees that a particular activity is visible and 
another is not, that this speech is understood as discourse and another as noise (p. 29).  
In the Escarpment Mine case, the ‘police’ are the structures of the formal decision-
making process, which force activists to engage in the formal process in order to be 
somewhat heard. This is because the formal process is supposedly depoliticised, 
yet environmentalists’ expertise is delegitimised in the formal process under a 
‘police’ logic that prioritises other values, such as economic development. This 
means that political activity must occur outside the formal process. Rancière 
(1999) suggests that something is not simply political because of power 
relationships that exist in it. Rather, “[f]or a thing to be political, it must give rise to 
a meeting of police logic and egalitarian logic” (p. 32). The framework’s ideal of 
equality implies that democracy is only possible when equality is present, both in 
the formal process and in the broader context. Rancière’s idea implies that the 
political is when equality is challenged against the dominant and prevailing 
institutions. In the case of Escarpment Mine, the way in which environmentalists’ 
knowledges were disregarded is certainly an expression of inequality, and this has 
been challenged through the activism and campaigning that has occurred outside 
of this process.  
 
Rancière (1999) states that:  
Political activity is whatever shifts a body from the place assigned to it or changes a place’s 
destination. It makes visible what had no business being seen, … it makes understood as 
discourse what was once only heard as noise (p. 30). 
Political activity in Escarpment Mine will occur when activism against it becomes 
visible to the decision-makers and becomes a legitimate voice within the 
formalised processes. However it is not clear from the literature whether the shift 
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from ‘noise’ to a legitimate voice within the formal processes necessitates a change 
in the decision, or simply that the discourse is now accepted as valid 
argumentation.  
 
In one sense, the formal participation process under the RMA has attempted to 
transform antagonism to agonism by giving space for disagreeing voices to 
participate and engage respectfully. However, in incorporating such voices, as 
shown in 6.4, privileging this agonistic approach creates a site where compromise 
is rife, essentially denying the very disagreement that it once aimed to include. 
And, as illustrated in Chapter five, this formalised process in one sense privileges 
environmentalists’ attempts at agonism, while at the same time excludes 
environmentalists’ opinions in the decision-making process. Antagonistic activism 
is therefore a force that environmentalists can mobilise to show the strength of 
their knowledges and arguments. Such activism is also valuable for consciousness 
raising and creating a value-shift in society. It must be valued in order for 
democratic politics to take place and challenge the status quo.  
6.6 Synopsis: Disagreement and democracy as expressed 
through agonism and antagonism 
The formal participation process under the RMA offers an opportunity for the 
public to be involved in decision-making. An environmentalist with decades of 
experience indicated he was “not against the RMA process, because things were a 
lot worse before we had it, a lot lot worse” (participant 8). Yet the critiques of the 
RMA process by this environmentalist and others throughout this research imply a 
strong dissatisfaction with the way in which the participation process runs.  Little 
(2010) interprets Mouffe (2000), saying that ironically, “the risk of contemporary 
democracy …is that at the same time as it opens up opportunities for a more 
radical politics, it closes down these possibilities through excessive proceduralism 
and policing of the political order” (p. 972). Contemporary democracy, such as in 
New Zealand with laws like the RMA, includes formalised participation processes 
that inherently exclude voices that are not considered legitimate by the ‘police’.  As 
May (2010) suggests, “Progressive institutions… seem either to evolve into 
institutions that are antithetical to their original aims or alternatively to be 
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incapable of sustaining themselves” (p. 102). The RMA, with a participatory ethos 
which was progressive at the time it was established, has been unable to maintain 
its participatory nature. Perhaps in the attempt to increase democracy in decisions 
about the environment, the institutionalised nature of the RMA’s participation 
process has closed down some opportunities for a more radical politics that would 
involve more equality in participation, accepting underlying difference, keeping 
decisions open for further deliberations and accepting antagonistic activism as a 
legitimate voice.  
  
This chapter has reflected on the framework and its relevance in 
environmentalists’ participation in the council-led decisions about Escarpment 
Mine. The lack of transparency in the process and in the availability of information 
illustrated how equality was not progressed, and how this contributed to 
antagonism. The fixed nature of the agreements exhibited the exclusion of 
important voices in the decision-making. The way in which difference was 
expressed through the relationships between the council and environmentalists 
illustrated the fluidity and complexity between agonism and antagonism. The 
formal process’s aim for reaching consensus showed the way in which consensus 
involves exclusion, compromise or closing down the possibilities for radical 
politics. Lastly, this chapter considered the role of antagonistic activism as a 
valuable means for effecting political change.  
 
Considering these arguments, I turn back to the framework to demonstrate how 
the normative ideals of the framework have not been expressed. I affirm that some 
parts of the framework that should ideally be agonistic have manifested as 
antagonism. Thus, these parts do not fulfil the primary principles of democracy; 
equality, justice and rule of the people.  
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Figure 6.2: The democratic framework as per the case of Escarpment Mine, the decisions and 
environmentalist participation 
 
As we can see in Figure 6.2, compared to Figure 6.1, the ethos of democracy 
(equality, justice and rule of the people) is far from being attained in this case, due 
to a distinct lack of agonism and the way that antagonistic activism was relegated 
to noise outside the process. Aspects that in Figure 6.1 that were ideally agonistic 
(in orange circles), have mostly changed to antagonistic (in red circles). This case 
has also reflected less relationship to the concept of agonism (with relationships 
between agonism and other principles represented as weak by dotted purple 
arrows). The majority of the ideal framework (Figure 6.1) did not manifest. Thus, 
the contrary reality, as represented in Figure 6.2, mostly falls outside of the ethos 
of democracy (equality, justice and rule of the people) that initially encompassed 
the entire framework (represented by the green circle).  
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Figure 6.2, representing this decision, may also be indicative of the difference in 
the scope of the decision and how environmentalists perceive the ideals of equality 
and justice compared to the council and the company. For example, with the issue 
of climate change, environmentalists are seeing the decision-making process as 
adversely affecting equality and justice globally. Potentially the council officials are 
allowing for the values of equality and justice in the effects of this specific case, 
rather than extending these principles to a larger scale. Dryzek (Dryzek, 2013) 
suggests that democratic systems should be able to go beyond the boundaries of 
states to enhance the democratic principles of justice and equality. Yet, the 
decision-makers form the police order that defines what discourses are visible and 
legitimate in the formal decision-making processes, denying the larger issues that 
democratic principles apply to. The legitimising of certain discourses and not 
others also raises questions about how agonism and antagonism can be defined, 
when the parties involved have differing amounts of power in the decision-making 
process. Furthermore, the reflections on the framework raise questions about 
where the boundaries of equality and justice are situated, and to what extent these 
principles are evaded when the boundaries are conceived of differently.  
 
Antagonism is not necessarily inferior to agonism, despite Mouffe’s goal of 
transferring antagonism to agonism. However, whether the antagonism sits within 
the broader democratic ideals of equality, justice and rule of the masses is critical 
as to whether this type of antagonism should be accepted as valid activity in 
democracy.  
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Chapter seven: 
Concluding and including 
disagreement in democracy 
 
 
 
 
This thesis set out to demonstrate how democracy is actualised or constrained 
through environmentalist actions about decisions made for coal-mining on 
conservation land, with participation in democracy both through formal processes 
and informally through environmental activism. Democracy, in the words of 
Derrida, is something that can never be fully attained but simply worked towards 
(May, 2010), consistent with radical democrats’ idea that democracy is an on-going 
process (Bohman, 1996). The findings of this research demonstrate that so-called 
democracy deals with disagreement in a variety of ways that do not necessarily co-
exist with the ethos of democracy; equality, justice and rule of the people. 
Democracy, in the case of Escarpment Mine, is a work in progress within the 
complex context of New Zealand’s environmentalism and its influence on 
environmental decision-making.  
 
This concluding chapter reflects on the main arguments from the findings and the 
literature. I also address the limitations of this research, and areas that have 
emerged as priorities for further research. Lastly, I conclude with 
recommendations of varying scope: suggesting changes for policy and best 
practice, as well as proposing new ways of thinking about democratic decision-
making processes.  
7.1 Conclusion of findings 
The overarching research objective of this thesis is to understand how democracy 
is actualised or constrained through environmentalist actions about decision made 
on coal-mining in conservation land. Such actions comprise of participation in 
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democracy through informal actions or activism, and formal participation as 
prescribed by legislation. This thesis has answered the research objective by 
analysing the influence that environmentalists were able to have on the decisions 
made about Escarpment Mine, and exploring how the case reflected democratic 
principles in relation to this inability to have influence.  
 
The context to the Escarpment Mine case was discussed in Chapter three, along 
with the rise of neoliberal politics in New Zealand and how this has shaped the 
decision-making processes under the RMA. The RMA was shown to be neoliberal, 
privileging technical and economic knowledges (Perkins & Thorns, 2001) and 
disregarding issues of power in the participation processes (Gunder & Mouat, 
2002). The three parallel cases demonstrated the nexus between informal 
participation in democracy through activism and formal participation processes 
under legislation. The cases highlighted that both types of participation are part of 
democracy, and both are effective in influencing decisions made, particularly when 
combined, as seen in ‘2 precious 2 mine’ and the Mokihinui case.  
 
Research question one asked how theories of democracy, participation and 
activism address disagreement in decisions about the environment. Chapter four 
reviewed literature on democracy and disagreement in order to address this 
question. It focused on deliberative democracy (and associated communicative 
planning) and radical democracy (with agonistic planning). Through analysing the 
reasonings for and critiques of each of these theories, I created a framework for 
democracy that was situated within the ethos of equality, justice, and rule of the 
people. The framework was used to explore the case of Escarpment Mine.  
 
Research questions two and three, respectively, asked how environmentalists 
influenced the decisions made about Escarpment Mine, through participation in 
democracy through the formal council-led process under the RMA and through 
environmental activism. These questions were addressed in Chapter five. Neither 
informal nor formal participation in democracy by environmentalists had 
influence on the commissioners’ decisions to grant consents for Escarpment Mine. 
It is plausible that activism and campaigning has influenced society’s perception 
and values about mining on conservation land, but this is outside the scope of this 
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research. Two environmental groups appealed the commissioners’ decision in the 
Environment Court. This was not the focus of this research, and the Environment 
Court decisions are yet to be announced. It is unknown whether environmentalists 
will have had more influence in these decisions than in the council-led process.  
 
The findings explored in Chapter five illustrate that the neoliberal discourses were 
prevalent in the decisions, and that it displaced and disregarded other knowledges 
that were raised primarily by environmentalists. The emphasis was on ‘apolitical’, 
objective and quantifiable knowledges, such as those that were technical, economic 
and that fragment the environment. Knowledges that were disregarded in the 
process are those that consider the environment as an ecological whole and went 
beyond the local scale. This included interactions within and between ecosystems 
and landscapes on the plateau, and with the global adverse effects of climate 
change, which will be contributed to by the greenhouse gases from the end-use of 
the coal mined. The privileging and disregarding of certain knowledges raises 
questions for democracy, in that such power imbalances do not achieve the goals 
of equality, justice and rule of the people.  
 
Finally, returning to the theoretical framework established through addressing 
research question one and reviewing literature in Chapter four, I turned to address 
research question four which asked how environmentalist action, both through 
formal processes and through other actions, reflects democratic principles. 
Chapter six reflected on the framework for democracy in light of the findings, 
thereby addressing research question four. I argue that due to an absence of 
equality, justice and rule of the people, this case fails to meet the framework of 
democracy as outlined in Chapter four. Underlying differences between 
environmentalists, the councils and the company, particularly with the difference 
in privileged knowledges as discussed in Chapter five, mostly contradicted the 
concept of agonism and thus failed to fulfil democratic ideals. There was a lack of 
transparency in both the formal decision-making process and in the information 
available to inform the decisions. While some of the council officials perceived the 
environmentalists as biased and overly subjective, numerous participants 
(including one council officer) expressed concern about the conflict of interest that 
the commissioners had or may have had as the decision-makers in this process. 
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The company was also perceived to be deceitful in their communications with 
submitters. DoC did not present an oral submission at the hearing, reducing the 
ecological information available about the Denniston Plateau in the decisions 
made. Furthermore, while DoC provided some information to environmentalists 
under the OIA, a third request was declined unless the environmentalists paid over 
$1000, which they were not willing to do. Consequently, transparency in the 
process and access to information in order to participate fully in the deliberations 
were not fulfilled.  
 
Chapter six also discussed the nature of temporary agreements and how in a case 
like Escarpment Mine, where the process produces a binding agreement, is 
unlikely to ever fulfil the principles associated with recognising the value of 
temporary agreement. This ideal would be similar to Dryzek’s (2001) workable 
agreement, and Mouffe’s (see Little, 2002) desire for decisions to be open to 
further and future debate. In terms of the ideal framework of accepting underlying 
difference, I analysed the relationships between environmentalists and councils, as 
well as the flaws of aiming for consensus. This included the compromise and 
manipulation that environmentalists perceived to be rife in mediation in other 
cases, and the impossibility of reaching agreement when a proposal would create 
irreversible adverse effects.  
 
Informal activism was not considered a legitimate voice to be considered by the 
decision-makers. Moreover, it contributed to the perception that 
environmentalists’ evidence was not objective as it asserted that their stance was 
“philosophical” or driven by values and emotions. This aligns with neoliberal 
politics that privileges measurable knowledges and claims to be apolitical. 
Antagonistic activism outside of the formal process (despite aiming to uphold the 
democratic ideals of equality, justice and rule of the people) is excluded by such 
privileging of neoliberal discourses and made to be seen as irrational and 
confrontational. Rancière’s (1999) concept of noise complements this situating of 
activism as outside of the realm of consideration by decision-makers. Political 
activity occurs when this ‘noise’ is made visible by the power structures at play, 
and included in the realm of discussion. This was yet to fully occur in the case of 
Escarpment Mine.  
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Similar to Mouffe’s (2005) radical democracy that requires a broad consensus on 
the ideals of equality and liberty and the principles of pluralism and how they 
underpin the way that democratic institutions function, the framework in this 
thesis requires agreement on the overarching democratic principles of equality, 
justice and rule of the people. When these principles are not met in any other 
aspects of the framework, democracy is not fulfilled, as is the case of Escarpment 
Mine. I recognise that the framework is just one view of democracy and that it is 
open to contestation. Nevertheless, it is drawn from a noticeable discourse in 
political theory that has been taken up in planning theory and practice in various 
ways.  
 
As identified in Chapter one, there are several gaps in the literature that this 
research addresses. Firstly, this research has contributed to literature about 
environmentalism in New Zealand, by focusing on environmentalists’ activism and 
participation in formal decision-making processes specific to Escarpment Mine. 
Secondly, meeting a gap suggested by Bäcklund and Mäntysalo (2010), this 
research has connected agonistic planning theory with democracy theory, through 
analysing the Escarpment Mine case both in theory and practice. Lastly, and 
perhaps most critically, the point of departure for this research has situated the 
influence of activism alongside the influence in participation processes. As Young 
(2001) suggests, there is little research into the role of activism in democracy 
outside of formal processes, and this research has contributed to this body of 
literature by exploring the role of antagonistic activism in achieving the ethos of 
democracy in parallel with participation in formal decision-making processes.  
7.2 Limitations of this research 
The limitations of this research relate to the small scope of the study. Firstly, while 
the choice of a single case study is justified through the constructivist and post-
structural methodology and the scale of a project for a Master’s topic, it would be 
beneficial to have comparative case studies to test the generalizability of the 
findings. It may also have been beneficial to study the Environment Court process 
for Escarpment Mine in addition to the council hearing, with an opportunity to 
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expand on or compare the findings. However, the Environment Court hearing and 
decision (to be released later in 2013) did not fit within the Master’s timeframe.  
 
Second, there were two parties that were not willing to be interviewed. Bathurst 
declined an interview on the grounds that it may adversely affect the Environment 
Court hearing that had not yet taken place. Interviewing Bathurst representatives 
would have contributed to my understandings of agonism and antagonism in this 
case, with particular regard to how it was expressed through Bathurst’s relations 
and consultation with environmentalists. Additionally, while no clear reasons were 
given, I was unsuccessful in finding someone in DoC willing to be interviewed 
despite being directed to various contacts. Interviewing a DoC representative 
would have been beneficial in completing the picture about their reasons for not 
being present at the hearing, and thus, the way in which their participation (or lack 
of) displayed elements of agonism, antagonism, equality, justice and transparent 
access to information.  
7.3 The way forward for disagreement in democratic 
environmental decision-making 
In light of the findings of this research, I propose two broad avenues for furthering 
the possibilities for disagreement in democracy: suggestions for further theoretical 
engagement and a more pragmatic policy oriented set of recommendations.  
7.3.1 Future research: agonism and the impossibility of agreement 
Four main areas of further research have arisen as a result of the findings of this 
thesis. 
  
1. How do we define the space and fluidity between agonism and antagonism? 
Definitions of agonism and antagonism, and the fluid spaces between them, need to 
be clarified if research of this kind is to progress meaningfully. For example, is 
antagonistic environmentalist activism antagonistic because it is confrontational 
or can such confrontation be also considered agonistic in different contexts? How 
can adversaries respectfully engage each other (as in agonism) when their 
discourses and knowledges compete and have no commonalities (as in 
antagonism)? 
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2. What is the role of the democratic ethos of equality, justice and rule of the 
people in determining agonism? 
There is a lack of specificity with these terms and they are contested in the 
literature. Each has different implications for and intersections with agonism. 
Determining the definitions for these terms will build the understanding of the 
conditions under which agonism can occur.   
 
3. How can the role of agonism and antagonism be reconciled with the formality 
of a decision-making process that is adversarial by nature? 
The processes such as the council hearing and Environment Court are established 
as adversarial processes to enhance the certainty of decisions while still allowing 
for public participation and appeal. In particular, the fixity of policies, district and 
regional plans and resource consents, as well as the prescriptions of the RMA, 
constrain possibilities for more flexible decision-making processes. Yet agonism 
and antagonism are fluid relationships, and both imply that agreements are 
temporary and open to further discussion. The question is, then, how the fluidity of 
agonism and antagonism can operate under the fixity of such agreements, and 
whether a reconciliation is possible.  
 
4. Finally, what is the role of antagonism in different cases and contexts? 
Establishing the normative criteria of antagonism is essential for understanding 
how such antagonism fits within the democratic ideals. As discussed in this 
research, certain antagonisms lie outside of the realm of equality, justice and rule 
of the people, and thus do not fulfil democracy. Yet other antagonisms are essential 
for the functioning of democracy, if the underlying values stem from these 
democratic ideals and the antagonistic behaviour leads to the formal politics 
becoming more democratic. Mouffe (2000, 2005) discusses the role of radical 
democracy as transforming antagonism to agonism, which privileges agonism over 
antagonism. However, as discussed in this thesis, there is space in democratic 
processes for antagonism to make a meaningful contribution to democracy. 
Accordingly, I ask under what conditions does antagonism arise in a way that is 
productive, rather than as totalitarian and oppressive?  
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7.3.2 Recommendations for planning consent practice 
In addition to areas for further research, there are some practical considerations 
that may benefit planning practice for environmental decision-making in New 
Zealand under the RMA.   
  
1. Neutrality of commissioners 
Various participants suggested that commissioners should be chosen in a more 
neutral way, as it appears that they are chosen based on prior experience, and 
some alignment between the council and previous experience of the 
commissioners’ decisions. Four environmentalists recommended having 
independent commissioners not appointed by councils (participants 8, 9, 12 and 
14). One said “there needs to be just more neutrality in the people that are 
actually… listening to the arguments” (participant 9). The accreditation process 
that, while not yet mandatory for commissioners, is currently being encouraged, 
may be a step in this direction. The accreditation was discussed in section 6.2.1. 
However, the database of accredited commissioners might not be functioning as 
well as it could be. As stated by one of the council officers interviewed, an ecologist 
would have been ideal to be on the hearing committee, but they were unable to 
find an appropriate ecologist at that time who was not already connected to a 
mining company (participant 5). It is unknown whether they made use or were 
aware of the database of accredited commissioners, or indeed, whether such a 
database would actually increase the likelihood of neutral commissioners. 
Measures to enhance such neutrality and barriers to those with conflicts of interest 
need to be investigated.  
 
2. Landowner’s obligation to present in council hearing 
In order for the RMA planning consent process to lead to a well-informed outcome, 
it should be mandatory for the landowner to present a submission at the council-
led hearing. In this case, DoC was the landowner and did not present a submission. 
According to numerous participants (3, 5, 9, 10, 11 and 13), this absence 
contributed to a distinct lack of ecological knowledge informing the decision.  
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3. Legitimation of differing knowledges and views containing emotion and lay-
knowledge 
The role of ‘expertise’ needs to be addressed, as well as the different weighting 
given to different knowledges that may be equally ‘expert’ according to 
qualification or experience. Another recommendation is to have participation 
processes that are less dismissive of voices that are perceived to be tainted by 
emotion or a “philosophical stance”. How this should be implemented is an area for 
further research.  
7.4 Imagining the unimaginable 
One environmentalist was certain that the process would need to be very different 
to deal with the problems that society faces:  
I think the process is so woefully inadequate. Just to deal with our day to day human reality 
let alone to deal with our society trying to address climate change, which I don’t think 
overall it is, because of the powers that be. But we would need some pretty awesome and 
different looking tools I think, to really do that (participant 11).  
While some practical recommendations can be deduced from my research, 
participants felt that it was hard to imagine an ideal democratic participation 
process in detail that was different from the one that they knew under the RMA. 
When asked what an ideal democratic decision-making process would look like, 
some hesitated, others said they did not know then provided hesitant suggestions, 
and one person said a completely different set of tools was needed but did not 
know what these tools would be (participants 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11).   
 
As May (2010) comments, Socrates asked “[h]ow… will we know we have found 
what we’re looking for if we don’t know what it is in the first place?” (p. 3).  
Although we may not be able to imagine a world that is fully equal, just or ruled by 
the people, and if democracy is only ever an on-going process and not an achieved 
state (Bohman, 1996), our only option is to continue working on equally and justly 
incorporating disagreement in decision-making. Foucault argued that “I think that 
to imagine another system is to extend our participation in the present system” 
(1977, p. 136, as in May, 2010). This research has aimed to extend the concept of 
democracy through analysing environmentalists’ participation in decision-making 
about Escarpment Mine.   
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Interview information sheet and consent form 
 
Participant information sheet 
Research title: Democracy, disagreement and environmentalists’ participation: A 
case study of coal mining on conservation land 
Researcher: Lillian Fougère, School Geography, Environment and Earth Sciences, 
Victoria University of Wellington 
 
I am a Masters student in Environmental Studies at Victoria University of 
Wellington. For my Master’s thesis, I am researching how environmentalists are 
involved in decision-making about coal-mining on public land, through both 
informal participation or activism, and formal participation as offered through 
legislation.  To inform this research, I am interviewing people who have been 
involved in decision-making processes surrounding the proposed Escarpment 
Mine on the Denniston Plateau. I would like to invite you to be interviewed. 
 
The interview will take up to one hour. With your consent, I will take notes and 
digitally record it. After the interview, I will transcribe and/or summarise the 
interview, and provide you with a written copy to check for accuracy. All 
information will be stored in a locked cupboard or with a password protected file. 
 
I will keep your personal details and identity confidential. I may quote you directly 
but your real name will not be identifiable in my thesis, nor the specific 
organisation you are part of. You can provide me with a preferred pseudonym if 
you wish, or I may assign you with a pseudonym. While your name and 
organisation will not be identified in my thesis, there may be situations where 
other individuals who are intimately involved in the case may be able to identify 
you. I will ensure that any identifiers (such as age, specific occupation, resident 
location) will be ambiguous in my thesis to avoid the potential for such 
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identification. You may decline to answer any questions and you may withdraw 
any information you provide by 3 August 2012.  
 
On completion of my research, a copy of my thesis will be deposited in the Victoria 
University Library and will be available online. A copy of the research findings will 
be available for you at the completion of my research if you wish.  Findings from 
this research may also be published in academic or professional journals, and may 
be used to inform future research. The data I collect will be kept for five years 
following the completion of my thesis, and it will then be destroyed.  
 
If you have any questions or would like more information about this research, 
please contact: 
 
Lillian Fougère 
Phone: 0211864281 
Email: Lillian.Fougere@vuw.ac.nz  
 
Dr. Sophie Bond (supervisor) 
Phone: 04 4635217 
Email: sophie.bond@vuw.ac.nz 
 
This project has received approval from the Human Ethics Committee of Victoria 
University of Wellington. 
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Participant consent form 
Research title: Democracy, disagreement and environmentalists’ participation: A 
case study of coal mining on conservation land 
Researcher: Lillian Fougère, School Geography, Environment and Earth Sciences, 
Victoria University of Wellington 
Please read the above information sheet. If you are comfortable with the research 
conditions outlined above, please fill out and sign below.  
 
I, _____________________________________________________(name) have read the information 
sheet provided. I understand the reasons for this research. I have had the 
opportunity to ask questions about this research and have had them answered to 
my satisfaction. 
I consent to participating in an interview and for this interview to be recorded. I 
am aware that my name and identity will be kept confidential. I consent to being 
quoted from this interview, so long as quotes are not attributed to my name or 
organisation.  
I understand I can stop this interview at any point and do not have to answer any 
questions I am not comfortable with. I understand a transcript and/or summary of 
this interview will be given to me to check that I am comfortable with the 
information I provide.  
I understand that this interview will be analysed for the Masters research as 
outlined in the information sheet. I also consent to information from this interview 
being used in further publications and to inform future research.  
After the completing the interview, I understand I have until Friday 3 August 2012 to 
withdraw the information I have given, and that if this is the case, the interview will be 
digitally deleted.  
 
I agree to participate in this research. 
Signature: 
Preferred pseudonym (optional): 
Date: 
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Research findings 
If you would like to find out about the findings of my research, please tick below: 
⎕ I would like to receive a summary of findings  
⎕ I would like to be notified where I can access the full thesis online  
The best way to make contact about these findings is by:  
⎕ Email: _________________________________________________________________ 
⎕ Postal address: ________________________________________________________ 
Thank you for your participation in this research.  
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Appendix 2: Interview topic guides 
The following questions were used as a topic guide in interviews with 
environmentalists and council and government officers. While all of these topics 
were addressed during the interviews, given the nature of semi-structured 
interviews, questions changed and new themes emerged as the interviews 
progressed.  
 
Questions for environmentalists 
1. What is your role in _______(organisation)? Voluntary role or employed?  
2. How long have you been involved in this organisation, and in 
environmentalism in general? 
3. How did you find out about the proposed Escarpment Mine?  
How (and when) did the council/Department of Conservation/Bathurst 
Resources Ltd present the information to you about the proposals for the 
consents applied for? 
4. How long have you been involved in action against the Escarpment Mine 
proposal? 
I am going to ask you questions both about your involvement in formal consultation 
through the resource consent process, and your involvement in environmentalist 
actions, such as protest, petitions and publicity.  
5. How have you or your organisation participated in formal submission 
processes? Eg. submission on the resource consents in 2010, and appealing the 
resource consent in the Environment Court.  
6. What was involved for you personally in this submission process?  
7. So that’s about the formal process. - What other actions have you been involved 
in, as part of the protest against Escarpment Mine?   
8. How do you feel that these actions influenced the consequent decisions made 
about the mine?  
9. How would you compare the effects that you saw after both your activism and 
formal participation? 
Now some more general questions about the decision-making processes 
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10. What do you think about who was/is involved in the decision to grant the 
resource consents (at the council level) and the permits that may be given by 
the Department of Conservation? Eg, who the public voted for in the current 
government/council, who was on committees, the council/government officers 
involved, who participated in formal submission etc).  
11. Were you aware of other groups (residents/iwi/individuals/heritage) taking 
action outside of the formal submission process?  
12. What do you think of environmentalists’ influence compared to these other 
groups: in formal submissions, and through their actions outside of formal 
processes?  
13. Knowledges and power - Something I’m interested in is how different 
arguments carry different weight to those that make the decisions, and how the 
different perspectives sway the decisions to a different degree. What kinds of 
perspectives appeared to have the most power in the formal submission 
process and in other actions?  
Eg, knowledges/discourse/perspectives, Eg, technical information about the 
site, scientific information about climate change or conservation, feelings and 
emotional/spiritual connections with the area.  
Relationships and underlying difference, agonism, what kind of democracy 
framework 
14. Did you work with other types of groups (residents/iwi/heritage) to make your 
arguments?  
15. Does your organisation (or you) often submit or protest against similar issues? 
16. How would you describe your (or your group’s) relationship to the decision-
makers – the councils involved? To Buller Coal/Bathurst?  
Eg, are you known to decision makers? How has this relationship changed over 
time? 
17. Has your position changed at all on being opposed to Escarpment Mine? Under 
what circumstances would your position change? 
18. How did you communicate with Buller Coal/Bathurst or the council during the 
time leading up to the decisions made?  
19. What do you think a democratic-decision making process would ideally look 
like, especially when there is strong disagreement about a proposal?  
Can you give an example of a democratic process? 
157 
 
20. What do you think about consensus decision-making? Is it possible, and should 
it be a goal? 
21. Do you feel that your actions as an environmentalist contribute to the 
democratic-nature of a decision-making? How so?  
22. What do you think the role of environmentalism is in the broader sense of 
democracy? 
(What do you think of in democracy?) 
 
Questions for council officers 
1. What is your role in _______(organisation)? How long have you been in this role, 
or similar roles? 
2. How long have you been involved in the decision-making process for the 
Escarpment Mine proposal? 
I am going to ask you questions both about the formal submission processes through 
Resource Management Act, and your perceptions of environmentalist actions, such as 
protest, petitions and publicity.  
3. What was your role in the formal submission processes? At what stage did you 
become involved?  
4. When did you first come into contact with the public about this case, and what 
was the nature of this communication?  
5. Did you notice a presence of environmentalists in the formal submission 
process? How much influence did their involvement have in this formal 
process? 
6. So that’s about the formal process. - What other actions against Escarpment 
Mine, such as protest, petitions, and publicity, have you been aware of?  
7.  Do feel that these actions influenced the consequent decisions made about the 
mine? (Prompt – Under RMA, potentially excludes – Should this be the case?) 
8. How would you compare the influence of both the environmentalist action 
within and outside of the formal submission processes? 
Now some more general questions about the decision-making processes 
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9. What do you think about the amount of discussion and deliberation that the 
council had before making the decisions to grant a resource consent? 
10. What do you think about who was involved in that decision? (For example, 
through who the public voted for in the current government/council, who was 
on committees, the council/government officers involved, who participated in 
formal submission etc).   
11. Were you aware of other groups (residents/iwi/individuals/heritage) taking 
action outside of the formal submissions?  
12. What do you think of environmentalists’ influence compared to these other 
groups: in formal submissions, and through their actions outside of formal 
processes?  
13. Knowledges and power - Something I’m interested in is how different 
arguments carry different weight to those that make the decisions, and how the 
different perspectives sway the decisions to a different degree. What kinds of 
perspectives appeared to have the most power in the formal submissions 
process and in other actions?  
Eg, knowledges/discourse/perspectives, Eg, technical information about the 
site, scientific information about climate change or conservation, feelings and 
emotional/spiritual connections with the area.  
Relationships and underlying difference, agonism, what kind of democracy 
framework 
14. How would you describe your relationship to the environmentalists involved?  
Eg, are they known to you as regular submitters? How has this relationship 
changed over time? 
15. At any point, did you reach agreement with any of the environmentalists? If so, 
did this agreement change, and how?  
16. What do you think a democratic-decision making process would ideally look 
like, especially when there is strong disagreement about a proposal?  
17. What do you think about consensus decision-making? Is it possible, and should 
it be a goal? 
18. Who should be involved in the formal decision-making process? What is the 
best form of participation in such decisions and why? What practicalities are 
involved? 
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19. How do you feel that your actions as a council/government officer contribute to 
the democratic-nature of a decision-making?  
20. What do you think the role of environmentalism is in the broader sense of 
democracy? 
(What do you think of in democracy?) 
 
Questions for Commissioner 
1. How long have you been a councillor, and how frequently have you been 
commissioner? What is the process for choosing commissioners? 
2. How long were you involved in the decision-making process for the 
Escarpment Mine proposal? 
I am going to ask you questions about the formal consultation processes and the way 
that actions of “interest groups”/stakeholders/community might or might not 
influence decisions that are made by commissioners.  
3. What is the role of commissioners in the formal consultation or submission 
processes? 
 At what stage do you become involved?  
4. Do you come into contact with the public (in this case?), and what was the 
nature of this communication? How would you describe the nature of your 
relationship with the public (including those against a proposal or a decision 
that is made?) 
5. What does a commissioner do if they notice a presence of public protest against 
a proposal, both within the formal submission process or outside of this 
process? How much influence does either of these actions have on the decisions 
the commissioners make?  
6. How would you compare the influence of both the action within and outside of 
the formal submission processes, and the influence it has on any decision? 
7. What do you think about the range of people participating in decisions that are 
made?  
8. Who should be involved in the formal decision-making process? What is the 
best form of public participation in such decisions and why? What practicalities 
are involved? 
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9. What do you think a democratic-decision making process would ideally look 
like, especially when there is strong disagreement about a proposal?  
10. What do you think about consensus decision-making? Is it possible, and should 
it be a goal? 
11. How do you feel that your actions as a commissioner contribute to the 
democratic-nature of a decision-making?  
12. What do you think the role of environmentalism, activism or protest is in the 
broader sense of democracy? 
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